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This paper focuses on the development of a conceptual anti-ship cruise missile 
defense (CMD) model that integrates FORCEnet architecture components with the 
technical requirements of the Program Executive Office for Integrated Warfare System 
(PEO IWS) Open Architecture (OA) functional domain model.  FORCEnet is the enabler 
of the CNO’s vision of SEAPOWER 21 as the transformer of Navy and Marine Corps 
combat power projection.  
The current pedigree of anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) sold on the global 
market proliferates as a poor man’s air force by nations frequently hostile to the policies 
of the United States and its coalition partners.  They enable nations of economically 
modest means to exercise power in response to perceived coalition threats, further 
political or regional power agendas, or to promote theater-specific mayhem.  The cost of 
fielding these weapons is estimated to be orders of magnitude less than the cost of 
defending against them.  They are lethal to naval forces and are characterized by their 
high-speed intercept, extended standoff range, advanced seekers, incorporation of 
multiple reduced observable technologies, and feature maneuvering trajectories making 
them difficult to detect and counter.  The most recent witness to modern cruise missile 
capability was the coordinated attack of the Israeli Corvette Hanit in JUL2006 while 
patrolling 16 km off the coast of Lebanon.  Hanit was struck by Hezbollah shore batteries 
by the second of two missiles in a high/low attack.  The missiles consisted a pair of radar 
guided C-801/802 ASCM’s or one C-801/802 and one EO/IR guided C-701, both of 
Chinese design.  The first high missile sunk an Egyptian merchant vessel while the 
second sea skimming missile inflicted a mission kill leaving four dead and Hanit dead in 
the water.   
Research and analysis verified that OA provides the framework for the 
development of FORCEnet design concepts that enables implementation of a CMD 
Integrated Fire Control (IFC) and command structure.  PEO IWS, chair of the Open 
Architecture Enterprise Team (OAET), disseminates OA policies and standards 
iteratively and plans for its implementation in next generation surface and subsurface 
combatants.  Fusion of the FORCEnet information architecture and an OA functional 
 xiii 
domain model pose challenges and risks to be identified, managed, and mitigated.  To 
realize the potential of this new architecture, FORCEnet will need to be an operational 
construct supporting all U. S. Navy forces prior to implementation. 
The goal of the conceptual architecture is to fuse time-dependent tactical 
information from distributed sensor and platform nodes with minimal error and 
disseminate it in real-time to the decision-makers and Composite Warfare Commanders 
(CWC).  The power of OA rests with the ease in which technology refresh occurs and its 
promotion of force-wide joint interoperability on the same distributed network.  
According to the Israeli Navy and Ground Forces Command, a lack of force wide joint 
interoperability caused the Hanit mission kill.  FORCEnet, through OA, will expedite 
data flow enabled by common services and will reduce human interaction in the kill 
chain.  This paper placed special emphasis on joint forces interoperability and 
prevention-based Information Assurance (IA) to ensure the rapid and accurate flow of 
tactical data among forces, and to prevent the compromise of information resulting from 
a breach in network security.  IA must preserve the low reaction time needed to counter 
stressing threats and feature graceful degradation of the command function in the event of 
a network security breach.  
The proposed architecture was developed using the systems engineering process 
to define the requirements, functions, evaluate capability gaps, and assess the risk of 
alternatives consistent with the technical characteristics essential for FORCEnet.  A wide 
variety of models were subsequently built, discarded, evolved, and analyzed to verify that 
the proposed architecture met the OA domain model functionality.  The models were 
constructed relative to three tactical scenarios with emphasis placed on three IFC 
scenarios including Precision Cue, Launch on Remote, and Preferred Shooter 
Determination all in the context of the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) loop.  
IFC is fundamental to improved cruise missile defense and refers to platform-
independent sensor fusion and weapons pairing to overcome radar horizon or earth 
curvature effects that effectively constrain the battlespace volume.  Through automated 
IFC, weapons are not limited to local surveillance and fire control.  IFC capitalizes on 
networked sensors, reduces horizon and terrain limitations, and improves the layered 
defense against stressing CMD threats.  
 xiv 
Two fundamental differences between PEO IWS’s and the proposed architectures 
are that the proposed architecture contains a re-engagement loop after the first salvo is 
fired and it is horizontally integrated.  The re-engagement loop following the kill 
assessment hastens message flow while horizontal integration simplifies and minimizes 
the functional interfaces.  
To visualize the proposed architecture and its capabilities, strike group formations 
and CONOPS were developed to form the basis of the simulation needed to validate the 
proposed architecture.  Classical queuing theory formed the foundation of the simulation 
model defending against arriving CMD threats.  The model was based on a discrete-event 
quadruple serial queue; one arrival and three weapons assignment queues for each 
layered defense weapon.  While the simulation model was based on the discrete-event 
model, it was built in the process-view of Arena version 10.0 simulation software.  The 
kill chain functions were represented in the simulation in the context of the higher-level 
aggregation of the OODA loop.  Uncertainty was represented by statistical distributions 
of stressor threat inter-arrival and service times that provides predictive forecasting 
through statistical inference, which was absent from the conventional OODA loop. 
The measures of performance used in the simulation were the means of the 
following: the number of IA attacks; the number of electronic countermeasures softkills; 
the number of threat missiles killed by interceptor missiles; the number of 
reengagements; and the number of leakers.  The PEO IWS architecture simulation results 
were the control group in both the raid and the stream cases. 
The simulation revealed that there was no silver bullet and architecture changes 
alone will not solve the Navy’s ability to counter stressing CMD threats.  ASCM’s 
successfully perforated the defensive layers resulting in leakers in both attack scenarios.  
Nonetheless, the simulation revealed that the proposed architecture delivered a 
statistically significant performance improvement compared to PEO IWS’s OA 
functional domain model.  Thus, the authors conclude that the proposed architecture 
should include a re-engagement loop and retain the human in the decide function of the 
OODA loop.  In addition, the authors suggest re-grouping some functions within PEO 
IWS’s OA Warfare Domain model to achieve improved performance and capability.  
























Successful Cruise Missile Defense (CMD) for United States (US) Navy ships 
depends on early threat detection and subsequent engagements.  Prosecution of cruise 
missile threats requires real or near real-time target information.  FORCEnet has been 
identified as the construct that enables the communication of high fidelity data across the 
battlefield.  The ability to provide a commonality of services and easier integration of 
upgrades is accomplished by enforcing Open Architecture (OA) as a design principle in 
the development of systems, as well as during legacy system technical refreshes. 
The continuing development of FORCEnet will eventually lead to dependence on 
distributed weapons and sensor nodes.  Collectively, these systems will have access to 
greater resources, which will provide a choice of multiple, semi-automated engagement 
options with faster response times and earlier intercept times.  This report will examine 
six scenarios with particular emphasis on three current examples of geographically 
separate integrated fire control (IFC) capabilities and how they may be improved through 
the FORCEnet umbrella (Young, 2005).  
 
B. PROBLEM ASSESSMENT  
 
Fusion of the FORCEnet information architecture and an OA functional domain 
model poses specific challenges.  Some of these challenges are extracted from Chapter 5 
of FORCEnet Implementation Strategy (Committee on the FORCEnet Implementation 
Strategy, 2005): 
• The process and tools for translating FORCEnet operational concepts into 
products, services, and warfighiting capabilities have yet to be fully 
developed.   
• The number of unique interfaces that must be maintained need to be 
carefully selected and kept to an absolute minimum, or evolution will be 
hindered by expensive and lengthy integration and testing.  One way to do 
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this is to require that systems partition common functions in a 
standardized way. 
• There has been minimal effort in attempts to characterize how FORCEnet 
will function in terms of network management, data flow, traffic control, 
nodal performance, or data access.  This information is required to 
engineer the FORCEnet network management system (Committee on the 
FORCEnet Implementation Strategy, 2005). 
• Command and Control (C2) responsibilities as well as firing authority 
from remote will need to be addressed.  Remote fire procedures and 
practices will need to become part of the chain of command concept of 
operations (CONOPS).   
In addition to the above integration challenges between FORCEnet and OA, 
Information Assurance (IA) considerations must be implemented to prevent data 
compromise through security breaches.  Additional security designs will need to be 
implemented including unauthorized access detection and isolation of a compromised 
subsystem, re-distribution of workload after a system is down or compromised, and 
authentication of the message or data source. 
The purpose of this project, as stated in the Open Architecture as an Enabler for 
FORCEnet Statement of Work (SOW, Appendix A), is to address the above challenges.  
The focus of this report is on the development of a conceptual architecture model that 
integrates FORCEnet architecture components with the technical requirements of PEO 
IWS 7’s OA functional architecture shown in Figure 1.  Furthermore, the conceptual 
model is evaluated against the model in Figure 1 to analyze and determine its validity.  
This analysis serves as the basis for providing recommendations for improvement to PEO 
IWS 7 with regard to its OA functional domain model.   
Current system and legacy deficiencies will be identified as well as constraints 
inherent in the operational environment in order to characterize, understand, and bound 
the problem space.  Relevant operational imperatives are translated into system 
engineering structures such as concepts, functions, requirements, and solutions necessary 
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Figure 1.   PEO IWS 7 functional architecture (The Critical Network Centric Warfare 
Enabler, Rushton, 2004). 
This architecture is expected to simplify FORCEnet implementation. 
 
IFC capabilities are then introduced during the development of principles for the 
design and architecting of OA and FORCEnet.  Design principles will consider known 
limitations and constraints of the operational environment such as communication 
challenges and operator interaction.  Communication challenges include unreliability, ad 
hoc mobile networks, and limited bandwidth.  The development of a vision, architecture, 
and conceptual framework that addresses the problem space is based on the design 
principles for a distributed system.  Automated decision aids will be used to manage 
warfare resources for collaborative operations.  
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Next functional representations and system models are developed to express 
automated resource collaboration concepts and solutions.  The final step includes the 
analysis of the following key capabilities: 
• Data fusion techniques and algorithms 
• Resource management scheduling and optimization methods 
• Weapon and sensor management 
• Engagement functionality, initialization, and control 
• Situation prediction and war game scenarios 
• Tactical planning and battle management 
• Opportunities for application of fuzzy logic and neural networks 
• Allocation of tasking to people or software 
• Information assurance against cyber attacks and for data integrity 
Further, this report concentrates on CMD with emphasis on the following three 
IFC scenarios (Young, 2005): 
• Precision Cue – an indication of a possible threat is received from a 
remote source. 
• Launch on Remote – remote sensor data is used to initiate missile launch 
without holding a local track. 
• Preferred Shooter Determination – the optimum weapon from a group of 
warfare units is selected to intercept a threat. 
 
C. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The following general assumptions were documented as part of the scoping and 
bounding of the project:   
• Threat environments are in both blue water and littoral areas. 
• Threats are Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM) that can be launched from 
air, sea, and land. 
• Bandwidth and communications pipelines can support real-time data 
transfer and sensor reporting. 
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• ASCM raids of 10 maximum per scenario. 
• Ao of 98% of the  ASCMD system.  
• Participating units automatically become part of the theater defense 
network through a standard credential verification and validation process. 
• CMD provided for US Navy assets only. 
• System costs are outside the scope of this effort. 
• Only US Navy sensors and weapons.  
• No open source data for the performance of the PEO IWS architecture was 
available; therefore, the authors simulated and documented the simulation.  
This data was held constant except where noted in the simulation of the 




An ASCMD simulation model was developed to test both PEO IWS 7’s current 
architecture and the authors’ proposed architecture.  The simulation model is the 
compilation of the diagrams developed and analysis performed in the Design and 
Analysis section.  The results show that the proposed architecture performed significantly 
better than the current architecture in the following: mean number of re-engagements, 
mean Electronic Warfare (EW) success and IA kills, mean interceptor kills, and mean 
leakers allowed.  These improvements are attributed to the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act 
(OODA) loop that was added to the simulation model.  Results and conclusions are 
discussed in the Findings and Recommendations section.  
 
E. REPORT ORGANIZATION 
 
This report is organized into five main sections: Introduction, Literature Review, 
Technical Approach, Design and Analysis, and Findings and Recommendations.  The 
Introduction section provides the background for the project and assesses the problem to 
be analyzed.  The goal of the project is to create a conceptual architecture that combines 
FORCEnet with OA for CMD.  The Literature Review section covers the current state of 
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FORCEnet, OA, IFC, and CMD efforts.  The research in this section provides a 
foundation for the Technical Approach. 
In the Technical Approach section, the System Engineering Design Process used 
throughout the project is discussed, stakeholders are identified, and the problem space is 
characterized.  The Design and Analysis section covers the analysis of capabilities key to 
the ASCMD concept, compares the current and proposed high-level architecture concepts, 
defines the battlespace through CMD and tactical scenarios, provides a detailed 
functional design analysis of the proposed architecture, and closes with a simulation 
model that encompasses all analyses herein.  This section breaks the analysis effort from 
the highest-level to the lowest, most detailed level.  The Findings and Recommendations 
section provides conclusions from the simulation model, a final overview of the proposed 





II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The team conducted research on the concepts of Open Architecture, FORCEnet, 
Integrated Fire Control, and Cruise Missile Defense.  The purpose of the research is to 
define each concept, determine existing capability gaps and risks inherent within each 
concept, and investigate what work has been done to date for each.  This section 
documents the research information found for the concepts above, and leads the reader 
into the Technical Approach section. 
 
A. OPEN ARCHITECTURE 
 
Definitions for OA vary depending on the person’s point of view and 
organizational philosophy.  These definitions vary in scope and content but all have the 
same general idea of the OA concept.  To better understand what OA is, the following 
key components of OA are defined to establish a common lexicon:  
• Architecture.  Architecture is the fundamental organization of a system, 
embodied in its components, their relationships to each other and the 
environment, and the principles governing its design and evolution.  
(American National Standards Institute (ANSI) / Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE), 2000).  More simply put, architecture is the 
human organization of empty space using physical materials. 
• Open Systems.  Open systems are systems that employ modular design, 
use widely supported and consensus-based standards for key interfaces, 
and have been subjected to successful validation and verification tests to 
ensure the openness of key interfaces (Open Systems Joint Task Force, 
2006).   
The Open Systems Joint Task Force (OSJTF) states that an open system is 
characterized by: 
• Well-defined, widely used, preferably non-proprietary interfaces and 
protocols. 
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• Use of standards, which are developed and adopted by recognized 
standards bodies or the commercial market place. 
• Definition of all aspects of system interfaces to facilitate new or additional 
systems capabilities for a wide range of applications. 
• Explicit provision for expansion or upgrading through the incorporation of 
additional or higher performance elements with minimal impact on the 
system. 
Next, three definitions of OA are collectively examined with the final goal of 
resolving these characteristics into one common definition.  First, OA is an enterprise-
wide, multifaceted business and technical strategy for acquiring and maintaining national 
security systems as interoperable systems that adopt and exploit open systems design 
principles and architectures (Mullen, 2005). 
The second definition is provided by the Program Executive Office for Integrated 
Warfare System (PEO IWS): “OA is an architecture that employs common standards, 
across government and private industry, for key interfaces within a system.”  (Naval 
Surface Warfare Center Division, 2004).  OA is the high-level technical structure that is 
designed in accordance with the principles of open systems to achieve mission 
requirements, functional commonality, and life-cycle supportability goals.  Open systems 
attributes include use of public, consensus-based standards; adoption of standard 
interfaces and services; use of product types supported by multiple vendors; selection of 
sTable vendors with a broad customer base and large market share; interoperability with 
minimal integration; ease of scalability and upgradeability; and portability of applications 
and users (Strei, 2003). 
The third definition, as defined by the Navy Open Architecture Enterprise Team 
(OAET), states that OA is a multi-faceted strategy providing a framework for developing 
joint, interoperable systems that adapt and exploit open systems design principles and 
architectures.  This framework includes a set of principles, processes, and best practices 
that provide more opportunities for competition; optimize total system performance; are 
easily developed and upgraded; minimize total ownership costs; rapidly field affordable, 
interoperable systems; employ non-proprietary standards for internal interfaces; and 
enable component reuse (Shannon, 2006). 
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What the above OA definitions have in common is that all of them emphasize the 
open systems approach, the establishment of standards and design principles, and the 
implementation of technical architectures.  A concern with the three definitions is that the 
implementation of OA is currently limited to key interfaces within a system.  A legacy 
combat system cannot be reasonably expected to be fully compliant with open systems 
concepts, but it can benefit greatly by applying some of the key attributes of open 
systems especially when interfacing with other systems.  Technology refresh is an 
example of leveraging OA into legacy systems.  The establishment and adherence to 
internationally established standards is one of the key attributes of open systems.  These 
standards evolve with time; new standards can also be introduced by a disruptive 
technology.  A disruptive technology is a technology innovation, product, or service that 
eventually overturns the existing dominant technology or product in the market. 
Standards-based architectures lessen the degree of control that the Department of 
Defense (DoD) can expect to exert.  Hence, changes, fixes, and updates are under the 
vendor’s control rather than the associated program office.  This has a significant impact 
on system lifecycle support performance.  The Chief of Naval Operations has cited five 
principles of OA that must be followed in order to reap its advantages (Mullen, 2006):   
• Modular design and disclosure.   
• Reusable application software.   
• Interoperable joint warfighting applications and secure information 
exchange.   
• Life cycle affordability.   
• Encouraging competition and collaboration through development of 
alternative solutions and sources.   
The result of our collection of these definitions is the subsequent resolution into a 
single common definition: “Open architecture is a technical architecture that employs 
open specifications and international standards across government and private industry 
for key interfaces within a system.  Furthermore, OA is implemented in accordance with 
the principles of DoD Directive (DoDD) 5000.1 Modular Open Systems Approach 
(MOSA) to achieve mission requirements, functional commonality across a wide range of 
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systems with minimal change requirements and accomplishment of life-cycle 
supportability goals.” 
PEO IWS  7 continues to refine open architecture policies and standards, as well 
as planning and implementation of OA into the surface and subsurface fleet.  Figure 2 
illustrates PEO IWS 7 Engineering Development Model (EDM), which runs on the OA 
Computing Environment and contains selected communication and specialized war 
fighting services and applications.  
 
Figure 2.   The visual high-level model of Total Open Systems Architecture (Open 
lustrates the nodal open systems architecture and the 
 
 
Architecture in Naval Combat System Computing of the 21st Century, 
Strei, 2004).   
The model il
relationships between the commercial computer industry and the defense 




The Secretary of the Navy has set forth the Navy’s guiding vision in a document 
entitled SEAPOWER 21 (England, Clark, Jones, 2007).  This doctrine is comprised of 
three operational concepts: Sea Strike, Sea Shield, and Sea Basing.  FORCEnet is the 
enabler of the naval transformation process, transforming the Navy and Marines into a 
combat organization that is effective against the future complex threats to the United 
States and coalition forces. 
In addition, a fundamental shift has begun to occur in development of shipboard 
combat systems, transitioning from stove-piped designed systems into systems that 
interact seamlessly.  The evolving Global Information Grid (GIG) is an overarching, 
interconnected system designed to collect, process, store, disseminate, and manage 
information.  FORCEnet is the Navy’s contribution to the GIG with complementary 
inputs from the Army and the Air Force with expected operational capability by 2020. 
FORCEnet is the operational construct and architectural framework for naval 
warfare in the information age, integrating warriors, sensors, Command and Control, 
platforms and weapons into a networked distributed combat force (Naval Network 
Warfare Command, 2007).  This definition provides the guidance for architecting 
FORCEnet.  FORCEnet is essential due to shortened response times associated with more 
complex weapon engagements throughout the battlespace. 
FORCEnet relies on two assumptions.  The first assumption is that information 
technology will improve the data source availability, connectivity, and bandwidth.  The 
second assumption is that the non-Navy elements of the GIG will be developed in parallel 
to provide the information and services necessary to provide coverage for existing gaps in 
the Navy domain. 
In addition to the merits of FORCEnet, a number of risks inherent to the concept 
have been identified.  First, there is a vulnerability to hostile information attack or 
exploitation.  In addition, reliance on the use of information technologies may make the 
Command and Control less able to deal with natural disasters amid the possibility of 
degradation.  The architecture is based on currently available technologies; however, the 
bandwidth capabilities may not keep pace with the ever-increasing amounts of 
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information.  Finally, the future processor capabilities within FORCEnet will reduce but 
not eliminate the decision-making load on the warfighter.  These risks, as well as other 
risks, will need to be managed to prevent the collapse of this concept.   
The following list identifies required capabilities for an effective integrated 
FORCEnet and OA structure.  Some of these capabilities will need to be resident within 
the FORCEnet structure while others will be resident within other organizations: 
• Robust, reliable communication to all nodes, based on the varying 
information requirements and capabilities of those nodes. 
• Reliable, accurate, and timely location, identity, and status information on 
all friendly forces, units, activities, and entities/individuals. 
• Reliable, accurate, and timely location, identification, tracking, and 
engagement information on environmental, neutral, and hostile elements, 
activities, events, sites, platforms, and individuals. 
• Store, catalogue, and retrieve all information produced by any node on the 
network in a comprehensive, standard repository so that the information is 
readily accessible to all nodes and compatible with the forms required by 
any nodes, within security restrictions. 
• Process, sort, analyze, evaluate, and synthesize large amounts of disparate 
information while still providing direct access to raw data as required. 
• To depict situational information for each decision-maker in a tailored, 
user-defined, shareable, primarily visual representation. 
• Distributed groups of decision makers to cooperate in the performance of 
common Command and Control activities by means of a collaborative 
work environment. 
• Automation of certain lower-order Command and Control sub-processes 
and to use intelligent agents and automated decision aids to assist people 
in performing higher-order sub-processes, such as gaining situational 
awareness and devising concepts of operations. 
• Information assurance. 
• Functionality in multiple security domains and multiple security levels 
within a domain, and to manage access dynamically. 
 12 
• Interoperability with Command and Control systems of very different type 
and level of sophistication. 
• Functionality of individual nodes while temporarily disconnected from the 
network. 
• Quick implementation of good decisions under conditions of uncertainty, 
friction, time pressure, and other stresses.   
 
C. INTEGRATED FIRE CONTROL   
 
Within the DoD, the US joint vision is “to build the most effective force for 2020, 
we must be fully joint: intellectually, operationally, organizationally, doctrinally and 
technically” (Young, 2005).  IFC and CMD are inextricably linked and inherently joint.  
Their objective is to detach service-unique and platform-specific fire control radars from 
the weapon for Over-the-Horizon (OTH) CMD engagements.  Integrated Fire Control 
(IFC) is the capability to engage targets by providing fire control solutions with real-time 
information from one or more non-organic sensors.  The literature search revealed that 
IFC is a single component of the 2010 Theater Air Missile Defense (TAMD) operational 
concept.  The TAMD central theme is that an overhaul of current Command and Control 
infrastructure and composition is needed to conduct warfare in geographically diverse 
areas.  Historically, the German Air Force was the first user of IFC.  The German Air 
Force and its Command and Control structure first used IFC during raids on London 
during World War II (WWII).  Currently, Command and Control is isolated, with respect 
to the Area of Operation (AOR), not unlike the way engagements were conducted during 
WWII.  
IFC is the central enabler of joint warfighting capabilities and pillars that include 
the Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP), Combat Identification, and Automated Battle 
Management Aids (ABMA).  In this context, the pillars coalesce to increase joint power 
projection through IFC and enforced interoperability.  Through the achievement of IFC, 
weapons are not limited to local surveillance and fire control.  IFC capitalizes on 
networked sensors, reduces horizon and terrain limitations, and improves the layered 
defense against stressing targets.  
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From an operational perspective, several IFC capabilities are identified (Young, 
2005): Precision Cue (PC), Launch on Remote (LOR), Engage on Remote (EOR), 
Forward Pass (FP), Remote Fire (RF), and Preferred Shooter Determination (PSD).  
These scenarios leverage the distributed assets to achieve collaborative and automated 
engagements.   
The Defense Science Board as early as 1994 studied CMD and determined that 
our adversaries can quickly and economically acquire Land Attack Cruise Missiles from 
several sources on the global weapons market and engage them against targets in the US 
or its allies.  The findings of the Defense Science Board were accepted, which led to the 
establishment of the Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organization (JTAMDO) in 
1997 (Defense Science Board, 2007).  JTAMDO coordinated the efforts of the 
Commanders in Chief’s (Combatant Commanders) and resulted in the operational 
architecture of the TAMD capability.  With the TAMD established, the leadership and 
processes were in place such that the IFC capability could be jointly developed, evolved, 
and deployed among and across the services. 
 
D. CRUISE MISSILE DEFENSE 
 
1. Cruise Missile Defense Gaps 
 
The advancements in missile guidance, stealth, and propulsion technologies have 
made cruise missile capability available worldwide and a prominent threat to naval 
forces.  Cruise missiles are affordable and relatively inexpensive; they are known as the 
“Poor Man’s Air Force,” (Feickert, 2005).    
Several capability gaps currently exist in US naval combat systems that preclude 
effective CMD prosecution.  Current US naval weapon systems lack full interoperability 
across multiple platforms and full integration of detection, control, and engagement 
processes against single or multiple incoming enemy targets.  Cruise missiles can avoid 
radar detection by flying at wave top altitudes, thus making detection difficult.  Stealth 
technologies minimize cruise missile radar signatures, making the weapon systems 
detect, identify, track, and engage process a very challenging endeavor.   
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When a cruise missile is first detected, the reaction time, or radar detection to 
missile launch time of the weapon system, is very small.  For example, a shipboard radar 
located 50 feet above sea level will detect a 50-foot altitude inbound subsonic cruise 
missile at 17 nautical miles from its own sensor.  The radar horizon formula shows that 
the ship will have 90 to 100 seconds to react and engage a subsonic cruise missile.  
Reaction time gets even shorter when encountering supersonic cruise missiles.  The Navy 
has made some improvements in the self-defense capability for surface ships against 
cruise missiles; however, gaining additional reaction time is the most difficult challenge 
that the Navy currently faces in order to defend against future cruise missile threats 
(General Accounting Office, 2000).     
Another capability gap involves the separation of weapon engagement zones by 
theater commanders.  This separation implies isolation of weapon systems where sensors 
working independently of each other reduce detection capabilities.  A concept called 
Joint Engagement Zone (JEZ) is currently in development by DoD for theater war 
fighting.  JEZ provides a SIAP to identify threats and an IFC system for offensive and 
defensive operations among all military services’ sensors and weapons.  The SIAP and 
IFC system are key enablers to effective and efficient CMD. 
 
2. Cruise Missile Defense Defined as a Strike Group Problem 
 
Most Navy ships have limited capabilities against CMD.  Anti-ship Cruise 
Missiles (ASCM) are developed in large numbers with the latest in guidance and stealth 
technologies.  Current ASCM’s have incorporated advanced target seekers and fly at low 
altitudes.  Additionally, these ASCM’s are faster and may arrive in multiple raids due to 
their lower purchase price.  These capabilities create significant detection and defensive 
challenges.   
Addressing ASCM defense requires incorporation of the latest technology and full 
adherence to MOSA.  In addition, existing capabilities have been limited to platform-
specific defense assets without taking into account the collaborative capability of sensors 
and weapons within the Carrier Strike Group (CSG).  The current CSG / Expeditionary 
Strike Group (ESG) watch configuration is separated between tactical operations and 
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intelligence data due to information classification and originating sources.  
Communications between operations and intelligence watch standers occur via computer 
chat, email, or through voice reports.  This type of communication adds more reaction 
time to the kill chain. 
 
3. Threat Assessment 
 
The 2005 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress in Cruise 
Missile Defense (Feickert, 2005) indicates that the majority of cruise missiles are short 
range ASCM’s.  According to the CRS report, there are about 130 different types of 
cruise missiles in existence today and over 90 countries have the capability to produce the 
anti-ship version.  ASCM’s can be launched from air, land-based, and sea-based 
platforms.  Many experts predict that cruise missile proliferation will increase in capacity 
and level of technological sophistication (Feickert, 2005).  Detection of low observable 
ASCM’s and reaction time continue to be areas of concern.  The latest radars to be 
installed on future surface combatants will still lag technically behind next generation 
cruise missiles (Feickert, 2005). 
Surface combatants have greater reaction time against ASCM’s launched from 
land than those launched from undersea.  The land-launched ASCM threat response time 
decreases with proximity to shore.  For multiple raids, the current Command and Control 
system, Ship Self Defense System (SSDS), is not sufficient.  The SSDS will require fire 
control quality data to react against the threat using shipboard weapon systems (Naval 
Network Warfare Command, 2007). 
The next section uses the research above presented to establish the functional 
need and stakeholder requirements.  The problem space characterization is explained in 
terms of deficiencies, constraints, and assumptions. 
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III. TECHNICAL APPROACH 
 
A. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING DESIGN PROCESS 
 
Figure 3 represents the iterative Systems Engineering Design Process (SEDP) that 
is followed through this report’s entirety.  This report only focuses on two phases of the 
SEDP: Problem Definition and Design and Analysis.  The Problem Definition defines 
this project’s stakeholders’ needs and turns them into a functional need and requirements.  
The Design and Analysis phase decomposes the functional need and requirements into a 
functional design analysis of the proposed architecture that ranges from a high-level 
Value System Design to detailed use cases and flow diagrams.  The Design and Analysis 
phase culminates with Modeling and Simulation of the functional design to determine its 
validity.   
The authors use this design methodology to complete the requirements definition, 
requirements analysis, functional analysis, modeling and simulation, and a value system 
design in the development of the conceptual model.  These activities will create a path for 
comparison between the authors’ conceptual architecture and PEO IWS 7's architecture.  
Since this report only focuses on a conceptual architecture and not a physical one, no 
alternatives are considered.  Decision-making of alternatives and implementation of the 




 Figure 3.   Systems Engineering Design Process.   





The primary stakeholders for this project are John Michael Green of the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), and the Program Executive Office (PEO) for Naval Open 
Architecture (PEO IWS 7).  The secondary stakeholder is Mr. Adam Simonoff of the 
Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) in Dahlgren, VA.  Mr. Simonoff is a member of 
the Ship Self Defense System (SSDS) Systems Engineering Team, which supports the 
Navy Review Team for Open Architecture Combat system design (Simonoff, 2005).  Mr. 





The ultimate customer of the conceptual architecture model herein is the US Navy 
and its battleforce commanders.  The expectation is that this conceptual architecture will 
lay the foundation for a workable physical architecture.  This architecture will improve 
warfare resource management, effective decision-making, ship self-defense, and mission 
execution. 
 
2. Functional Need 
 
The current Navy operations environment lacks network centricity.  As of today, 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), Command and Control, and 
combat systems operate in a stovepiped manner.  As explained by Commander Pat Roche 
of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command, each of these areas receives their 
data through individual communication networks that do not talk to each other (Roche, 
2005).  For example, ISR data comes from a common data link into an independent 
server that is directly accessed by users.  The ISR data does not automatically correlate 
with Command and Control and combat systems servers, which may contain additional 
tracking information.  
The functional need is to integrate ISR, Command and Control, and combat 
systems via networks to create a common operating picture.  An integrated FORCEnet 
and OA model can provide the complete information needed for effective naval 
operations.  The vision is that ISR, Command and Control, and combat systems servers 
would reside in a distributed services network that receives simultaneous data via GIG 
and other tactical data links such as Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS), Joint Tactical 
Terminal (JTT), Global Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M), Link 16, 
and others.  The distributed services network would in turn enable users to access data 
across ISR, Command and Control, and combat systems areas.  Identified enablers for the 
distributed services network are Extensible Markup Language, Internet Protocol version 
6 (IPv-6), and distributed security. 
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3. General Characteristics of the FORCEnet Architecture 
 
Chapter 5 of the book FORCEnet Implementation Strategy addresses six technical 
characteristics that are considered essential to achieving FORCEnet (Committee on the 
FORCEnet Implementation Strategy, 2005).  Those characteristics are guaranteed end-to-
end quality of service, bandwidth, information assurance, availability, redundancy and 
graceful degradation, an architecture that supports incremental deployment, and 
interoperability. 
End-to-end quality of service refers to the capability of network warfighting 
nodes to deliver services needed by specific network traffic from end-to-end (Cisco, 
2007).  Bandwidth availability and expansion are required to process large amounts of 
data in a very short period.  Information assurance is needed to reinforce the FORCEnet 
architecture against emerging threats such as cyber attacks.  Availability, redundancy, 
and graceful degradation of network assets must be increased, monitored, and managed to 
allow for fast replacement in case of failures.  An architecture that supports an 
incremental deployment allows new capabilities to be implemented with minimal impact 
to the combat system.  Finally, the FORCEnet concept must employ common elements, 
standards, and protocols across its architecture to ensure interoperability.   
 
4. Stakeholder Requirements 
 
The stakeholders for this project tasked the team with developing a conceptual 
FORCEnet architecture that addresses interoperability and information assurance 
capabilities.  The conceptual architecture must comply with the technical requirements 
outlined in PEO IWS’s OA functional architecture, which are identified in Figure 1.  The 
stakeholders also tasked the team with evaluating the validity of the OA architecture in 
Figure 1 via Excel and Arena simulations, and to compare it to the conceptual 
architecture.  The design principles used in developing the model must take into 
consideration known limitations and constraints of the operational environment and be 
based on automated decision aids.   
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C. PROBLEM SPACE CHARACTERIZATION 
 
FORCEnet encompasses all Navy command, control, and information-sharing 
functions necessary to ensure accurate, rapid, and secure transfer of information via the 
supporting warfighting capabilities listed in Chapter II of this report.  Information is 
dispersed to the forces throughout the battlespace via the FORCEnet information 
network.  Current capability gaps include a lack of common configuration and Fire 
Control Quality (FCQ) connectivity among platforms that is needed to achieve and 
maintain a robust cruise missile defense.  FCQ is defined as data obtained with the 
sufficient accuracy and refresh rate to support engagement actions such as launch 
decision, guidance calculations, and engagement control that may involve sensor tasking 
or managing the data path (Young, 2005).  While FORCEnet is commonly thought of 
purely in terms of added warfighting capabilities, FORCEnet supports enterprise-wide 
computing needs necessary for force planning, coordination, and theater-wide 
sustainment or warfighter operation and support.  Table 1 provides a summary list of 




Form, fit and function Situational Awareness 
Subsonic Threat Force Planning/Coordination/Management 
Maneuvering Threat Data Latency 
Fleet Deployment Tactics (Operational Area 
under consideration) 
CONOPS (over- the-horizon) 
Multiple Threat Environment Lack of Sensor fusion 
Counter-Countermeasures Lack of Common Track Management 
Seamless communications Bandwidth 
Unique function/platform Share resources (chain of command issues) 
Schedule/Time Interoperability (or lack thereof) wrt 
/US/Allied/Other 
Rules of Engagement INTEL instead of ISR GIG  
Sustainment- Joint training, as a constraint, 
couples with joint interoperability as a 
deficiency. 
Communications gridlock 
Cost Training for Information Services 
Current weapons and sensors Information Assurance 
Manpower The OA warfare domain model features 
multiple independent entities.  
 Lack of common message format 
 Target track refresh rate 
  
Table 1.   Constraints and Deficiencies Summary.   
This Table supports the discussion of deficiencies, capability gaps, 




Deficiencies exist in how the architecture influences the behavior of the weapon 
system.  A thorough understanding of the behavior is required to construct the 
architecture so that accurate representations of a cruise missile defense system can be 
modeled and simulated.  A desired by-product of improved knowledge of system 
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behavior is that it may enable a more complete understanding of efficiencies and 
inefficiencies to improve the man-machine interfaces and to drive down the shipboard 
manpower required in an environment where resources are always constrained.  This 
aspect of the system is especially crucial during cruise missile defense when all the 
weapon systems critical to the defense of the surface combatant are fully manned. 
Currently, there is limited understanding of the combat system posture necessary 
for complete cyber attack defense.  Some of the challenges are posed as part of IA and 
FORCEnet’s capability to detect packets, perform passive detection of a compromised 
subsystem, isolation upon attack detection, redistribution of information to prevent 
balking upon restoration after the compromise is excised, and non-repudiation guarantee 
through multiple information assurance methods that include personal knowledge such as 
username and personal identification number, smart cards, biometric markers, or a 
combination of technologies (Schekkerman, 2005).   
Dependence on web-based architectures increases the risk of cyber attacks 
because it is a vulnerability that is cost-effectively exploited through the patience and 
persistence of our adversaries.  Thus, an ironclad IA policy and implementation is 
essential to effective Command and Control.  Implementation of cyber attack prevention 
instead of the current process of attack detection will move our cyber enemies further 
outside of our rings of defense.  The multi-layered defense is discussed in detail 
throughout this report. 
The OA warfare domain model features multiple entities acting independently.  
The architecture requires greater interaction among model elements so that there is real-
time correlation among intelligence collectors and distributed users.  The currently 
deployed web-enabled command, control, and ISR tools must deliver sufficiently 
accurate and timely situational awareness as a part of FORCEnet’s capability. 
The Boyd Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop for C2 response is defined 
as an information strategy concept for information warfare developed by Colonel John 
Boyd (Luessen, 2003).  The OODA loop does not enable rapid decision cycling, which 
increases battle force vulnerability and reduces survivability.  The current C2 system 
response is unsTable which means that, from classical queuing theory, the mean service 
time is greater than the arrival rates of high raid intensity, the C2 decision system simply 
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will not “keep up” with the “arrivals.”  Luessens’s concept of the OODA loop is missing 
the critical element of prediction based on distribution functions of uncertain input 
parameters.  To reflect uncertainty in the C2 response, the OODA loop needs a prediction 
function inserted into a revised Observe-Orient-Predict-Decide-Act (OOPDA) loop.  In 
turn, the prediction element is a key function missing from current modeling and 
simulation efforts, which negatively impacts the task force commander’s situational 
awareness and his ability to effectively plan and coordinate combat forces during cruise 
missile defense.  Where accurate data is available or synthesized, prediction functions 
should increase the accuracy when modeling system behavior through simulation. 
Communications gridlock, or data latency, which refers to the inefficient “flow” 
of data among entities such as organic and distributed sensors, weapons, ordnance, and 
delivery platforms, is prevalent within current Areas of Operation (AOR).  In event graph 
conceptual model lexicon, these entities are collectively called nodes that are strung 
together by suboptimal placement of “arcs” or connections.  Other inefficiencies that 
contribute to communications gridlock include different message formats, low target 
track refresh rates, shared C2 resources, and insufficient common track management that 
limits seamless interoperability among platforms and joint forces.  These factors 
additively compromise ship self-defense by limiting the ability to integrate 




Constraints are inherent limitations in resources, technologies, or other limitations 
that prevent implementation of reasonable and instantaneous solutions.  Assumptions 
enabled the authors to take a snapshot of dynamic events and thereby change the problem 
from a continuous dynamic state into a series of discrete events.  Constraints and 
assumptions co-exist, through measured interactions, forming the balance necessary to 
make fundamental design implementation, tactical decision optimization, and 
improvement through models of the highest degree of fidelity.  
The existing inventory of weapons and sensors is a constraint; no additional 
weapons or sensors will be added to the inventory nor will any be reduced or eliminated.  
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Current sensor cueing and data fusing methods remain in effect.  The weapons and 
sensors, in their current block configuration, establish the physical form, fit, and function 
but not the architecture to counter cruise missile threats, regardless of their speed, 
kinematic capability, raid size, or countermeasures employed.  In addition, some of the 
more advanced cruise missiles have a passive radar capability that allows them to detect 
and lock to an active jamming countermeasure, making it resistant to electronic 
countermeasures employed by a defending platform (Defense Threat Information Group, 
2005).   
Certain platforms would have unique capabilities or functions that other platforms 
in the task force may not have.  The lack of seamless communications among the 
multiple interfaces that compose these capabilities poses a constraint.   
 Rules of Engagement (ROE) are a constraint because the existing CONOPS, 
specific to the weapon, countermeasure, or AOR, remain in effect.  The task force 
commander must make rapid and accurate decisions relative to positive target 
identification, availability of weapon/platform assets, and collateral damage estimates.  
Multiple threat environments encompassed by sea, air and land-launched cruise missiles, 
along with proliferation of these technologies throughout the world, makes it more 
challenging for the task force commander.  
Inbound ASCM warning makes time a constraint.  Warning time with regard to 
cruise missile defense is very limited, and depends on the range of detection with an 
average time of 2 to 2.5 minutes for a subsonic threat, and approximately 20 to 30 
seconds for a supersonic threat.  Complexity is added to the equation of a maneuvering 
threat by means of unpredicTable flight paths. 
Bandwidth is a constraint but not the focus of this report.  Similarly, processing 
speed and capacity are expected to be continuing constraints as they are limited 
resources. 
Finally, offensive capabilities can be obtained at a much lower cost than defensive 
capabilities, according to a Congressional Research Service Report for Congress 
(Hichkad 2005). 




In the context of a combat system, IFC requires that ordnance be considered in the 
same reference frame for all fused organic and distributed sensors, weapons, targets, and 
delivery platforms regardless of the environment or geography.  In other words, active 
use of a common reference frame reduces the probability that the force commander 
makes imperfect or imprecise decisions based on an unsymmetrical or myopic view of 
the battlespace.  
It is predicted that the global commercial market will continue to drive 
information technologies into the distant future.  These technologies include interactive 
products and services that include operating systems and applications directly catering to 
the communication, information sharing, financial, consumer, and entertainment sectors.  
The commercial market has embraced the Open Architecture Computing Environment 
(OACE), but it is expected that mere compliance with OACE specifications alone will 
not make FORCEnet truly open.  
FORCEnet enablers are technology-centric and dependent.  Because of high 
reliability and built-in redundancy, future systems can reduce or eliminate single point of 
failure scenarios.  Such high reliance poses significant C2 and warfighting risk.  For 
instance, theater communications are highly variable, communication in the available 
frequencies vary continuously, and unpredictably, due largely to environmental 
conditions over which there is no control.  This is a separate issue from frequency 
spectrum availability and management.  Similarly, modeling of the environment with 
respect to FORCEnet functionality, while worthy of study, is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  In the near term, it is expected that the Navy will trail the commercial sector in 
OA applications for a variety of reasons including organizational inertia, legacy operating 
systems, and applications. 
Improved sensors, sensor fusing, and integration of ISR data will increase data 
flux.  Adapted from chemical instrumental analysis, data chromatography is the process 
of separating small amounts of usable information from large and mostly trivial amounts 
of data.  Increased data flux increases the burden on C2 due to greater decision cycle 
times.  While improved sensors or fusing capabilities adds information, it also adds 
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uncertainty, which must be estimated and represented in the decision-making process.  
Disregarding uncertainty due to data overload, erroneous estimation, interpretation, or 
application of uncertainty will lead to combination of incorrect, imprecise, or slow 
decisions that may result in materiel losses.  Uncertainty and the measurement, 
application, and response to it are essential to effective situational awareness (SA). 
The functional need and problem space characterization lay the foundation for the 
next section.  The efforts throughout the Design and Analysis take the functional need 
and expand it into workable systems engineering diagrams that will lead into the 
ASCMD simulation model.  The deficiencies and constraints found in the problem space 
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IV. DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 
 
In this section, the current PEO IWS 7 OA functional architecture is compared 
with a proposed architecture model developed by the team.  The proposed architecture is 
first described at the highest level, with detailed decomposition occurring along the way 
until the lowest level is reached.  This section is divided into six analyses in the following 
order: key capabilities, comparison between current and proposed OA functional 
architectures, battlespace definition, design principles, conceptual design, functional 
design, and the proposed ASCMD simulation model. 
 
A. KEY CAPABILITIES 
 
The key capabilities in this section, identified on page 8 of the Introduction, are 
the major considerations the team will analyze to develop the proposed ASCMD 
functional architecture.  The following capabilities are analyzed immediately below: 
situation prediction and wargaming, tactical planning and battle management, 
opportunities for application of fuzzy logic and neural networks, information assurance, 
and allocation of tasking to people and/or software.  The proposed ASCMD simulation 
model section analyzes the following capabilities: data fusion techniques and algorithms; 
resource management scheduling and optimization methods; weapon and sensor 
management; and engagement functionality, initialization, and control.   
 
1. Situation Prediction and Wargaming 
 
Situation prediction is an extrapolation of the analyses to a future point in time.  It 
is the projection of the current situation, which is developed by the various situation 
assessment and evaluation functional sets, into the future (Young, 2005).  The purpose of 
situation prediction is to estimate the enemy course of action (COA) and potential impact 
of the battleforce’s planned actions, to predict real-time, near real-time, and non-real-time 
operational situations.   
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Some functions are combined to predict the cruise missile defense’s behavior as 
time progresses.  These functions include environment prediction, warfighting resource 
projection, wargaming, and force projection.  The environment prediction predicts the 
environment situation for the area of interest (AOI).  The warfighting resource projection 
is the status and capability prediction of sensors, weapons, and warfighting units’ 
performance.  Wargaming predicts the threats; identifies, evaluates, and prioritizes blue 
force COA; evaluate effects of C2 inputs on blue force COA; predict and evaluate enemy 
COA and intent; and analyze the historical trend.  Force Projection is a prediction of 
Force Readiness.  It is a prediction of overall force readiness and capabilities.  All these 
functions are taken at once in a data fusion level, providing a solution to the cruise 
missile defense observation. 
 
2. Tactical Planning and Battle Management 
 
Tactical planning is a critical ingredient towards the identification of mission 
critical resources and identification of strategic goals.  An approach for the development 
of strategic objectives is presented in Figure 4 using the Strategic Creative Analysis 
(SCAN) process (MBA Tool Box, 2007).  SCAN is a process for strategic planning, 
decision-making, and analysis that supports the development of an effective and efficient 
battle management plan.  The twelve steps required for the SCAN process are depicted in 
Figure 4.  Step 3 requires the selection of the Top Rank Objective (TRO) that is going to 





 Figure 4.   Strategic Creative Analysis (SCAN) process.   
The SCAN supports the development of battle management planning 
(Winer, MBA Tool Box, 2007). 
 
Step 4 introduces another tool called the Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, 
and Threats (SWOT) analysis.  Once the TRO has been identified, the SWOT analysis 
can be used to help in the pursuit of that objective or mission objective.  SWOT is 
defined as Strengths: attributes of the platform that aid in the achievement of the 
objective; Weaknesses: attributes of the platform that are detrimental to achieving the 
objective; Opportunities: external conditions that are beneficial to achieving the 
objective; and Threats: external conditions that are detrimental to achieving the objective.  
The SCAN analysis is an interactive process that needs to be repeated because attributes 
of the platform and outside conditions could change overtime.  In addition to the SCAN 
and SWOT, analysis processes also needed are Automated Battle Management Aids 
(ABMA) tools that are required to determine the best use of Command, Control, 
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Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I), weapons, and sensors that facilitate 
the development of a Battle Management Plan.  See Table 2.  
 
Table 2.   Automated Battle Management Aids tools.   
lanning efforts required for 
 
To effectively conduct CSG, ESG, and Carrier Air Wing (CAW) operations, the 
authors
 
Force Planning Weapon System 
Capabilities 
Mission 
Air defense control plan 
with decentralized 
execution 
Weapon scheduling Area of Operations 
(AOR) 




Sensor fusion and sensor 
planning aids 
Threat assessment 
Force allocation Weapons inventory Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) 
Force scheduler Interceptor guidance 
control 
Post-mission analysis, 




Sensor capability areas Wargaming 
    Course of Action (COA) 
and rapid replanning 
IFC priorities Range Identification and location 
of friendly forces 




Mission logistics support 
Tracking and prioritization 
of warfighting resources 
Organic and non-organic 
support 
  
   
ABMA tools are needed to aid with tactical p
the implementation of an effective CMD strategy. 
 developed a CMD operations diagram that would function as a two-layered 
Operations Management Center (OMC) concept as depicted in Figure 5.  The Platform 
OMC operates under a set of policies and ROE’s that are delegated by the CSG OMC 
under the authority of the Composite Warfare Commander (CWC).  Under established 
ROE’s, each platform is accounTable and is given full responsibility for the deployment 
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of weapons for self-defense or the protection of other platforms within a particular area of 
responsibility (AOR) boundaries.  These units also receive CWC Force commands via 
the OMC such as the commands listed in Table 3. 
 
Figure 5.   
agement Center and the second 
CSG/E erations center that 
integra
e CSG/ESG OMC can 
automa
Operations management center concept.   
The first layer is the CSG Operations Man
layer is the Platform Operations Management Center.  
 
SG Operations Management Center:  This is a single op
tes all Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) sources of 
information and generates a Common/Composite Operational Picture (COP) that is 
maintained using surveillance data from all available sensors.  The CSG/ESG OMC is 
linked to strategic information sources and disseminates to the associated warfare 
directorates on each unit.  The CSG/ESG OMC under the direction of the CWC (Ready-
for-Sea Modular Course & Handbook, 1999) is responsible for the management and 
oversight of all CSG resources (ISR sensors, mission planning, ROE’s, ordnance 
inventories, platform status, communications, and logistics).   
Based on the perceived cruise missile threat, th
tically issue mission updates using force-centric or unit-centric commands listed 
in Table 3 via secured high-speed and high-bandwidth communication networks to 
counter single or multiple threats with one or multiple platforms and missiles.  Some of 
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these Force Commands include selection of the designated preferred shooters, the 
designated engagement support platform (fire control data providers, the weapons in-
flight control and terminal homing support providers) and other types of engagement 
orders as needed.   
FORCE-C
Table 3.   Force-centric and unit-centric commands.   












ENTRIC / UNIT-CENTRIC CMD COMMANDS ORIGINATOR 
OMC 
EXECUTE ENGAGE ON REMOTE OMC/REMOTE 
EXECUTE FORWARD PASS  OMC/LOCAL/REM
EXECUTE LAUNCH ON REMO OMC/REMOTE 
FORCE INTEGRATED SCHEDULER OMC 
FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN OMC/Local/Remote 
IN-FLIGHT MISSILE CONTROL/GUIDANCE RELAY OMC/LOCAL/REMOTE 
ISSUE PRECISION CUE OMC/LOCAL/REMOTE 
LOGISTIC PLAN/UPDAT OMC/LOCAL/REMOTE 
NEW TRACK REPORT OMC/LOCAL/REMOTE 
PREFERRED SHOOTER OMC 
PROVIDE MISSION/KILL ASSESSMENT OMC/L
PROVIDE ROE/MISSION PLAN/UPDATE OMC 
REMOTE WEAPONS FIRE ORDER OMC/R
 SCHEDULE A SENSOR OMC/Local/Re
TARGET ILLUMINATION OMC 
THREAT ASSESSMENT REP OMC/L
 
Mission updates can be automatically issued
 
 through these commands. 
hese commands could be automatically or manually processed and 
commu
T
nicated to the designated platform based on ROE’s (Young, 2005).  Even though 
the CWC can issue tactical commands via the OMC as described above, the designated 
platform (CG, DDG, FFG or SSN) retains control authority over all organic warfare 
assets (sensors, hard kill and soft kill weapons, illuminators, and communications). 
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 Figure 6 provides an example of a typical chain of command structure with 
Warfare Commanders assigned to different mission areas.  This model can also be 
applied to an ESG with an LHA/LHD substituting for the carrier.  Each Warfare 




Figure 6.   Chain of command structure for Warfare  
Commanders assigned to different mission areas. 
 
The Air Defense Commander (ADC) (call sign AW) is typically assigned to the 
commanding officer of a USS TICONDEROGA (CG 47) class cruiser operating the 
Aegis Weapon System.  A second Aegis cruiser may act as an alternate AW to allow for 
24 hours of operation (12 hours on and 12 hours off).  The ADC units are deployed 
throughout the region or in sectors of interest. 
The Force Track Coordinator (FTC) manages all organic and non-organic 
communications in addition to all Tactical Data Links (TADILs).  These include Link 11 
(TADIL A and B), Link 4A (TADIL C) and Link 16 (TADIL J).  Link 11 provides a 
standard message format for exchanging digital information among airborne (TADIL-A) 
as well as land-based and shipboard (TADIL-B) tactical data systems.  Link 4A is used to 
provide vector commands to fighters.  Link-16 is DoD's primary tactical data link for 
command, control, and intelligence, providing critical joint interoperability and situation 
awareness information. 
 The CWC, via the OMC, will determine the battleforce readiness 
condition level that will be in place to allow for each ship to perform offensive and 
defensive functions necessary to counter cruise missile threats, keep required operational 
systems continuously manned and operating, perform other command and control 
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functions relevant to the cruise missile threat, and accomplish urgent underway planned 
maintenance and support functions.  The battleforce readiness condition level can last 
from 24 hours to two months based on the perceived threat level. 
 
3. Opportunities for Fuzzy Logic and Neural Networks 
 
There are continuing efforts in minimizing the reaction time for cruise missile 
defense.  One area that has received more attention is in computational intelligence or 
“intelligent decision-making system” (Pal, Mudi, 2003).  The concepts of neural 
networks and fuzzy logic are born out of this field, where the approach originates from 
studies of the central nervous system and human brain.  With the increasing complexities 
of the systems of today and those proposed in the future, it is becoming more difficult to 
predict and explain the behavior of these complex systems with current methods.  New 
techniques of system control and decision-making are being studied to determine if these 
concepts can indeed curtail system complexities that currently exist and for future 
applications.   
The concept of neural networks comes from medical research into the human 
central nervous system.  In the central nervous system, neurons collect signals from 
others through structures called dendrites.  The neuron itself sends out electrical pulses 
through a strand called an axon and each axon is connected to another neutron/dendrites 
combination.  What is of interest in regards to these elements that make up the central 
nervous system is their information processing capabilities.  This type of system performs 
functions collectively and in parallel by the neurons (units) rather than in a task/subtask 
hierarchy.  In addition, it has been shown that this system has the ability to adapt (learn).  
Learning is accomplished by electrical activity, which inhibits or excites the surrounding 
neurons.  It is this capability to solve problems collectively and adaptively that can be 
integrated into the ASCMD functional architecture to eliminate some of the organic 
decisions made in the kill chain.   
Figure 7 (Stergiou, Siganos, 2007) below depicts a simple artificial neuron.  This 
neuron can have multiple inputs and one output.  These neurons can be grouped together 
to form artificial neural networks.  Engineers have been studying this concept and have 
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developed artificial neural networks, which can be used to detect trends and extract 
patterns from data; due to their open structure they can be applied to non-linear 
applications such as tracking highly-maneuverable targets.  In addition, due to the ability 
to detect trends and patterns, these networks could be used for pattern recognition as seen 
in radar systems, face recognition, sequence recognition (speech), process control, and 
data mining. 
 
Figure 7.   Artificial neuron (Stergiou, Siganos, 2007).   
These neurons can be grouped together to form artificial neural networks. 
 
Artificial neural networks take a different approach to problem solving than 
conventional computers in use today.  Today’s computers use an algorithm encompassing 
a set of instructions.  The solution to a problem must be known as well as the steps 
necessary to solve the problem.  This concept limits the use of today’s computers to those 
problems and solutions, which are known today.  Problems that deviate from what is 
known cannot be solved with conventional processing capabilities.  
As stated earlier, neural networks process information and execute problem 
solving in ways that are similar to the brain.  Processing elements, neurons, work in 
parallel to solve problems.  It has been shown that these neurons can be trained and can 
adapt based on the input received.  In Neural Networks (Stergiou, Siganos, 2007), it was 
shown that if one would define a collection of training modes for a neuron, then 1-taught 
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set of patterns would cause the neuron to fire and 0-taught set of patterns would prevent 
the neuron from firing.  If the neuron was presented with an undefined pattern, it could 
“compare” the undefined pattern with the defined patterns produced from the taught set 
of patterns to produce a defined output pattern.   
Presently, artificial neural networks are being studied to determine if these 
concepts could be applied to highly-maneuvering threats.  Highly-maneuverable target 
motions can be difficult to predict.  When tracking these types of targets it is difficult to 
determine where in space the object will next occupy.  These types of targets are said to 
be non-linear in nature and as such can change from the assumed motion model. 
A study was conducted by The Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center San 
Diego in the area of real-time modeling of maneuvers.  The Center has developed an 
artificial neural network multiple model tracker, which has shown to predict the correct 
system states of a target as it is maneuvering.  The model uses the concepts of neural 
networks to handle the nonlinearities of these types of targets.   
Fuzzy logic originated with studies of the human brain and its ability to receive 
imprecise inputs, evaluate these inputs, and develop an accepTable output.  Fuzzy logic is 
used by people every day.  For example, when driving in traffic it is usually optimum and 
safest to drive with the flow of traffic; however, defining the specific instructions for 
“driving with the traffic” would be difficult.  A number of inputs are received by people 
as they are driving in traffic, most of which is fuzzy or imprecise at best.  Some inputs 
received are drivers that weave in and out of traffic, drivers going faster than the speed 
limit, determining how many drivers are ahead, trucks slowing down lane traffic, and 
number of police officers using speed radars.  All of this is imprecise input but people 
have the ability to take this fuzzy information and determine if it is safe to drive with the 
flow of traffic. 
Fuzzy logic exists in every day items like self-focusing cameras, washing 
machines, automobile engine controls, subway control systems, and other applications.  
Fuzzy logic analysis and control can be mimicked in machines to perform tasks 
somewhat like humans.  The method is divided into three main areas; input, processing, 
and output.  For the input, determine what measurements or assessments of the condition 
of the system are required.  Here may be one or multiple inputs, depending on the 
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application.  A unit receives one or more stimuli in the form of a measurement or some 
other assessment of a condition within a system.  As an example, the temperature would 
be the input for a home air conditioner.  Then process these inputs according to “If X and 
Y Then Z” rules.  These rules are human-based, expressed in plain language, and need 
not be as precise as an algorithm found in a conventional computer system.   
IF/THEN rules are developed in the form of If variable Is set Then action.  Using 
the home air conditioner example, one of the rules could be: IF temperature IS very cold 
THEN stop fan.  There will be a number of these rules developed into a fuzzy algorithm 
to be executed by a conventional computer.   
Another allocation can be made by using averaging and outputs, where weights 
are assigned to each sensor’s output based on the sensor’s performance, as well as an 
averaging and fusing of all the sensor outputs into one output.  This output is the 
command the system uses to adjust itself in response to a change in its environment.   
One area of application within fuzzy logic is target tracking.  There is ongoing 
research that examines fuzzy logic and fuzzy inference systems in the use of multiple-
sensor integration.  During certain operating conditions, one sensor may provide more 
reliable data than others may.  Personnel at the Southern Illinois University, Department 
of Mechanical Engineering and Energy Processes (Mahajan, Wang, and Ray, 2007) 
developed a generic model which placed three different sensors on a cantilever beam.  
The characteristics sensed by these sensors were used as input measurements to a Fuzzy 
Inference System.  The outputs of the Fuzzy Inference System were weights assigned to 
each sensor measurement.  These weights reflected the confidence in the sensors 
performance.  The data from the three sensors were fused together by normalizing with 
their weights.  Each individual sensor error was measured and compared to the error of 
the fused error.  It was found that the model delivered an accurate estimation based on 
fused data.  
To minimize reaction time to an inbound subsonic threat, computational 
intelligence will have to exist within the architecture.  Computational intelligence can 
dramatically cut down systems response times by eliminating decision pauses in the kill 
chain.  While it is difficult to place a numerical value on the amount of time that an 
operator reports up the chain of command, it would not be a far stretch to estimate that 
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five to ten seconds may pass from when a positive identification has been made by the 
sensor operator who tells the supervisor of the confirmation which then verbally goes to 
the Tactical Action Officer.  These technologies are still in their infancy and their 
adaptive learning and problem-solving applications are not mature enough to defend 
human life at this time.  Further research, testing, and verification of computational 
intelligence will eventually lead to mostly non-organic self-defense architectures. 
 
4. Information Assurance 
 
Network-based systems are subject to exploitation, theft, viruses, worms, and 
other network interruptions that can alter data fidelity.  This is especially true when other 
countries attempt to access our classified and tactical information.  The current approach 
to network security is one where the data is protected through a layered defense, an 
intrusion prevention posture instead of intrusion detection.  Network intrusion can be 
detected along the “outer walls” or perimeter by building various levels of security 
throughout the data flow in the architecture, and can be defended against prior to any data 
compromise. 
Data integrity must start at the lowest level, coded binary data.  The US 
Government uses the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) to perform this task.  
Although TDEA is intended for unclassified but sensitive information handling, it can 
provide a starting point for data protection.  This algorithm can be implemented in 
software, firmware, hardware, or any combination thereof (Barker, 2004).  Processing, 
transmission, and storage components of the architecture will possess the algorithm.  
The network will require physical encryption of the data as it leaves classified 
spaces to provide system security.  This can be accomplished with a high speed, CAT 6-
supporTable, wideband encryption device.  Users throughout the architecture will reside 
on a distribution list for the key(s); the key will be changed at a predetermined time 
interval.  Some of the source material entering into the architecture may need to be kept 
separate from other data due to different classification levels or other access restrictions.  
Higher classified data will require cleansing and downgrading prior to introduction at a 
lower-security level when combining tactical and ISR data to present a COP for the 
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Composite Warfare Commander.  There is existing government-owned software and 
hardware programs that when implemented can maintain the required separation and 
classification downgrade capabilities.  The architecture will also contain differing levels 
of trust assigned to both tactical access and to user accounts. 
The network that the equipment resides on will be kept in spaces with limited 
access.  Only those personnel with clearances at or above the classification of the 
network will be allowed unescorted access to a space containing network interfaces.  
User access will also be limited to those personnel in performance of their duties by the 
system administrator and will be required to log on with an issued, restricted common 
access card, their user name, and a password.   
Amongst the data processing, analyzing, and storage nodes, bulk encryption of 
outgoing and incoming data will occur, providing the first layer of network security.  The 
sensor assets that transmit data may not require bulk encryption since they are a single 
stream already encrypted.  The architecture will employ best of breed IA applications and 
practices to ensure the availability and confidentiality of system data while providing 
authentication and verification of system users as in Figure 8.   
 
 
Figure 8.   Network Information Assurance applications.   
Accreditation of the architecture is required in accordance with the Navy 
Information Assurance Program. (Modified from Defense Science Board, 
2000)  
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5. Allocation of Tasking to People and/or Software 
 
The available resources at the disposal of the system designer for task allocation 
are hardware, software, people, or combinations of the three.  The allocation of some of 
the functions will be mandatory and predetermined by the stakeholders identified through 
the requirements analysis process.  Task allocation should be determined through the 
comparison of performance between humans, hardware, and software; what the cost 
incurred will be; cognitive support of the operators; and knowledge of what pieces of 
information and decisions must be available to support the function.  Knowledge of what 
resource would be best at executing what functionality at the cheapest cost can be crucial 
in the selection process to deliver a system with the optimum mix of functionality and 
resources at a reasonable cost.   
Human role strategies will require that certain functions and tasks be performed 
by people within the system while others, due to performance requirements or 
stakeholder needs, will be allocated to hardware and software, or both.  Given the 
mandatory allocations, a determination will need to be made of the knowledge, skills, and 
abilities (KSA) that will be required of the people that will be a part of the system.   
After the mandatory functions have been allocated, the design team identifies 
potential allocations for those functions not yet allocated.  These allocations can be static 
or dynamic in nature.  The dynamic allocations will change depending on the mission 
conditions and/or priorities.  During the primary mission phase, mission-critical functions 
will take priority and will be followed by other functions as well as other primary mission 
functions.  To allocate these tasks effectively among the hardware, software, and people, 
a study of the operator and maintainer capabilities and limitations, as well as the potential 
of the hardware and software to perform the systems functions, will need to be identified.  
Other factors, which influence the allocation of functions and need to be taken into 
account, include safety, frequency of function occurrence, training requirements, and 
workload and manning requirements.   
Within this phase of development, selection of a set of optimal function 
allocations based on the system design factors can be made.  This effort will include 
comparing the proposed allocations to accepTable risk of the design, the time required to 
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implement the design, expected performance and system availability, system manning 
levels, system lifecycle costs, and training requirements.  Tradeoff studies will need to be 
performed, comparing system design factors and stakeholders desires to the proposed 
allocations to determine the correct mix of allocations as compared to the system 
requirements.   
Possible human-in-the-loop (HIL) optimal allocations within an IFC context of 
operations are issue firing commands, issue abort commands frequency selection, reset 
faults, set radar doctrine parameters, selection of automatic modes, monitoring of system 
status, and monitor engagement resources.   
During the problem definition phase of the design process, objectives and 
measures of effectiveness of the system will be developed by the system design team, and 
reviewed and approved by the stakeholders.  Through the verification, validation, and 
acceptance phases of system development, the functional allocations will be matched 
against these requirements as well as the design requirements and specifications to ensure 
that the system has been designed and built correctly.  Verification, starting in the design 
phase and overlapping the validation period, will determine that the configuration items 
meet the requirements developed by the stakeholders.  The validation phase will 
determine whether the system capabilities match the operational concept.  Acceptance 
phase is conducted by the stakeholders and will determine if the system satisfies their 
needs.   
 
B. COMPARISON BETWEEN CURRENT AND PROPOSED 
ARCHITECTURES  
 
The OA functional domain model, depicted in Figure 9 below, identifies the 
combat system detect-to-engage (DTE) functionality that is needed by the warfighter to 
establish a CMD strategy.  Some of the OA design principles include the usage of 
common software that is reusable in part or whole and that can be implemented across 
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OA Warfare System Domain
 
Figure 9.   PEO IWS functional architecture (Strei, 2004).   
This architecture is expected to simplify FORCEnet implementation. 
 
The OA Enterprise approach directly supports the implementation of FORCEnet 
design concepts and more robust business practices that improve cycle time with respect 
to technology refresh, simplifies software maintenance and delivery, rapidly enables new 
technology insertion, and capitalizes on a broader supplier base.  These improvements 
translate into cost savings throughout the lifecycle of a combat or weapon system.  The 
PEO IWS OA functional architecture was evaluated per generally agreed OA criteria.  
Figure 10 depicts the proposed high-level OA functional architecture. 
The fundamental difference between the architectures in Figure 9 and Figure 10 is 
that the proposed architecture is horizontally integrated, which both greatly simplifies and 
minimizes the functional interfaces.  Horizontal integration refers to the desired end-state 
where intelligence of all kinds flows rapidly and seamlessly to the warfighter, and 
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enables information dominance warfare (JASON Program Office, 2007).  In contrast, the 
PEO IWS functional idiom is functionally independent and characterized by large, 
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Figure 10.   Proposed high-level OA functional architecture.   
This architecture simplifies the kill chain process by horizontally 
integrating Search & Detect; Data Information Services; Planning, 
Assessment, and Decision; Weapon/Asset Services; and Mission 
Execution. 
 
In computer science terms, this architecture exhibits high coupling and low 
cohesion and may demonstrate “brittle” behavior when subjected to stressor message 
transfer rates.  While adopting identical functions, the proposed architecture captures an 
improved balance between cohesion and coupling of functions.  While the PEO IWS 
functional architecture may deliver improved service in certain functionalities, it may 
perform worse in others.  The net structural effect is that when the architecture is stressed 
during periods of high message flux rates, it may deteriorate or fail completely.  The 
effect is compounded under tactical scenarios where several sources of uncertainty are 
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prevalent.  Another critical difference between the architectures is that the external 
communications (EXCOMM) function needs to become an OA candidate common 
function/application.  Full integration between the EXCOMM and Command and Control 
systems is critical to the implementation of an IFC. 
To further understand the differences, the proposed OA functional architecture is 
decomposed and compared to the PEO IWS architecture.  The first observation is that the 
proposed architecture is broadly characterized through the parent-child relationship 
between FORCEnet and open architecture, separated by the Search and Detect, C2, and 
Engagement functions.  That is, the open architecture supports FORCEnet and performs 
the kill chain functions through C2.  Command and Control adheres to the rules of 
engagement; establishes positive target identification; performs engageability 
calculations; and preferred weapon selection based on multiple parameters, such as target 
kinematics, number of threats, and environment prior to issuing a weapons engagement 
order.  These events must be completed quickly, accurately, and all may include several 
elements of uncertainty such as kinematics and inter-arrival uncertainty.  The architecture 
must be both sTable to efficiently process (service) the arriving messages and be robust 
during high-stressor states.  
The proposed architecture detours from the PEO IWS OA functional architecture 
as follows.  The 7.0 Networks and Common Services, which includes displays, 
navigation, time, databases, data extraction, and recording functions, broadly aggregates 
the 1.0 Search & Detect (S&D); 2.0 Data Information Services (DIS); 3.0 Planning, 
Assessment & Decision (PAD); 4.0 Weapon/Asset Services (W/AS); and 5.0 Mission 
Execution (ME) under the 6.0 platform External Communications (EXCOMM) function.  
The EXCOMM function becomes a candidate OA common application.  Instead of the 
PEO IWS independent 8.0 Training function, the proposed architecture integrates training 
functions (functions 1.0 through 5.0) that are explicitly used to execute simulations of the 
DTE process for the various combat/weapon systems supporting individual warfare and 
mission areas.  In addition, each individual block within the nine modules will be 
examined throughout this section to determine if additional functions are needed to 
prosecute CMD successfully. 
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The proposed OA architecture retains the following advantages over the PEO 
IWS OA architecture: 
• Horizontal functional integration simplifies and reduces the number of 
interfaces to balance cohesion with coupling to deliver robust (common) 
services during high message flux that are characteristic during cruise 
missile or other tactical engagements. 
• The proposed OA architecture improves system stability; the ability to 
service increased cruise missile threats is greater than their inter-arrival 
rates.  
• By design, the proposed architecture improves the ability to accurately and 
efficiently process (kinematics and inter-arrival) uncertainty. 
• Ability to re-assess and re-engage target after first salvo is fired. 
• EXCOMM changes from a candidate OA platform-unique function and 
application to a candidate OA common function and application. 
 




The battlespace definition was adopted directly from United States Air Force 
(USAF) doctrine and the first step of the intelligence preparation of the battlespace 
process.  The battlespace is defined as "the commander's conceptual view of the area and 
factors, which he must understand to apply combat power, protect the force, and 
complete the mission.  It encompasses all applicable aspects of air, sea, space, land, and 
information operations, as well as the human dimension that the commander must 
consider in planning and executing military operations.  The battlespace dimensions can 
change over time as the mission expands or contracts, according to operational objectives 
and force composition.  Battlespace provides the commander a mental framework for 
analyzing and selecting courses of action for employing military forces in relationship to 
time, tempo, and depth" (Air Force Doctrine Document, 1997; Department of the Army, 
1994). 
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The objective is to expand the battlespace volume.  In the context of this paper, it 
is defined as increasing over-the-horizon surveillance and wide area defense against 
ASCM’s.  As defined above, the battlespace is not fixed; it varies in volume as a function 
of time and depends on wide area and long range combat identification (CID) of CMD 
threats, degree of interoperability, sensor range, Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) 
accuracy, synchronization, IFC, ABMA, and passive defense (Kaler, Riche, Hassell, 
1999-2000).  Long range CID of airborne threats increases the battlespace by increasing 
the composite warfare commander’s confidence interval of achieving hard or soft mission 
kills of stressing CMD threats.   
Similarly, improved interoperability among task force elements will increase the 
battlespace through accurate translation of kill chain events among the task force 
elements.  For example, any lost track will effectively constrain the battlespace volume 
and reduce the probability of successfully defending task force elements in the event of 
ASCM attacks.  Theater Air Missile Defense (TAMD) 2010 introduced six tenets to 
defeat aerial stressors by expanding the battlespace, only several of which will be applied 
to defining the CMD battlespace.  
Increased sensor range by itself will not expand the battlespace.  Instead, 
increasing the sensor range in concert with increased interoperability and intelligent 
signal processing algorithms expands the battlespace volume by increasing the Single 
Shot Probability of Kill (SSPk) over single and multiple engagements.  The SIAP 
continuously tracks each target and provides a common operating picture (COP) of 
overlapping engagement zones that increases the probability of defeating stressing CMD 
threats better than a singular task force element.  The SIAP supports force 
synchronization, which means that weapons and sensors receive common parametric 
information from each task force element including weapons inventory and target track 
data.  This information is used in IFC scenarios to determine the preferred sensor, 
weapon, and shooter.  Thus, the SIAP enables the Composite Warfare Commander to 
capitalize on layered defenses. 
IFC, composed of six scenarios, relies on platform-independent sensor fusion and 
weapons employment to overcome radar horizon or earth curvature effects that 
effectively constrain the battlespace volume.  IFC’s ability to increase the battlespace 
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volume through layered defenses was successfully demonstrated during the 1996 
Mountain Top Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator (ACTD).  The Mountain 
Top experiment validated the mid 1970’s Forward Pass (FP) IFC concept of increasing 
the battlespace by extending the engagement range beyond the ship horizon (Krill, 1997).  
During the 1990’s, FP was a type of Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) whereas 
today it is one of six independent IFC scenarios.  Also significant is that FP-aggregated 
Engage on Remote (EOR) entails currently stand-alone IFC scenarios.  IFC is defined as 
the ability of a weapon system to develop fire control solutions from information 
provided by one or more non-organic sensor sources, conduct engagements based on 
these fire control solutions, and either provide mid-course guidance to the interceptors 
based on this externally provided information or in certain cases, have them provided by 
a warfare unit other than the launching unit.  IFC can be executed through several 
architectures that include human-in-the-loop, semi-automated IFC, or fully automated 
IFC.  Only fully automated IFC is considered with human override capability in the 
context of this paper and for the purposes of defining the battlespace and designing a 
FORCEnet architecture capable of defending against CMD threats.  
In simple terms, ABMA increases engagement efficiency by optimizing the 
sensors, weapons, and identification of shooters from multiple geographically-separated 
task elements.  Optimization in this sense refers to the ability of the Composite Warfare 
Commander to assign quickly and accurately weapons to stressing threats in a dynamic 
tactical scenario.  Quality signal processing algorithms are ABMA inputs that enable 
expansion of the Composite Warfare Commander’s battlespace volume.   
Passive defense effectively expands the battlespace through early warning 
prediction of point of impact and time of intercept based on IFC scenarios that optimize 
the sensors, weapons, and shooter’s ability to maximize Pk.   
The model represented by Figure 11 includes selected portions of the TAMD 
2010 six tenets that were used in the context of this paper to define the battlespace.  In 
particular, ABMA and CID functionality are responsible for improving the 
interoperability within the IFC scenarios. 
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Figure 11.   2010 CMD concept optimizing force employment (Barwis, 2006).   
The model illustrates the relationship among the SIAP, ABMA, and wide 
area long range CID in support of the IFC scenarios.   
 
“Defeating modern cruise missiles involves three distinct phases: detection, 
control, and engagement (GAO, 2000).”  While the GAO battlespace model is correct in 
the above statement, it is too wide in scope and insufficiently granular to support the six 
kill chain functions.  The GAO model aggregates the sensor-to-shooter kill chain 
functions into the GAO detect function.  The GAO model parallels the kill chain track 
and control functionality but completely ignores the assessment function.  The GAO 
battlespace model functionality is compared to the chain model in Figure 12 below. 
IFC is fundamental to improved cruise missile defense.  The United States and its 
allies spend large sums of money over protracted development cycles, frequently 
measured in decades, to field weapons delivery platforms.  In contrast, foreign suppliers 
are agile in their ability to field low-cost ASCM’s and export the tactics needed to deploy 
















Figure 12.   GAO battlespace functionality model versus kill chain model.   
The GAO model parallels the kill chain track and control functionality. 
 
These ASCM’s enable nations of economically modest means, but hostile to the 
United States, to exercise power in response to perceived coalition threats, further 
political or regional power agendas, or to promote theater-specific mayhem.  IFC expands 
the battlespace by enabling airborne surveillance platforms, or Joint Land Attack Cruise 
Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS), to relay ASCM tracks through 
FORCEnet to task force elements (Bolkcom, Hichkad, 2005). 
 
2. Battlespace Scenarios 
 
This report focuses on CMD scenarios using IFC capabilities with emphasis on 
Precision Cue, Launch on Remote, and Preferred Shooter Determination.  The CMD 
scenarios are described below.  Figures 13 through 18 are modified from Future 
Integrated Fire Control (Young, 2005). 
Precision Cue, shown in Figure 13, is an IFC capability in which a cue is received 
from a remote source that represents a possible threat and is used to direct local sensors to 
hold a specific target.  The cue is comprised of target information such as a location 
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estimate, target track data, and assessment of the target’s identification.  The remote 
sensors can be located on an airborne or surface platform and the local sensors are 
located on a surface platform.  The cue from a remote sensor on an airborne platform is 
more advantageous than the cue from a surface platform due to radar geometry.  The 
airborne platform extends the range of the surface radars and provides earlier warning to 
the surface platform before the incoming cruise missile enters the detection range of the 
local sensors.  Early detection from the remote sensor cue will increase the CMD reaction 
time, allowing for early engagement with a higher probability of kill.  The best shooter to 
engage the threat at this point can be selected using the Preferred Shooter Determination 








Remote sensor detects threat.
Local unit receives cue. 
Local unit tasks local sensor to 







Figure 13.   Depiction of the Integrated Fire Control Precision Cue scenario.   
A cue is received from a remote source that represents a possible threat 
and is used to direct local sensors to hold a specific target. 
 
Preferred Shooter Determination, as shown in Figure 14, is an IFC in which the 
optimum weapons from a group of warfare units is selected to intercept the threat target.  
The best shooter is selected based on best available engagement geometry and 
engageability determination.  This IFC capability requires extensive collaboration among 
units.  Ship location is another factor that will influence the choice for best shooter.  The 
best shooter can be an airborne or surface platform, or a combination of the two.  With 
Fire Control Quality (FCQ) threat data from a remote sensor, the remote unit can initiate 




The best shooter is selected based 
on optimum engagement geometry 
and engageability determination. 
1
Threat
Figure 14.   The Integrated Fire Control Preferred Shooter Determination scenario.   
The optimum weapon from a group of warfare units is selected to intercept 
the threat target. 
 
Launch on Remote, Figure 15, is an IFC capability in which the remote sensor 
data is used to initiate a missile launch without holding the track locally.  The local firing 
unit uses remote sensor data from a remote airborne or surface platform to track and 
engage cruise missiles launched from air, land, or sea-based platforms.  Since remote 
sensors on an airborne platform are not limited by line of sight, local firing units have 
more time to react before the local sensor detects inbound cruise missiles.  With early and 
accurate remote sensor data, the local firing unit on a surface platform can start launching 
missile as soon as the cruise missile enters the radar detection zone.  This early 
engagement keeps the intercept point as further away as possible from the ship and 







Remote sensor(s) provides FCQ threat data.
Firing ship launches interceptor based on remote threat data.
Local unit tasks local sensor to provide FCQ threat data for 






Figure 15.   Depiction of the Integrated Fire Control Launch on Remote scenario.   
Remote sensor data is used to initiate a missile launch without holding the 
track locally.   
 
Other IFC capabilities used to engage cruise missiles threats are Engage on 
Remote, Forward Pass, and Remote Fire.  Engage on Remote, Figure 16, is an IFC 
capability where one or more remote sensor units provide data to conduct an engagement.  
Engage on Remote uses remote data to initiate a missile launch from a firing unit, and 
remote sensors to illuminate the threat by relaying guidance to the interceptor.  Engage 














Remote sensor(s) provides FCQ threat data.
Firing ship launches interceptor based on remote threat data.






Figure 16.   Depiction of the Integrated Fire Control Engage on Remote scenario. 
One or more remote sensor units provide data to conduct an engagement. 
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Forward Pass, Figure 17, occurs when a remote unit takes over the in-flight 
missile control from the firing unit to complete the engagement.  This IFC is effective in 
battlegroup engagements to defend against a single or multiple cruise missile threats. 
 
 
2 Remote Unit takes over engagement control to intercept threat.






Figure 17.   Depiction of the Integrated Fire Control Forward Pass scenario.   
A remote unit takes over the in-flight missile control from the firing unit 
to complete the engagement. 
 
In the Remote Fire scenario, Figure 18, the launch decision is made by the remote 
unit and the engagement control can be handled by the remote unit or the firing unit.  
This IFC provides flexible engagement control between remote and firing units for the 







2 Firing Unit launches interceptor.
Remote Unit makes decision to launch interceptor.1 
3 Remote Unit controls engagement.
Figure 18.   Depiction of the Integrated Fire Control Remote Fire scenario.   
The launch decision is made by the remote unit and the engagement 
control can be handled by the remote unit or the firing unit.   
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 To better visualize the intended architecture and its capabilities, Navy strike group 
configurations and CONOPS were developed by the authors to provide a blueprint for 
wargaming.  The following scenarios were created to provide a realistic approach for 
edification of our architecture and validation of our model.  The current layout shows a 
CSG with its units aligned in defense along the estimated threat axis.  Although an ESG 
will have different aircraft assets, the model for all generally aligns the same and can be 
used by renaming the main body and minor modification of sensors/weapons input to the 
















Figure 19.   Overall physical layout of battleforces.   
This layout is used to visualize scenarios for validating the proposed 
ASCMD functional architecture. 
 
For the first tactical scenario, Carrier Strike Group CONSTELLATION is 
underway in the Arabian Gulf.  Tensions in the area of operations (AOR) are elevated 
due to political unrest in the fictional nation of Drmecia.  A pro-democracy faction has 
held demonstrations demanding less government involvement and more individual rights.  
The United States supports this faction and has sent CONSTELLATION CSG into 
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international waters off of the Drmecia coast.  The Drmecia president has vowed to 
suppress the insurrection in his country and has warned the international community not 
to interfere with domestic affairs.  He has previously stated that he has purchased 
Sunburn missiles for defense of his country and will not hesitate to launch them if 
provoked. 
An SH-60 helicopter flying off CONSTELLATION has experienced a 
catastrophic loss of hydraulic fluid and has crash-landed onto an island two kilometers 
off of the Drmecia coast, land that is claimed by Drmecia.  Attempts to rescue the 
stranded crewmembers are interpreted by the Drmecia Defense Ministry as an attempt to 
infiltrate American Special Forces.  Drmecia defenses go on high alert.  Drmecia’s 
President states that he is not afraid of the United States and vows that his will be the first 
country to sink an American Aircraft Carrier since WWII if the Americans continue their 
aggressive actions. 
CSG Carrier Air Patrols are extended, but the main body pulls farther from the 
coast.  Drmecia naval vessels actively shadow CSG units.  During a Maritime 
Interdiction Operation (MIO) against a Drmecia fishing vessel, a Drmecia ship opens fire 
on USS CHOSIN, which returns fire destroying the Drmecia vessel.  The response from 
Drmecia is ten inbound missiles coming from Drmecia, each one fired at approximately 
three-second intervals from shore-based battery.  Each missile flies at sum Mach 2.0 with 
initial launch pop up to altitude of 90 feet, then drop to 15-20 feet above sea level within 
15 miles of target. 
In the second scenario Country “Orange” leadership has coveted the island nation 
“Green” for its newfound oil reserves and natural deep industrial harbors.  Country Green 
is located approximately 180 kilometers off country Orange’s coastline.  Both countries 
share a similar ancestry but differ in political views.  Country Green has provided its 
citizens with generous royalties derived from a strong economy, angering many of the 
Orange politicians who believe that Green should share the wealth with their 
impoverished nation. 
Country Green is an ally of country Blue whose strong Navy acts as a deterrent to 
hostile actions from Orange.  Country Orange has recently protested joint naval exercises 
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conducted by Green and Blue CSG's close to their shoreline as acts of provocation and 
vow to defend their country against all threats.   
Country Orange has mined three of the five harbors that Green homeports its 
surface fleet.  A Green destroyer encounters a mine while entering port and the 
subsequent explosion causes 15 deaths and cripples the ship.  Orange has initiated a naval 
blockade on the western coast of country Green and warns international traffic that it will 
sink any vessel that enters the vicinity without Green’s escort.  Blue CSG returns to the 
conflict area and takes up station off the Orange coast.  Orange then fires 10 missiles, 
each firing simultaneously at one-second intervals, from aircraft at altitude of 10,000 
meters from ten separate bearings.  Missile flies at an average of just under Mach 2, 
dropping to an altitude of 5-7 meters above sea level once it is 32 kilometers from the 
target. 
Queuing theory provided the foundation to model the battlespace in defense 
against stressor ASCM threats.  The model is based on a quadruple serial queue; one 
arrival and three weapons assignment queues for each layered defense weapon.  This 
model is represented by the event graph model in Figure 20 and Figure 21 below.  The 
engagements represented in Figure 19 were modeled as discrete-events while the 
software simulation was based on a process view.  Still, it is important for the reader to 
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N= Number of arriving cruise missiles
Q= Queue length
S= Number of defending “servers” in the ESG or CSG
The MOP’s/ MOE’s are state variables that are updated as a result of 
each “servicing” engagement.
Figure 20.   Event graph representation of ASCM defense. 
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Figure 21.   Event graph representation of ASCM defense.   
The battlespace model is based on a quadruple serial queue. 
 
ASCM’s enter the first queue with an arrival rate, λ, and average time between 
arrivals or inter-arrival rate, λ-1.  The arriving ASCM initializes the queue and the kill 
chain begins service defensive functions.  The queue becomes unsTable and defenses 
reach saturation, whenever the raid or stream arrival rate exceeds the service time.  
ASCM service time is complete upon ASCM intercept or declaration of a leaker. 
Based on the kill chain functions the threat is first identified, classified, 
prioritized, weapon-target pairing is completed, and then enters the second queue.  The 
ASCM is serviced or engaged by the shooter using long-range Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) 
interceptors whose average service rate is µ and average service time for stream or raid 
engagements is µ-1.  If the ASCM penetrated the outer layer of defense, then it is either a 
leaker or the queue balks because the stressor is within the minimum intercept range.  In 
either event, the ASCM enters the third queue for reengagement by the second layer of 
defensive capability, the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM).  Similarly, if the queue 
balked due to minimum intercept range limitations or the ASCM penetrated the second 
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defensive layer with sufficient reengagement time remaining, then it enters the fourth and 
final queue for engagement by the Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM).  Figure 21 does not 
feature a fifth queue for point defense guns such as the Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) 
because it was assumed that even if the ASCM was successfully engaged it will typically 
be within the keep-out range where fragments have a high probability of intercepting the 
shooter. 
 The following assumptions were used in the initial battlespace modeling: 
• The initial queue state is empty and idle. 
• First-in, first-out (FIFO) queue discipline is maintained to service stressor 
threats.  
• Perfect IFC self-synchronization; no more than a single shooter engages a 
single stressor. 
• From the shooter’s perspective, a leaker that penetrated the innermost 
layer of defense is considered a miss even if it does not directly or 
indirectly impact the shooter. 
• The IPB process does not give the task force commander reliable 
knowledge of ASCM inventory. 
• Uncertainty in raid or stream arrival distributions and distribution 
parameters were estimated and discussed below.  
• ASCM inter-arrival rates are statistically dependent; the arrival of one 
stressor threat directly influences the arrival of the next stressing threat.  
That is, ASCM raid or stream attacks are coordinated and based on the 
adversaries firing policy. 
• The probability of detection, Pd, equals 1.0.  The task force calculates with 
certainty the ASCM’s position, velocity, time of intercept (TOI), and Point 
of Impact (POI). 
As mentioned above, uncertainty of arriving ASCM’s and the service times were 
estimated.  Several statistical distributions were modeled including the Poisson, Beta, 
Uniform, and Triangular distribution.  There were two sources of top-level uncertainty 
associated with the analysis; selection of a distribution and estimation of the distribution 
parameters. 
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The Poisson distribution is a discrete distribution suiTable for counting events 
such as counting the arrivals of ASCM’s in a raid or streaming attack.  At first glance, the 
Binomial distribution, another discrete distribution, was considered to model service time 
uncertainty because it is based on success or failure criteria.  The success or failure logic 
was extrapolated to ask whether the stressor ASCM was killed or missed.  However, 
applying the binomial distribution required testing several criteria.  One criterion was that 
the arrival of stressor ASCM’s, called trials in statistical terms, must be independent.  
This criterion was not met because it is contrary to a key assumption of dependence.  
The Beta, Uniform, and Triangular continuous distributions were well-suited for 
modeling ASCM arrival and service times.  While ASCM arrivals are a counting process, 
the Beta distribution is suiTable because the output of its α and β shape parameters 
define the expected value.  The Uniform distribution is a suiTable distribution because 
any value is equally likely to occur.  The Triangular distribution is suiTable because the 
probability of the random variable of interest is assumed within a given interval.   
The following firing policies that had direct bearing on the probability of kill (Pk) 




The reader is advised that dependence in the context of arriving ASCM’s must not 
be confused with the probability of kill (Pk) of shooting down the ASCM.  The Pk for 
successive shots against stressor threats is statistically independent but is influenced by 
the selected firing policy.  In other words, the firing policy influences Pk, Pk does not 
influence the selected firing policy. 
While the application of statistics to queuing theory was not the thrust of this 
paper, they were fundamental to constructing a reasonable simulation model.  
Deterministic Pk calculations for the various firing policies are left as an exercise for the 
reader but were based on simple parallel networks where the Pk for successive shots 
against stressor threats must be independent. 
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3. Design Principles  
 
The following design principles were identified in an attempt to define the high-
level requirements for the development of system solutions in support of Cruise Missile 
Defense operations.  Extensive research was conducted to identify the most relevant 
design principles that should be taken into account and are paramount to ensure the 
effectiveness, suitability, and survivability of our deployed forces.  This is not a 
comprehensive list of all the design principles required, but serves as a departure point 
for further research and to improve upon.   
• Provide robust, reliable, and timely communication to all platforms 
(nodes), based on mission requirements and inherent capabilities of those 
platforms/nodes (Clark, Hagee, 2006).  Allow for interoperability with C2 
and weapon systems of very different types and levels of sophistication.  
This level of interoperability needs to allow for implementation of 
requirements such as: engagement control strategy, distributed weapons 
coordination, battle management, distributed training, and in-flight control 
of non-organic weapons.  
• Provide each decision-maker the ability to depict situational information 
in a tailorable, user-defined, shareable, primarily visual representation 
(Clark, Hagee, 2006).  This requires reliable, accurate, and timely location, 
identity and status information on all friendly forces, environmental, 
neutral, and hostile elements, units, activities, events, sites, and 
entities/individuals. 
• Store, process, analyze, evaluate, synthesize, catalogue, and retrieve all 
information produced by any platform/node on the network in a 
comprehensive, standard repository so that the information is readily 
accessible to all nodes and compatible with the forms required by any 
nodes, within security restrictions (FORCEnet, 2005).  Implement push-
pull technologies to allow efficient access, retrieval, sharing, and 
distribution of critical C2 and integrated fire control data that is accurate 
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and provided at the right time, and at the right location.  As explained in 
Enterprise C/S (Hurwitz, 1997) push technology means that a user states 
under which conditions information should be sent. The user therefore 
subscribes to key pieces of data that are then "pushed" or delivered to the 
user.  Pull technology refers to information that is stored on a server and 
accessed on demand by a user. 
• Design IFC into a decentralized architecture (Young, 2005) that allows 
individual platforms to support individual phases of the Detect to Engage 
(DTE) process against cruise missile threats. 
•  Automate DTE functions to be conducted locally or remotely (Young, 
2005) such as: ordnance selection, issuance of firing command, re-
engagement, engagement initiation, salvo size, rate of fire, guidance 
control, weapon-target pairing, sensor support for engagement, intercept 
geometry, preferred shooter, and terminal homing support for interceptors. 
• Provide information assurance at the platform and battleforce level 
(FORCEnet, 2005).  Protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of data and their delivery systems, in addition to ensuring adequate 
authentication and non-repudiation.  This includes providing for 
restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, 
and reaction capabilities. 
• Transfer search and detect, command and control, and fire control 
functions from individual systems methods to CSG/ESG/CAW common 
processes.  
• Allow individual platforms to perform IFC while exercising local 
Command Authority (Young, 2005) and to function independently while 
temporarily disconnected from the battleforce network. 
• Conduct persistent readiness level monitoring of all combat systems 
elements such as sensors, command and control, weapons, ordnance, 
logistics, support systems, networks, communications, computing 
infrastructure, and networks in order to maintain the highest possible level 
of material readiness and to identify, diagnose, troubleshoot problems, 
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make timely repairs, document, and share lessons learned with applicable 
users as needed.  Ensure that readiness levels are maintained and shared 
between all platforms. 
• Provide decision makers the ability to determine the best course of action 
under conditions of uncertainty, friction, time, pressure, and other stresses 
(Young, 2005 & FORCEnet, 2005). 
• Provide the capability to determine or predict the intent or threat level of 
an inbound unknown object with high level of accuracy and reliability. 
• Implement a battle force resource management capability that is 
distributed across all platforms/nodes to aid in the determination of best 
course of action. 
Additionally, the following Open Architecture design principles are the 
foundation for the realization of the above design concepts: 
• Develop a common and standards-based computing environment and 
implement distributed computer processing power to improve 
survivability.  
• Functional capabilities are implemented as medium-grain components 
(OACE, 2003).  A software component is a unit of independent 
deployment and third-party composition that has no persistent state.  They 
often reside on the server and provide infrastructure for applications such 
as frameworks, binary programs, and templates (Aitken, 1999). 
• Use of object-oriented (OO) programming within components and 
middleware technologies for interconnection of and interoperation among 
components (Bruegge, Dutoit, 2004; OACE, 2003). 
•  Use of design mechanisms such as client-server to maximize isolation of 
implementation details from publicly visible services and Application 
Programmer Interfaces (OACE, 2003). 
• Build modular designs and disclose data to permit evolutionary designs, 
technology insertion, competitive innovation, and alternative competitive 
approaches from multiple qualified sources (OA Strategy). 
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• Provide a common interface using the same standards to establish a plug-
and-play connectivity throughout the combat system. 
 
D. CONCEPTUAL DESIGN  
 
1. Conceptual Framework – Operational View  
 
Figure 22, developed by the authors, shows the operational concept of the 
ASCMD functional architecture in support of CMD for the overview scenario described 
in this paper.  In essence, the Operational View (OV-1) represents a graphical executive 
summary that describes the missions, high-level operations, organizations, and 
geographical distribution of assets.  Both local and remote OA units in the FORCEnet 
command and control network consist of Carrier Air Wing (CAW), Expeditionary Strike 
Group (ESG), and Carrier Strike Group (CSG).  The FORCEnet command and control 
communicates with the integrated CAW, CSG, and/or ESG sensors to provide situational 
awareness and adequate response with a joint single integrated picture.  All participant 
units are to monitor and assess the current tactical situation of cruise missile threats via 
FORCEnet’s C2 component utilizing DoD Satellite Communications (SATCOM).  Each 
element of the ASCMD system provides the capability of sharing all available resources 
and information to present successful Integrated Fire Control (IFC) for intercepting 
potential cruise missile threats from air, land, and undersea.      
Note that the scenarios discussed in the Defining the Battlespace section do not 
reflect cruise missile launches from a submarine.  The scope of this project is on above-
water cruise missile engagement.  However, our architecture has the capability to handle 
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Figure 22.   Operational View (OV-1) for ASCMD in support of CMD.   
The OV-1 provides a graphical executive summary that describe the missions, high-level operations, organizations, and 
geographical distribution of assets (http://www.vsix.net/other/special/United_States_IPv6_Summit_2005/United_States 
_IPv6_Summit.htm, 2007). 
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2. Architecture Diagrams 
 
An Architecture Flow Diagram (AFD) based on Process for System Architecture 
and Requirements Engineering (Hatley, Hruschka, Pirbhai, 2000) was developed to 
capture the modules and flows that make up the proposed OA functional architecture 
described in this paper.  The AFD, represented in Figure 23, is divided into five regions: 
user interface processing, main and support functions, and input and output processing.  
The External Communications (EXCOMM) is common to both the user interface 
processing and the main functions.  The reason for the duality is that once the battleforce 
commander plans a mission, coordination and communication of mission orders to his 
battlegroup occur through EXCOMM.  The battlegroup in turn uses the EXCOMM to 
retrieve and access those orders.  Each module and flow within the AFD is described 
below. 
OA Candidate Platform-Unique Function / Application
Kill Chain Data Flow/LoopOA Candidate Common Function / Application
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Figure 23.   Architecture Flow Diagram (AFD) for proposed OA model.   
The AFD provides a snapshot of the proposed architecture flows and key 
functions. 
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The following is a list and description of the modules shown in Figure 23: 
• EXCOMM – includes all methods of communication and communication 
service actions used by force planners and coordinators to transmit 
mission orders.   
• Search and Detect (S&D) – includes all sensor tasking actions such as 
sensor availability and tracking reports. 
• Data Information Services (DIS) – includes data fusion activities such as 
compilation, scheduling, and classification. 
• Planners, Assessors, and Decision-Makers (PAD) – threat data is analyzed 
and assessed.  Command and Control orders are issued to engage threat. 
• Weapon/Asset Services (W/AS) – includes all weapon allocation and 
scheduling. 
• Mission Execution (ME) – includes weapon assignment, threat 
engagement, and kill report. 
• Common Services (CS) – includes services used by modules a through f 
listed above, such as displays, databases, synchronizers, and recorders. 
 
The following is a description of the flows shown in Figure 23: 
• Battle Force Commander Orders – orders issued at the Force 
Planning/Coordination (FP/C) level to execute a mission.  These orders 
are issued to joint strike forces and strike groups. 
• Satellite Communications (SATCOM), Radios, Data Links, and Networks 
– methods of communication used for mission coordination. 
• Simulator – used for training on search, detection, decision-making, and 
mission execution. 
 
The following is a description of the kill chain loop and flows shown in Figure 
23:  
• Sensor data – sensor assets provide threat track and intelligence reports to 
the DIS.   
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• Sensor data fusion – the DIS compiles and fuses the threat sensor data for 
analysis by the PAD.   
• Threat assessment – after the PAD analyzes the fused threat sensor data, 
an assessment is made and a Course of Action (COA) determined.  The 
COA is sent to the W/AS for weapon scheduling. 
• Weapon schedule – the best weapon to engage the threat is scheduled for 
mission execution and kill. 
• Firing/Kill Assessment (KA) report – after weapon engagement, a report 
is created to determine if the threat has been eliminated, or if re-
engagement is necessary. 
• Weapon report – a report is created to determine weapon status.  This 
report covers salvos fired and remaining salvos. 
• Mission assessment – mission status is assessed by the Firing/KA report.  
• Sensor schedule – if threat re-engagement is necessary, then sensors are 
scheduled to provide track and intelligence reports. 
The Architecture Interconnect Diagram (AID) reflects the channels in which 
information is transferred between the architecture modules (Hatley, Hruschka, Pirbhai, 
2000).  Since the focus of this project is on the development of an abstract architecture, 
specifications for physical channels will not be determined.  However, the channels will 
form a local network that binds the architecture modules together.  This local network 
will be made of wired and wireless connections.  See Figure 24.  As with the flows 
depicted on the AFD, all modules will have a common or shared connection leading to 
the Common Services module. 
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Figure 24.   Architecture Interconnect Diagram (AID) for proposed OA model.   
The AID provides a snapshot of the proposed architecture 
interconnections between key functions. 
 
E. FUNCTIONAL DESIGN ANALYSIS  
 
1. Value System Design   
 
The problem definition phase of our Systems Engineering Design Process entails 
the development of a Value System Design (VSD).  The VSD methodology requires the 
definition of system functions that define what the system must do, objectives that 
indicate the preferred direction of attainment of an evaluation consideration (Higher 
probability of kill), a goal that shows the threshold of achievement (Probability of kill > 
0.95) and an evaluation measure that serves as a scale to measure the degree at which we 
attain an objective. 
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During the development of this VSD, it was difficult to obtain access to interview 
senior leaders and key stakeholders.  Therefore, several group sessions and interviews 
were conducted with experienced systems engineers and stakeholder representatives. 
The VSD model supports the Open Architecture functional domain model in a 
FORCEnet environment and its application to Cruise Missile Defense.  In addition, this 
VSD was created at a level of abstraction to systematically support the operational 
Integrated Fire Control scenarios presented in Integrated Fire Control for Future 
Aerospace Warfare (Young, 2005).  Only functional requirements are analyzed; non-
functional requirements are not considered. 
Modeling efforts commenced with allocating system functionality across the kill 
chain.  Four broad levels of combat system functionality were developed and represent 
the high-level activities the CMD system will perform to execute the Integrated Fire 
Control and associated design concepts.  The structure is functionally sub-divided into 
four major functional groups.   
The functions and sub-functions represent the refined activities and provide a 
vehicle to develop the objectives necessary to achieve the result of the mission.  In 
addition, these objectives are the next logical step towards developing the necessary 
evaluation measures needed to determine the fulfillment of each objective. 
The value hierarchy includes functions and sub-functions that are encompassed in 
two network areas to ensure network communications and data sharing.  One set of 
functions and associated sub-functions are related to the local network.  The other set is 
related to the force network.  Open Architecture candidates in both networks are further 
divided into OA Common functions and OA specific functions.   
The VSD process allowed the authors to identify the system functionalities that 
are required to implement a cruise missile defense combat system using FORCEnet and 
OA design concepts.  By going through the exercise of a VSD, the authors were able to 
verify and validate the requirements and problem space that would be used in the 
simulations providing the data for analysis.  The VSD further insured that additional 
redundant or irrelevant requirements and functionality were not placed in the model, 
which had the potential to add unnecessary complexity and obfuscate the results.  
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The following discussion will follow a top-down flow of the functionality of the 
VSD.  Figure 25 is the visual depiction of the value system hierarchy evolving from the 
need statement or the main function into the major functions.  The main function of the 
VSD, the Provide Cruise Missile Defense using ASCMD, is functionally sub-divided into 
four major functions: Maintain Communications; Perform Search, Detection, and 
Tracking; Perform Command and Control; and Perform Engagement.  These major 
functions are indexed at the top center from 1.0 to 4.0 respectively for further 
decomposition and analysis.  The value of each major function compared to the value of 
the Provide Cruise Missile Defense function is shown at the lower right-hand side of each 
major function as a relative weight in decimal of the whole.  The relative weight of each 
major function is added to one as the total weight at the lower right-hand of the main 
function.  The relative weight of each major function is distributed not equally but 
accordingly with its role and importance to support or achieve the main function purpose.  
The Perform Search, Detection, and Tracking is considered the most important role to 
achieve the purpose of the Provide CMD using ASCMD function; thus, it contributes up 
to 0.30 or 30% of the main function weight; Maintain Communications and Perform 
Command & Control functions have the same contribution weight of 0.25 or 25%; and 
Perform Engagement has 0.20 or 20% weight because its performance needs support of 
other major functions.  All the evaluation measures are considered natural and direct 
measures.  These measures focus on the attainment of each of the stated objectives and 
can have a common interpretation.  They focus on the greatest value of the objective 
either in hard terms of quantity such as “number of contacts: identified” and/or quality 
such as “accurate battlegroup (BG) COP.” 
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Figure 25.   Value System Design Hierarchy. 
The representation of the highest-level required functions derived from the 
functional need statement. 
 
The first major function, Maintain Communications, supports the communication 
requirements necessary for the IFC scenarios.  It is an OA-specific function and is 
decomposed into two levels of sub-functions.  In Figure 26, the top-level function of 
Maintain Communications has additional levels showing the sub-functions and their 
relative importance.  The first level of decomposition includes three sub-functions 
decomposed from the major function: Maintain Local Network, Maintain Force Network, 
and Maintain IA.  Then three sub-functions are further decomposed to one more level 
into eight lower sub-functions to capture all functionalities needed for the major function. 
Each level represents a level of abstraction of three decomposed functions or sub-
functions.  Their relative weights at each level represent their individual value in support 
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Figure 26.   Maintain Communications.   
This represents the aggregation of sub-functions that form the Maintain 
Communications function. 
 
The Maintain Local Network sub-function is responsible for ensuring that local 
area networks are able to support real-time data transfer of tactical information between 
organic combat, weapon, and support systems.  It provides the functionality that is 
required for monitoring and troubleshooting data node issues within the platform.  Its 
objectives are to send own ship tracks, receive accurate contact data, and perform nodal 
polling.  Successful completion of these objectives results in BG track correlation, 
seamless data flow, and an accurate BG COP. 
The Maintain Force Network sub-function allows for full interoperability between 
members of the CSG, ESG, and the CAW.  The Composite Warfare Commander uses 
this functionality to send orders to the battlegroup, send and receive Force Orders, 
sharing and updating common tactical picture, receive mission status reports, and for 
communication with high-level headquarter commands. 
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The Maintain Information Assurance system sub-function ensures that those 
system operations required to protect and defend information and information systems 
are executed to ensure information availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, 
and non-repudiation.  Proper monitoring and verification of the network provides 
preventive network security.   
The next top-level block, Perform Search, Detection, and Tracking functionality, 
is an OA-specific function and is decomposed into two levels of sub-functions as shown 
in Figure 27.  The major function is decomposed at the first level into three sub-functions 
including Perform Search, Perform Detection, and Perform Tracking.  Each sub-function 
is further decomposed into two lower sub-functions.  Similar to the decomposition of the 
Maintain Communication function, the relative weights are expressed at each level of 






































































Figure 27.   Value system decomposition of Perform Search, Detection, and Tracking. 
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The sub-function Perform Search is responsible for conducting surveillance using 
all available shipboard sensors.  Sensors include radar systems such as continuous wave, 
frequency-modulated continuous wave, high-resolution, synthetic aperture radar, 
electronic scanning, and the phased array.  Other sensors include electro-optical thermal 
imagers, laser radar systems, electronic support systems, and sonar.  Sensor reports are 
provided for all detections within the sensor coverage for further assessment.  The 
Perform Search functionality will respond to a track cueing from local or remote sensors 
to conduct a targeted sensor search in the battlespace tracks of interest.  Knowledge and 
intention of all platforms within the battlespace are required.   
Perform Detection is the sub-function that evaluates the behavior of an object in 
order to estimate type, quantity, radar cross-section, and identity.  Part of this evaluation 
entails the discrimination of targets in a sea clutter or noise environment.  The object 
must be identified as friend or foe, submitted to, and held by the COP. 
The final sub-function in the Perform Search Detection and Tracking block is the 
Perform Tracking.  This function is responsible for maintaining a system track once the 
primary sensor is selected and scheduled by the combat system.  Track data is used for 
maintaining and updating COP and for conducting threat assessment on possible hostile 
threats or monitoring targets of interest for follow-up actions.  The track data must be 
verified as accurate prior to inclusion in the global grid. 
C2 is the most critical element of a cruise missile defense combat system.  The C2 
process includes the mission planning, directing, and coordinating with local forces and 
higher-level commands as well as controlling local forces and operations.  The system of 
command and control includes the personnel, computer programs, equipment, 
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by the Composite Warfare 
Commander.  This functionality is part of the OA Common functional architecture.  
Perform Command and Control is decomposed into three levels of sub-functions with 
associated relative weights as shown in Figure 28. 
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Figure 28.   Value system decomposition for Perform Command and Control function. 
This represents the aggregation of sub-functions that form the Perform 
Command and Control function. 
 
Perform Data/Information Services (DIS) is the function responsible for 
maintaining situational awareness at the battleforce level by contributing to the 
establishment and maintenance of the COP through track data fusion from multiple 
organic sensors and other sensors within the battleforce.  DIS is also responsible for 
classifying and tracking kinematics of system tracks in order to define track intentions 
and provide the ability to schedule needed sensors.   
The Perform Planning, Assessment, and Decision (PAD) functionality provides 
the ability to conduct mission planning and assessment (mission and threat) as well as the 
ability to communicate and report mission plans and status to the battle group.  The PAD 
will also provide firing policy determination (Shoot-Look-Shoot (S-L-S), Shoot-Shoot 
(S-S), Shoot-Look-Shoot-Shoot (S-L-SS), or Shoot-Shoot-Look-Shoot-Shoot (SS-L-SS)) 
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for the different weapon systems.  Proper completion of mission planning can be 
determined by thorough dissemination of action plan, threat assessment completion, and 
objectives attained.   
Finally, the Perform Weapon/Asset Services ((W/AS) provides the functionality 
required to control weapons, remote vehicles, and engineering assets and services.  This 
function is responsible for scheduling the required weapon and support assets to counter 
an inbound threat in support of cruise missile defense missions.  
As the major function at the end of the kill chain, the Perform Engagement 
functionality has only the two sub-functions at the first level of abstraction, which are 
Engage Threat and Control Engagement. 
The Engage Threat function conducts the engageability calculations required to 
develop a fire control solution, designate preferred weapon scheduling, and support 
systems based on established ROE's and weapon firing policy.  Once the target is 
verified, engaging the threat will consist of confirmation of engagement orders to verify 
threat data, selection of interceptor to determine best target solution, and launching 
interceptor to engage the threat. 
The Control Engagement functionality will provide the ability to maintain in-
flight local or remote control of the interceptor as well as kill assessment reporting.  
Evaluation of the hit or miss will be confirmed with sensors and other damage assessors. 
The Perform Engagement VSD decomposition is shown below in Figure 29.  The 
major function is decomposed into its component parts to the third level of abstraction.  
Additionally, the relative value associated with each sub-function is shown and expressed 
as a decimal percentage.  These values may serve as a baseline for weighting relative 
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Figure 29.   Value system decomposition for Perform Engagement function. 
Engage Threat and Control Engagement form the higher-level functions. 
 
2. Functional Flow Block Diagram  
 
To establish how the functions relate and interface within the system, a Functional 
Flow Block Diagram (FFBD) is developed.  FFBD is defined as “a formal technique for 
defining lower-lever functions and sequencing relationships using a formatted, consistent 
graphical methodology which includes function blocks, flow connections and directions 
and various ways of showing linkages between functional events and their traceability to 
higher-level functions” (Defense Acquisition University, 2007).  FFBD's are broken 
down into first, second, and third functional decomposition levels, identifying the task 
sequences or order of execution and relationships among the functions.  The FFBDs are 
then employed as a reference when constructing the Arena simulation model.  The high-
level FFBD is broken down into the main functional blocks depicted on Figure 30.  
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Constant communication with all nodes must be maintained, therefore the Maintain 
Communications functionality is in parallel with the rest of the function blocks.  Blocks 

















Figure 30.   High-level FFBD for Maintain Communications objective.   
  Maintain Communications is in parallel with function blocks 2.0, 3.0, 4.0. 
 
All three sub-functions of the primary function, Maintain Communication (1.1 
through 1.3), must be executed in parallel to achieve effective communications within a 











Figure 31.   FFBD for Maintain Communications sub-functions.   
The sub-functions Maintain Local Network, Maintain Force Network, and 
Maintain IA all occur in parallel. 
Similar to an Intranet, the Maintain Local Network, Figure 32, has the functions 
of either send or receive data to/from the CS, while monitoring all nodes simultaneously 













Figure 32.   Maintain Local Network FFBD. 
Either Receive or Send Data from CS can be performed, which are in 
parallel to Monitor All Nodes. 
 
Similarly, the Maintain Force Network functions achieve the same concept of 
communications as illustrated above, but in this case it is concerned with the exchange of 











Figure 33.   Maintain Force Network FFBD. 
Either Send BG Orders or Report to BG can be performed, which operate 
in parallel to Send/Receive Force Order. 
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With the exchange of information comes the responsibility of safeguarding and 
ensuring that the information is not compromised in any way.  Figure 34 below reflects 
the Maintain IA FFBD.  These functions must occur at all times and uninterruptedly in 
Figure 34.   Maintain IA FFBD. 
order to achieve a secure network.  
Verify Access operate in parallel to ensure data 
 
 Figure 35 shows the major function subgroup that is responsible for the 
search, etecti
series and can loop. 
 
Figure rveillance is conducted by 
multiple sensors, which operate continuously providing information. 








Secure Network and 
protection. 
 d on, and control of threats.  The search, detect, and track functions occur in 
series and then are repeated in a loop.   
These functions occur in 







36 shows the Perform Search FFBD.  Su
Perform Search FFBD. 










The s e concept as in Figuream  36 above is reflected in Figure 37 below for the 
Perform Detec ed and 
updated on a continuous basis.  The Perform Tracking FFBD in Figure 38 establishes a 
continuous process of updating the Common Operational Picture (COP) and maintaining 
all entities informed.  
Figure 37.   Perform Detection FFBD. 
Once a threat is detected a track report is generated and updated 
continually. 
 
Figure 38.   Perform Tracking FFBD. 
The COP is updated on a continuing basis. 
 
The C2 major sub-function group handles the DIS, PAD, and W/AS.  These 
functions occur in series.  The track picture along with classification is fed to the mission-
planning portion of the combat system, and then a weapon is scheduled to defend against 
the cruise missile threat.  All of this happens on a continuous basis as described in Figure 
39 below. 
 
Figure 39.   Perform Command & Control FFBD. 
These functions occur in series and loop continually. 






















Figure 40 shows the Perform DIS FFBD.  There are two paths.  Either the DIS is 










Figure 40.    FFBD. 
he DIS can perform either of these functions. 
 
With PAD functions, as pictured in Figure 41, the platform will be either planning 
a mission, or evaluating a mission.  Once this is done, the platform is expected to report 
the status to the BG. 
 
  Perform PAD FFBD. 
Conduct of Mission Planning or Assessment must be performed before the 
Report to the Battlegroup. 
 
Figure 42 represents the Perform W/AS FFBD.  Functions dealing with the 
Weapon/Asset Services involve a need either to identify the capability or execute the 














Figure 42.   
Figure 43.   Maintain System Track Repository FFBD. 
Either Maintain Track Kinematics or Maintain Attribute Data can be 
performed. 
Perform W/AS FFBD. 
A capability must be identified or a plan executed and the C2 order given. 
 


















Figure 44.   Conduct Mission Planning FFBD. 
Mission planning functions occur in series. 
 




fire solution te control of the 
missile take nt function.  The process 
ep See Figure 46.   
Figure 46.   Perform Engagement FFBD. 











Conduct Mission Assessment FFBD. 
Either Conduct Threat Assessment & ID or Rate Mission Perfor
be performed. 
Once a defensive measure is launched in the form of an intercepting m
 is calculated, missile is launched, and then guidance or remo














Figure 47 illustrates the launching functions for the Engage Threat FFBD in 
series. 
Figure 47.   Engage Threat FFBD. 
Processes within the threat engagement must occur in series. 
 
While the missile is in the air, the interceptor is guided, and a kill assessment is 
done at the end of flight.  See Figure 48. 
Figure 48.   Control Engagement FFBD. 
ent must occur in series. 
 
. Use Cases 
hooter, Make 
Firing Decision, Fire Weapon, Pass Engagement Control, Receive Engagement Control, 
and Control Engagement.  These use cases are used in combination to perform six IFC 
scenarios proposed in Integrated Fire Control for Future Aerospace Warfare (Young, 
2005).  These use cases and corresponding sequence diagrams create the path into the 
ASCMD simulation model.  The format used for all use case diagrams, textual 
 in accordance with the textbook Object-
Oriented Software Engineering (Bruegge, Dutoit, 2004).  System responses on the textual 
representation of the use cases are indented to distinguish from the actor’s actions.  




















The functions within Control Engagem
3
 
Eleven use cases are identified and examined through the OA functional 
architecture for CMD.  These use cases are Verify Access, Detect Target, Send Threat 
Data, Receive Threat Data, Maintain Track, Determine the Preferred S















Figure 49.   ASCMD use case diagram.   
This diagram covers all the functions that will be simulated in the 
ASCMD simulation model. 
The Ve ess to the 
network.  When a remote or local unit logs onto the network, the system will verify the 
unit’s identification through Force Planning (FP)/Coordination to deny or grant network 
access.  All units are required to be identified and established as nodes on the network for 
commu
 
rify Access use case verifies the unit Identification (ID) for acc
nication throughout the network.  This use case is one of the tools used to 
maintain information assurance for the network since OA is a web-based architecture that 
relies heavily on an Internet Protocol (IP)-based environment (Rushton, 2004).  The 
Verify Access use case is required before any other use cases can be performed.  Network 
security is also maintained by terminating operator’s access if there is no action detected 
or in case of power shutdown.  Flow of events and entry/exit conditions required for this 
use case are described in Table 4.   
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Use Case Name  Verify Access  
Participating Actors  Remote or Local Unit 
Flow of Events 
1. Remote or local unit initiates Network Access through 
Common Services (CS). 
2.          CS sends Access Request to Force Planning / 
Coordination (FP/C) via EXCOMM. 
3.          FP verifies access request and responds to CS of 
requesting unit via network of EXCOMM. 
4.          CS displays/notifies Access Request status (Granted 
or Denied) to requesting Unit and maintains network access 
if granted. 
 
Entry Condition All units are established as nodes on network for the 
communication within Battlegroup.  Interface between OA 
common function and platform-unique function is available. 
 
Exit Condition  Network access is granted.  System automatically 
terminates access if there is no operator’s input in 10 
minutes or system power down. 
 
Quality Requirements  Time required for verifying access is no more than 10 
seconds.  
Table 4.   Use Case: Verify Access.   
The unit Identification (ID) for access to the network is verified. 
 
Figure 50 describes the sequence of events in the Verify Access use case between 
the unit and the system.  The unit accesses the network through Common Services (CS).  
CS includes displays, input and output control consoles (IOCC), and other monitoring 
services as database and time synchronizers.  Unit’s ID is sent through EXCOMM to FP 
for verification and denied or granted access, then sent back to unit at the CS display.  
EXCOMM also disseminates unit’s ID to all nodes for sharing data and communication.  








 Figure 50.   
ts are reflected. 
 
The next use case explored is Detect Target.  Either a remote or local unit can use 
the Detect Target use case to search and detect threats in the environment, but a remote 
unit is more favorable for this use case because it can provide an earlier warning increase 
reaction time.  The searching unit initiates a search function at the IOCC of CS and the 
system will automatically perform sequential actions and responses.  CS sends search 
request to Data Information Services (DIS) and DIS schedules sensors from Search and 
 
 
Verify Access sequence diagram.   
Timing and sequence of even
Figure 51.   Flow of events for the Verify Access use case. 
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Detect h.  If a target is detected, S&D reports sensor data to DIS and 
IS f ses se nds to Planning, Assessment, and Decision 
sment. es (W/AS) receives threat data from 
o PAD for decision.  Threat 
d to all ent.  
All units are aware of the batt y course of action, disposition of 
own force, and logistics t it is the 
first step in the kill chain e ng is 
received, the higher the p  
target detection to threat diss
10 seconds.  Flow of events and entry/exit conditions required for this use case are 
ble 5.  
 describes th  
the unit and the system and w
nit starts its search function through the CS.  CS includes displays, IOCC, and other 
ces as databa IS.  DIS 
keeps track repository, system r data 
sion.  DIS receives search request, schedules sensors, and receives sensor data from 
udes 
tactical picture, threat assess ion assignment, or C2 order, and aid in making 
decision.  PAD assesses threat and sends to W/AS for weapon assessment.  W/AS 
p a assesses weapon availability, and schedules 
weapon for engagement or re-engagement.  W pon assessment from W/AS is sent to 
PAD to
(S&D) to searc
displays at CS.  D u nsor data and se
(PAD) for threat asses  Weapon/ Asset Servic
PAD, assesses best weapon response, and sends response t
data is distribute nodes of the network through the web-based C2 environm
lespace environment, enem
ail (Rushton, 2004).  Detection is very critical because 
: D tect, Control, and Engagement.  The earlier the warni
robability of survival.  Search time has no limits, but time from
emination through the network can be complete in the first 
described in Ta
Figure 52 e sequence of events in the Detect Target use case between
here the information is distributed through multicast.  The 
u
monitoring servi se and time synchronizers.  CS sends request to D
 track, and track kinematics for scheduling sensors o
fu
S&D.  Sensor data received from S&D is fused at DIS and sent to PAD.  PAD incl
ment, miss
erforms we pon inventory, reports or 
ea
 complete tactical picture, assign mission or C2 order, and aid in making decision.  
All units in the battlespace are informed and share all threat data through EXCOMM.  
EXCOMM includes data links, satellite, and radio for data transmission and 
communication.  EXCOMM disseminates data to all units on the network for situation 
awareness and readiness.  After detecting and disseminating the threat, the search unit 
keeps monitoring the target to update track for follow-up action.  Figure 53 shows the 
FFBD of the events. 
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Use Case Name  Detect Target 
Participating Actors  Remote or Local Unit 
 
Flow of Events 
1. The searching unit initiates search at Common Services 
(CS). 
2. CS sends search request to Data Information Services (DIS) 
and informs search-in-progress to other units and Force 
Planning/Coordination (FP/C) through EXCOMM 
3. DIS schedules sensors of Search/Detection (S/D) to search.  
4. The searching unit monitors environment through CS.  
5. Target detected by sensors from S/D is reported to CS and 
sent to DIS for track repository.   
6. DIS requests sensor data from S/D for fusion.  
7. S/D reports sensor data to CS for recording and display, 
and to DIS for fusion. 
a to CS for recording and sends fused 
ecision (PAD) for threat 
cluding FP/C. 
9. PAD assesses threat and reports to detecting unit at CS, to 
W/AS for capability assessment, to other units and FP 
through EXCOMM. 
10. The searching unit keeps monitoring or tracking the threat 
for follow up action 
11. W/AS reports capability against threat to searching unit 
through CS and PAD, and disseminates to other units and 
FP. 
 
Entry Condition Interface between OA common function and platform-






8. DIS reports fused dat
data to Planning Assessment D
assessment and to other units in
  
 
Exit Conditio   Target is detected, reported, and 
 
 
 Requirements  Time from detecting to disseminating capability against 
threat is no more than 10 seconds. 
 
 
Table 5.   Use Case: Detect Target 
Threats are searched and detected in the environment. 
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 Figure 52.   Detect Target sequence diagram.   
Timing and sequence of events are reflected. 
 
 
Figure 53.   Flow of events (FFBD) for Detect Target use case. 
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In the Send Threat Data use case either a remote or a local unit can send threat 
case is widely used by detecting units 
a firing  to keep tracking a threat for further 
etwork for sharing, this use 
ed because a unit in action may be a newly joint unit or temporarily 
network-disconnected unit.  The sending unit identifies the candidate unit and initiates 
sending the threat data at  
requisite functions.  CS s ing 
acknowledgement from th
data to receiving unit.  T  the 
sending unit.  This use cas  
enough time to take follo b-based C2 
environment employing c ).  
Flow of events and entry/ t  
6.  
Figure 54 describ  
between the unit and the sy tarts 
sending actions through  
services as database and ves 
acknowledgement through th d 
radio for data transmiss unication.  EXCOMM provides the path for 
 and data transmission.  CS sends threat data request to DIS.  DIS keeps 
system track  
 the receiving unit.  EXCOMM sends confirmation of data receipt from the receiving 
S of the sen nts. 
data to another unit in the environment.  This use 
sending threat data to  unit or by a local unit
action.  Although threat data is disseminated through the n
case is still need
the IOCC of CS and the system will automatically perform the 
ends notification to receiving unit.  When receiv
e receiving unit, CS of sending unit requests DIS to send threat 
he receiving unit responds upon receipt of threat data to
e should be complete within 3 seconds so the receiving unit has
w-up action.  Threat data is sent through the we
ollaborative web tools like Chart or Knowledge Web (KWEB
exi  conditions required for this use case are described in Table
es the sequence of events in the Send Threat Data use case
stem and where the information is sent.  The unit s
the CS.  CS includes displays, IOCC, and other monitoring
time synchronizers.  CS notifies the receiving unit and recei
e EXCOMM.  EXCOMM includes data links, satellite, an
ion and comm
communication
track repository, , and track kinematics.  DIS sends threat data as requested
to
unit to DIS and C ding unit.  Figure 55 shows the FFBD of the eve
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Use Case Name  Send Threat Data 
 
Participating Actors  Remote or Local Unit   
 
 
Flow of Events 
1. Sending unit initiates sending action at Common Services 
(CS). 
2. CS sends notification to the receiving unit through 
EXCOMM 
3. EXCOMM transmits notification to receiving unit. 
4. EXCOMM transmits acknowledgement to CS of sending 
unit. 
5. CS displays acknowledgement to sending unit 
6. CS requests DIS to send threat data/track  
7. DIS sends threat data/track to the receiving unit through 
EXCOMM. 
its threat data/track to receiving unit 
ation of receipt to sending 
unit CS. 
10. CS displays confirmation of receipt to sending unit 
 
Entry Condition Network access is granted.  Receiving Unit is identified and 
threat/track data is available for transmission. 
 
Exit Condition  Send Unit receives a confirmation from EXCOMM. 
 
Quality Requirements  Time from notification to receipt confirmation is no more 
than 3 seconds. 
 
  
Table 6.   Use Case: Send Threat Data.   









 Figure 54.   Send Threat Data sequence diagram.   
Timing and sequence of events are reflected. 
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The fourth use case is Receive Threat Data.  Either a remote or a local unit can 
nt.  This use case is widely used in 
ase a firing unit or a local unit needs threat data from a detecting unit to keep tracking a 
seminated through the network for 
 may be a newly joint unit or 
mporarily network-disconnected unit.  The receiving unit, which is active on the 
ds to the notif
system will automatically perfo uential actions and responses.  The threat data from 
the sending unit is sent to DIS .  The 
receiving unit responds upon r  case 
should be complete within 3  
follow-up action.  Threat data i employing 
collaborative web tools like Ch s 
required for this use case are described in Table 7.  
Figure 56 describes the e 
between the unit and the system re the information is sent.  The EXCOMM sends 
the notification to the S sends 
rough the CS and the EXCOMM.  The 
ceiving unit via the CS.  The receiving unit sends confirmation of data receipt through 
OMM to the s. 
 
receive threat data from another unit in the environme
c
threat for further action.  Although threat data is dis
sharing, this use case is still necessary since a unit in action
te
network, respon ication of the sending unit at the IOCC of CS and the 
rm seq
of the receiving unit and the DIS reports to the CS
eceipt of threat data to the sending unit.  This use
seconds so the receiving unit has enough time to take
s sent through the web-based C2 environment 
art or KWEB.  Flow of events and entry/exit condition
 sequence of events in the Receive Threat Data use cas
 and whe
C of the receiving unit.  The receiving unit 
acknowledgement to the sending unit th
EXCOMM sends threat data to the DIS and DIS reports receipt of threat data to the 
re




Use Case Name  Receive Threat Data 
 
Participating Actors  Remote or Local Unit  
 
 
Flow of Events 
1. EXCOMM transmits notification to Common Services 
(CS) of the receiving unit. 
2. CS reports notification from the sending unit to 
receiving unit. 
3. Receiving unit sends acknowledgement at CS. 
4. CS sends acknowledgement to the sending unit through 
EXCOMM. 
5. EXCOMM transmits acknowledgement to sending unit. 
6. EXCOMM transmits threat data/track from sending unit 
t data to CS. 
8. CS reports threat data/track to receiving unit. 
9. Receiving unit confirms receipt of threat data/track at 
CS.   
10. CS sends confirmation of receipt to the sending unit 
through EXCOMM 




Entry Condition Network access is granted.  Receiving unit receives 
notification through EXCOMM. 
 
Exit Condition  Receiving Unit completes transmission of confirmation. 
 
Quality Requirements  Time from receipt of notification to complete transmission 
of confirmation is no more than 5 seconds 
  
Table 7.   Use Case: Receive Threat Data.   
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Figure 
Figure 57.   Flow of events for Receive Threat Data use case. 
 
 
56.   Receive Threat Data sequence diagram.   
Timing and sequence of events are reflected. 
 
 
Either a remote or local unit can use the Maintain Track use case to monitor and 
the en et is detected or following a receipt of 
reat data.  This use case is also used with the Control Engagement use case to provide 
e track g function at the IOCC of CS and 
d responses.  Sensors of the 
acking unit are scheduled to track in accordance with available threat data.  Sensor data 
r data track upda  
PAD for threat assessment and a r weapon assessment, and to 
EXCOMM for dissemination thr te their 
situation awareness.  Tracking t  updated 
track should not take more than
required for this use case are desc
Figure 58 describes the 
between the unit and the system. ns through the 
IOCC of the CS.  CS sends requ rs 
from S&D to track in accordanc  threat data.  S&D sends sensor data to DIS for 
track updates.  DIS sends the u  or 
threat assessment.  PAD sends ta
via CS and to the EXCOMM r mination.  All units in the battlespace are informed 
and share all threat data through the EXCOMM.  The EXCOMM disseminates data to all 
t keeps 
monitoring the threat/target  environment.  Figure 59 
ows the FFBD of the events. 
keep track of threats in vironment after a targ
th
in-flight guidance.  Th ing unit initiates trackin
the system will automatically perform sequential actions an
tr
is sent to DIS fo tes and displayed at CS.  DIS sends threat/track data to
ction planning, to W/AS fo
ough the network.  All units share data to upda
ime from tasking sensors to disseminating the
 10 seconds.  Flow of events and entry/exit conditions 
ribed in Table 8.  
sequence of events in the Maintain Track use case 
  The tracking unit starts tracking functio
est for tasking sensors to DIS.  DIS schedules senso
e with
pdated threat/track data to PAD for tactical picture
ctical picture and threat assessment to the tracking unit 
disse fo
units on the network for situation awareness and readiness.  The tracking uni





Use Case Name  Maintain Track 
 
Participating Actors  Remote or Local Unit  
 
 
Flow of Events 
1. Tracking Unit tasks sensors to track in accordance with 
track data at Common Services (CS). 
2. CS sends track data to Data Information Services (DIS) 
and CS. 
3. DIS schedules sensor to track. 
4. Search/Detection (S/D) reports sensor data/track to DIS 
and CS 
5. DIS sends target track to Planning Assessment Decision 
(PAD) for composing a Tactical Picture 
6. PAD provides Tactical Picture to tracking unit through 
CS and disseminates to other units and Force 
Planning/Coordination (FP/C) through EXCOMM 
actical Picture to tracking unit. 
ng target track for follow-up 
actions. 
 
Entry Condition Network access is granted and threat / track data is 
available 
 
Exit Condition  CS displays/reports Tactical Picture to tracking unit. 
 
Quality Requirements  Time from tasking sensors to disseminating Tactical 
Picture is no more than 10 seconds 
 
Table 8.   Use Case: Maintain Track.   






7. CS displays/reports the T





detected.   
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 Figure 58.   Maintain Track sequence diagram. 
Figure 59.   Flow of events for Maintain Track use case. 
 





Either a remote or a local unit can use the Determine the Preferred Shooter use 
ing unit against the existing threat 
etermined by target geometry and operational capability.  This use case is used after a 
ollowin ta.  The requesting unit initiates a 
 will automatically perform 
quential actions and responses.  The determination request is sent to the PAD for 
ent.  The PAD s 
sharing data for engagement units through the 
EXCOMM.  After gathering d
the best shooter for the current it.  The PAD also 
multicasts the Preferred Shoote a 
to update their situation aware  
disseminating the determinatio ts 
and entry/exit conditions requir
Figure 60 describes the r 
use case between the unit and t
IOCC of the CS.  The CS sends the request of engagement determination to the PAD.  
The PAD acquires the ca nd geometry of the requesting unit in the PAD and 
of other 
nits to the PAD and the PAD determines the best shooter for engaging the current threat.  
s the preferre ates to 
ll units through the EXCOMM.  All units in the battlespace are informed of the best 
 
case to take advantage of the most effective fir
d
target is detected or f g a receipt of threat da
determination request at the IOCC of the CS and the system
se
mission assessm assesses the capability of the requesting unit and accesse
 geometry and capability of other 
ata and using decision-making aids, the PAD determines 
 threat and reports to the requesting un
r to all units through the EXCOMM.  All units share dat
ness.  Determination time from receiving the request to
n should not take more than 5 seconds.  Flow of even
ed for this use case are described in Table 9.  
sequence of events in the Determine the Preferred Shoote
he system.  The requesting unit initiates the request at the 
pability a
other units through the EXCOMM.  The EXCOMM responds with capability 
u
The PAD report d shooter to the requesting unit via CS and dissemin
a




Use Case Name  Determine the Preferred Shooter 
 
 
Participating Actors  Remote or Local Unit. 
 
 
Flow of Events 
1. Requesting Unit initiates a request to determine the best 
shooter in current situation through the Common Services 
(CS). 
2. CS sends a request to the PAD for a determination. 
3. PAD assesses the Engagement Geometry and Ability of 
the Requesting Unit. 
4. PAD acquires the Engagement Geometry and Ability of 
other units through sharing data. 
5. PAD determines the best shooter of the current situation. 
st shooter to requesting unit through 
nits and FP through 
EXCOMM 
7.  CS reports the best shooter to requesting unit. 
 
 
Entry Condition Network access is granted and threat data is available. 
 
 
Exit Condition  The dissemination of the determination. 
 
 
Quality Requirements  Time from receiving the request to completing 
dissemination of the preferred shooter is no more than 5 
seconds. 
 
Table 9.   Use Case: Determine the Preferred Shooter.  
The most effective firing unit is used against an existing threat based on 
target geometry and operational capability. 
 
  
6. PAD reports the be






 Figure 60.   Determine the Preferred Shooter.  




Figure 61.   Flow of events for the Determine the Preferred Shooter use case. 
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A remote or a local unit can use the Make Firing Decision use case to determine 
or fir g.  T e if the firing should be 
erformed by the remote or a local unit for a certain threat.  The requesting unit initiates a 
etermination request at the IOCC of the CS and the system will automatically perform 
n request is sent to the PAD for 
t weapon and accesses the 
ctical picture in the PAD.  After gathering data and using decision-making aids, the 
 the suitability e 
requesting unit.  The PAD al
network.  All units share data  time 
from receiving the request to d  
3 seconds.  Flow of events a  
described in Table 10.   
Figure 62 describes the  
between the unit and the system CC of 
the CS.  The CS sends the requ ssesses the 
threat and capability of the requesting units through the W/AS.  The W/AS reports the 
pdated capability to the P e PAD determines and reports the suitability to engage 
ugh 
e EXCOMM for situation awareness.  Figure 63 shows the FFBD of the events. 
 
unit suitability f in his use case is used to determin
p
d
sequential actions and responses.  The determinatio
mission assessment.  The PAD queries W/AS for curren
ta
PAD determines  for firing against the current threat and reports to th
so disseminates the determination to other units in the 
to update their situation awareness.  Determination
isseminating the determination should not take more than
nd entry/exit conditions required for this use case are
sequence of events in the Make Firing Decision use ca
.  The requesting unit initiates the request at the IO
se
est to assess suitability to the PAD.  The PAD a
u AD.  Th





Use Case Name  Making Firing Decision 
 
 
Participating Actors  Remote or Local Unit  
 
 
Flow of Events 
1. Unit determines suitability for firing through Common 
Services (CS). 
2. CS requests Planning Assessment Decision (PAD) for 
assessing suitability. 
3. PAD assesses capability through Weapon/Asset Services 
(W/AS). 
4. PAD assesses capability against threat and reports to CS 
and disseminates to other units in the network. 
5. CS reports determination of suitability for firing to 
 
 
Entry Condition Interface between OA common function and platform-
unique function is available and network access is granted.  
Threat data is available. 
 
 
Exit Condition  Suitability of firing is determined. 
 
 
Quality Requirements  Time from inquiring determination to receiving 
determination is no more than 3 seconds.  
 . 









A unit’s suitability for firing is determined. 
 107 
 Figure 63.   Flow of events for Make Firing Decision use case. 
 
 
Figure 62.   Make Firing Decision sequence diagram.  
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Legend:         OA Platform-Unique Function,        OA Common Function
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Either remote or local units can use the Fire Weapon use case to intercept the 
e the Preferred Shooter or Make 
iring Decision use case.  The firing unit sends fire orders at the IOCC of the CS and the 
stem will automatically perform sequential actions and responses.  The CS sends the 
 and d r to all units.  The W/AS functions 
 and schedules weapon for 
ngagement as ordered.  The W/AS receives the fire order from the CS and schedules 
ission Execu on 
systems that fire or launch guns ngage threat.  The ME fires interceptor as 
ordered and reports firing statu  at 
the CS.  The W/AS sends repo
current situation awareness.  T  
missile engaging the threat and t evaluates 
the KA report from the ME for oop in 
accordance with ship doctrine Shoot-Look-Shoot until the threat is killed or leaked.  The 
KA report is disseminated to all units in the battlespace to maintain the situation 
awareness.  Time from sending Fire Order to W/AS until receiving firing status from the 
 more than 3
for this use case are described
Figure 64 describes the sequence of events in the Fire Weapon use case between 
e unit and the system.  The firing unit initiates Fire Order at the IOCC of the CS.  The 
e Order to th pon for firing at the ME.  
he ME fires weapon as scheduled and reports the firing status to the W/AS and the CS.  
 The W/AS 
also disseminates to all units en ss.  Figure 65 
threat.  This use case can be used after the Determin
F
sy
fire order to the W/AS isseminates the fire orde
as a weapon control system that keeps weapon inventory
e
weapon at the M tion (ME) for engagement.  The ME includes weap
 or missiles to e
s to the weapon control system at W/AS and displays
rt of firing to the PAD and disseminates to all units for 
he ME also provides in-flight guidance to control the
performs Kill Assessment (KA).  The firing uni
 re-engagement.  This process can take place in a l
ME should be no  seconds.  Flow of events and entry/exit conditions required 
 in Table 11.  
th
CS sends the Fir e W/AS.  The W/AS schedules wea
T
The firing unit monitors KA reports from the ME to decide for reengagement. 
through the EXCOMM for situation awar e




Use Case Name  Fire Weapon(s) 
 
 
Participating Actors  Remote or Local Unit  
 
 
Flow of Events 
1. Firing Unit executes firing orders by sending Fire Order 
at Common Services (CS). 
2. CS sends request to fire weapon to  Weapon / Asset 
Services (W/AS) and disseminates firing order to other 
units and Force Planning (FP)/Coordination  through 
EXCOMM 
3. W/AS schedules to fire weapon at Mission Execution 
(ME). 
4. ME fires weapon(s) and reports firing status to W/AS. 
5. W/AS reports firing status to CS, Planning Assessment 
Decision (PAD), and disseminates firing status through 
EXCOMM 
6. Firing Unit monitors firing status. 
7. ME reports KA to W/AS. 
 unit and disseminates through 
 assigns weapon to reengage 




Entry Condition Network access is granted.  Firing decision is made. 
 
 
Exit Condition  A Kill or Leak is reported and disseminated. 
 
 
Quality Requirements  Time from sending Fire Order to W/AS until receiving 
firing status from the ME is no more than 3 seconds. 




8. W/AS reports KA to firing
EXCOMM. 




   
Either a remote or a local unit can engage an incom
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Figure 64.   Fire Weapon sequence diagram.   
Timing and sequence of events are reflected. 
 
Figure 65.   Flow of events for Fire Weapon use case. 
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A local or firing unit can use the Pass Engagement Control use case to pass 
s used in case a firing unit is firing to 
ngage a threat beyond its own sensor range or defending a raid.  Although threat data is 
the netw e case is still needed because a unit 
 action may be a newly joint unit or temporarily network-disconnected unit.  The 
ding the engagement control 
 of CS and the system will automatically perform sequential actions and 
responses.  CS sends notificati  
from the receiving unit, CS of s  data 
to the receiving unit.  The rec ol 
data to the sending unit.  This use case should be complete within 3 seconds so the 
receiving unit has enough time exit 
conditions required for this use 
Figure 66 describes the e 
case between the firing unit and formation is sent.  The firing 
unit starts sending action throu ving unit and receives 
through the EXCOMM.  When
sending unit, the CS requests 
unit.  This use case concludes ipt 
from the receiving unit to DIS and CS of the sending unit.  Figure 67 shows the FFBD of 
the events. 
engagement control to a remote unit.  This use case i
e
disseminated through ork for sharing, this us
in
sending unit identifies the candidate unit and initiates sen
data at the IOCC
on to receiving unit.  Once acknowledgement is received
ending unit requests DIS to send engagement control
eiving unit responds upon receipt of engagement contr
 to take follow-up action.  Flow of events and entry/
case are described in Table 12.  
 sequence of events in the Pass Engagement Control us
 the system and where the in
gh the CS.  CS notifies the recei
 EXCOMM sends the acknowledgement to the CS of the 
the DIS to send the engagement control to the receiving 




Use Case Name  Pass Engagement Control 
 
 
Participating Actors  Remote or Local Unit  
 
 
Flow of Events 
1. Sending unit initiates sending engagement control at 
Common Services (CS). 
2. CS sends notification to the receiving unit through 
EXCOMM. 
3. EXCOMM transmits notification to receiving unit. 
4. EXCOMM transmits acknowledgement to CS of sending 
t to sending unit. 
6. Sending unit sends engagement control data at CS 
7. CS requests the DIS to send engagement control data to 
the receiving unit through EXCOMM  
8. EXCOMM transmits engagement control data to 
receiving unit  
9. EXCOMM transmits confirmation of receipt to sending 
unit CS  
10. CS displays confirmation of receipt to sending unit. 
 
Entry Condition Network access is granted.  Firing status is a success launch. 
 
 
Exit Condition  A confirmation is received from the EXCOMM.  
 
 
Quality Requirements  Time from sending notification to receiving confirmation is 
no more than 5 seconds. 
 
Table 12.   Use Case: Pass Engagement Control. 









range or defending a raid. 
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 Figure 67.   Flow of events for Pass Engagement Control use case. 
Figure 66.   Pass Engagement Control sequence diagram.   




Either a remote or a local unit can use the Receive Engagement Control use case 
 receive engagement control from a firing unit.  This use case is used in case a remote 
on to engag d the sensor range of the firing 
nit, or a local unit can help a firing unit to engage multiple threats.  Although threat data 
s use case is still needed because a 
nit in action may be a newly joint unit or temporarily network-disconnected unit.  The 
he notification of the sending 
 of CS and the system will automatically perform sequential actions and 
responses.  The engagement c  the 
receiving unit and the DIS repo eipt of 
engagement control data to the thin 3 
seconds to allow enough time 
events and entry/exit conditions  13.  
Figure 68 describes the ontrol 
use case between the unit an e 
EXCOMM sends the notificat ing unit 
sends acknowledgement to the e 
EXCOMM sends engagement control data to the DIS of the receiving unit and DIS 
reports receipt of engagem iving 




unit has no weap  e the threat, which is beyon
u
is disseminated through network for sharing data, thi
u
receiving unit, which is active on the network, responds to t
unit at the IOCC
ontrol data from the sending unit is sent to DIS of
rts to the CS.  The receiving unit responds upon rec
 sending unit.  This use case should be complete wi
for the receiving unit to take follow-up actions.  Flow of 
 required for this use case are described in Table
 sequence of events in the Receive Engagement C
d the system and where the information is sent.  Th
ion to the CS of the receiving unit.  The receiv
 sending unit through the CS and the EXCOMM.  Th
ent control data to the receiving unit via the CS.  The rece
Figure 69 shows f the events. 
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 Use Case Name  Receive Engagement Control 
 
Participating Actors  Remote or Local Unit  
 
 
Flow of Events 
1. EXCOMM transmits notification to Common Services 
(CS) of receiving unit. 
2. CS reports notification from the sending unit to receiving 
unit. 
3. Receiving unit sends acknowledgement at CS. 
4. CS sends acknowledgement to the sending unit through 
EXCOMM. 
5. EXCOMM transmits acknowledgement to sending unit 
ent control data from 
7. CS reports engagement control data to receiving unit 
8. Receiving unit confirms receipt of engagement control 
data at CS. 
9. CS sends confirmation of receipt to the sending unit 
through EXCOMM 








Exit Condition  A confirmation of receipt is sent to the sending unit. 
 
Quality Requirements  Time from receiving notification to sending confirmation is 
no more than 5 seconds. 
 
Table 13.   Use Case: Receive Engagement Control.   
hreat that is beyond 





6. EXCOMM transmits engagem




Used in case a remote unit has no weapon to engage a t
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Figure 68.   Receive Engagement Control sequence diagram. 
Timing and sequence of events are reflected.   
 




Either a remote or a local unit can use the Control Engagement use case to 
ce to the missile for engaging the threat.  This use case is used after the 
ement Control use case.  The 
ontrolling unit initiates the action to provide the guidance at the IOCC of the CS and the 
s and responses.  The CS requests 
/threat data to the W/AS and 
des guidance to the ME.  The ME uses this guidance data for weapon 
control to engage threat and rep e 
in-flight guidance is no more th
 Figure 70 describes the sequence of events in the Control Engagement use case 
between the unit and the system a 
obtained from the Maintain Track use case to provide guidance to the in-flight 
interceptor.  The controlling u o 
provide guidance control.  The to the DIS.  The 
DIS sends threat/track data to he 
threat/track data to provide guidance to the ME.  The ME uses the guidance to control the 
weapon for threat engagement. d to 
the CS.  The W/AS also dissem
Figure 70.   
Timing and sequence of events are reflected. 
provide guidan
missile is fired and after the Fire Weapon or Receive Engag
c
system will automatically perform sequential action
track/threat data from the DIS.  The DIS provides the track
the W/AS provi
orts KA to the W/AS and CS.  Time for uplink to provid
an 5 seconds all of which are described in Table 14.  
.  The engagement is controlled by using track/threat dat
nit initiates the control action at the IOCC of the C
CS sends the request for track/threat data 
S t
 W/AS and to CS for display, which in turn uses t
  Lastly, the ME sends the KA report to the W/AS an
inates to all units through the EXCOMM for SA.  
 




Use Case Name  Control Engagement 
 
 
Participating Actors  Remote or Local Unit  
 
 
Flow of Events 
1. Unit controls engagement by providing guidance through 
Common Services (CS). 
2. CS requests Data Information Services (DIS) for threat 
track/data. 
3. DIS sends threat track for in-flight guidance to 
Weapon/Asset Service (W/AS)  
ile Execution (ME) 
issile in-flight to engage 
threat. 
6. ME reports Kill Assessment (KA) to W/AS and CS 
7. W/AS reports KA to other units and Force Planning 




Entry Condition Network access is granted.  Threat data/Track (through 




Exit Condition  A Kill or Miss is reported and disseminated. 
 
Quality Requirements  Time for uplink to provide in-flight guidance is no more 
than 5 seconds. 
 
 
Table 14.   Use Case: Control Engagement.   
A local or remote unit provides guidance to its ordnance (missile) for 




4. W/AS provides guidance to Miss






Figure 71.   Flow of events for Control Engagement use case. 
The three selected IFC scenarios from Integrated Fire Control for Future 
Aerospace Warfare (Young, 2005) including Precision Cue, Launch on Remote, and 
Preferred Shooter Determination scenarios are presented as combination of selec
 
ted use 
cases in the following use case diagrams (Figures 72 through 74): 
Figure 72.   Reflection of the combination of the above use cases between the remote 





Maintain Track Remote Unit Local or Firing Unit
Verify Access
and local units to form the Precision Cue I
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Figure 73.   remote 
n the remote 
and local units to form the Preferred Shooter Determination use case. 
 
 
The class diagrams in Figures 75 and 76 also use the format from the Object-
Oriented Software Engineering textbook (Bruegge, Dutoit, 2004).  The FORCEnet class 
diagrams desc hips, 
associations, attributes, and operations.  The class diagrams include three main classes of 
FORCEnet: Composite Warfare Commander (CWC), FIGHTING UNIT, and GEO UNIT 
ASCMD
Reflection of the  










 combination of the above use cases between the
 form the Launch on Remote IFC
ASCMD
Verify Access
Figure 74.   Reflection of the combination of the above use cases betwee
4. Class Diagrams 












connected via association.  The CWC includes Force commanders or Command and 
Control (C2) authorities that plan, coordinate, and control the fighting and geo units via 
FORCEnet and local networks.  The fighting units include all remote and local fighting 
units such as CG, DDG, or frigates that operate within the battlespace and provide 
battlegroup defense by detecting and engaging all threats.  For the cruise missile defense 
mission, the fighting units detect and engage a THREAT class that includes subsonic and 
supersonic cruise threats capable of attacking surface ships.  The GEO UNIT class 
provides FORCEnet and local network links for communication among FIGHTING 
UNITS and CWC.  Three main classes are linked or networked through a subclass called 
EXCOMM.  The associations among the EXCOMM subclass and the GEO UNIT, CWC, 
and FIGHTING UNIT class are represented by shared aggregation.  This means that the 
GEO UNIT, CWC, and FIGHTING UNIT classes exist independently.  The subclass 
EXCOMM is composed of communication assets from three main classes including 
network, radios, data links, and satellite communications. 
Figure 75.   FORCEnet class diagram.   
This diagram describes the types of objects in the architecture, their static 
relationships, attributes, and operations.   
 
The FIGHTING UNIT class includes the remote and local fighting units.  Remote 
fighting units are surface combatants such as CG, DDG, or frigates that are operational 
beyond the lin urface combatants 
such as CG, DDG, or frigates that are operational within the line of sight from the main 
Network  
Radios    
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e of sight from the main body.  Local fighting units are s
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body.  Each remote or local fighting unit is composed of subclasses that include S&D, 
DIS, PAD, W/AS, ME, CS, and EXCOMM.  These subclasses and their associations with 
the Local Unit and Remote Unit subclasses are modeled through shared aggregation.  The 
local unit and remote unit subclasses are similarly associated to the FIGHTING UNIT 
class through shared aggregation.  The subclasses originate from the OA Warfare System 
Domain Model.  S&D provides sensor assets to search, detect, and track targets.  Target 
track data is forwarded to DIS for compilation and fusion.  DIS supports tracking by 
scheduling sensors for tracking and by messaging fused data to PAD for analysis and 
threat assessment.  PAD analyzes the fused data for potential threats and assesses the 
threat as needed.  If threats exist, PAD coordinates target prosecution with C2.  Targeting 
s 
allocation and E controls the 
engagement and conducts BDA.  CS displays the status of the tactical environment, 
maintains databases, and synchronizes time.  Communications are maintained and linked 
by EXCOMM and provide the networks, radios, data links, and satellite communications 
needed to execute tactical actions and keep all units in the battlespace informed.  The 
training class is associated with S&D, PAD, ME, CS, and EXCOMM to provide 
sustaining training for theater operators. 
orders are forwarded to W/AS for weapons allocation and scheduling.  Weapon
schedules are forwarded to ME for weapons assignment.  M
Figure 76.   FORCEnet class diagram continued.   
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5. Control Flow and Data Flow Diagrams 
 
The Data Context Diagram (DCD) and Control Context Diagram (CCD), 
represented by Figure 77 below, are the top-level data and control flow diagrams for the 
Perform CMD architecture that define the boundary between the system and the 
operational environment.  They are represented in parallel to illustrate their differences; 
the DCD represents the process view while the CCD represents the control flow view.  
Both models are composed of a single input and output flow process: Perform CMD as 
the main system function, two repeated terminators represented by (*), one input and 
output for the DCD, and one input and output flow for the CCD.  The target is repeated 
for both input and output terminators because it is the only object that the system must 
detect and provide solutions to encounter.  Track data as the data flow input is detected 
by the system on the DCD depending on the control flow input as observables or 
signature threshold performed by the system on the CCD, and engagement solutions as 
the data flow output is provided by the system depending on the Rule of Engagement as 
the control flow output.  Neither diagram represents data stores because the intrinsic 
nature of cruise missile defense requires that data be manipulated into near real-time 
information for immediate tactical action.  Thus, the data and control flow entities 
passing through the process are perishable and without shelf life, rendering data store 
representation irrelevant.  The diagrams are identical for all IFC and tactical scenarios 
due to process and functional commonality, thus negating the need for additional IFC or 
tactical scenario specific models. 
Both the DCD and CCD model the kill chain functions in the context of the 
OODA loop.  The difference between the DCD and the CCD is that the CCD provides 
command and control functions and includes the information assurance function prior to 
d and most significant difference between the 
DCD and the C ehaves like a switch; it activates 
and terminates processes.  The data flow associated with the DCD represents process 
inputs and outputs as being activated or deactivated by the control flow of the CCD. 
 
any weapon-target engagement.  The secon
CD is that the control flow of the CCD b
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Figure 77.   Perform CMD Data Context Diagram (DCD) and Control Context 
Diagram (CCD). 



















As mentioned above, the kill chain functions were modeled in the context of the 
Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop, which requires elaboration.  See Table 15 
below.  As illustrated by the Table, the OODA loop models CMD engagements at a 
higher level of abstraction than the kill chain.  The OODA loop Orient function is 
represented by two kill chain functions, Fix and Track.  The OODA loop Observe 
function is represented twice to parallel the kill chain Find and Assess functions.  The kill 
chain targeting functions mirrors the OODA loop Decide function.  Each representation 
describes a serial-continuous process versus a one-step concerted process as will be 
discussed by the following Data Flow Diagram (DFD) and Control Flow Diagram (CFD).  
The kill chain and OODA loop functions share identical process terminators (*) located 
at the beginning and end of an engagement at the Find*-Observe* and Assess*-Observe* 
function pairing. 
 125 













Table 15.   Kill chain versus OODA loop functionality.   
The Table identifies the kill chain functions and places them alongside the 
equivalent OODA loop functions. 
 
The Data Flow Diagram (DFD) and Control Flow Diagram (CFD), illustrated by 
Figure 78 below, represent the CMD architecture processing capability and are the next 
lower level of functional decomposition or level 0.  They are one level down from the 
DCD and CCD, the context level, to describe the data or control flows as entities within 
the main system function (Perform CMD).  In contrast, the DFD and CFD illustrate the 
data or control flows exchanged among all processes associated with and common to the 
kill chain and OODA loop functi
et Detection Find* Observe* 
Target Location  
(kinematics and position) 
Target Identification Track Orient 
Target Classification Target Decide 
Target Prioritization Target Decide 
Weapon-Target Assignment Target Decide 
Weapons Engagement Engage Act 
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) Assess* Observe* 
 
ons.  As with the DCD and CCD representations, the 
diagrams are identical for all IFC and tactical scenarios due to process and functional 
commonality, thus negating the need for additional IFC or tactical scenario specific 
models.  The kill chain processes are also modeled in the context of the OODA loop, 
making it convenient and revealing to represent them both within each process bubble.  
Similarly, the DFD and CFD are rendered in parallel to illustrate how data flows of input 
and output from each process bubble of the DFD are associated with control flows of 

























































Data Flow Diagram (DFD) 0
Perf m FORCEnet for CMD
Control Flow Diagram (CFD) 0
Perform FORCEnet for CMD
Figure 78.   
   
These diagrams represent the architecture processing capability. 
 CMD service time.  Outside of those statistical constraints, data or 
control flow occurs instantaneously for both models.  The near-instantaneous data and 
 Data Flow Diagram (DFD 0) and Control Flow Diagram (CFD 0) 
supporting Perform CMD.
 
The DFD0 and CFD0 models do not represent the FORCEnet architecture nor do 
they represent the architecture’s procedures or its implementation.  Instead, the DFD0 
and CFD0 models represent the functional requirements of the kill chain and OODA 
loop.  The fact that the models do not reflect the FORCEnet architecture is important 
because from the representation the processes appear procedural.  The apparent modeling 
dichotomy is resolved because the kill chain functions, in the context of the OODA loop, 
are completed serially and continuously. 
The power of the DFD0 and CFD0 models lies in the fact that, beyond their serial 
and continuous implementation, in this instance, they operate near-instantaneously given 
the limits of the queue length as a function of the stressor threat inter-arrival time and 
distribution of the
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control flow response is precisely the feature that the DFD and CFD was designed to 
represent. 
Another difference between the DFD and the CFD is identical to that of the DCD 
and CCD; the CFD provides for control flows between processes that explicitly support 
the command and control functions of integrated sensor fusion over all IFC scenarios, IA 
query prior to each target engagement, and BDA through the Find-Observe and Assess-
Observe kill chain and OODA loop pairing.  The BDA function can only be revealed by 
the CFD through decomposition of the CCD. 
 
F. ASCMD SIMULATION MODEL 
 
1. Simulation Method 
The AS
FORCE et-ena ed herein.  This simulation analyzes the 
followi
t layout, but are not used for any 
other purposes in the simulation.   
 
CMD simulation model is based on the proposed Open Architecture for 
bled cruise missile defense discussn
ng capabilities: data fusion techniques and algorithms; resource management 
scheduling and optimization methods; weapon and sensor management; and engagement 
functionality, initialization, and control. 
The simulation applies the sensor-to-shooter kill chain, Observe-Orient-Decide-
Act (OODA) loop, functional flow block diagrams, and the sequence diagrams discussed 
in previous chapters herein.  The software used for creating the simulation was Arena 
version 10.0. 
Before constructing the simulation, the physical geometry of the scenario had to 
be determined.  Previously seen Figure 79 is the representation of the assumed layout of 
the fleet at the time of the cruise missile attack (also included below).  The layout shows 
a fleet consisting of a main body (CVN, LHA, or LHD), two guided missile destroyers, 
two cruisers, a frigate, and the combat air patrol (CAP).  The CAP is assumed to be part 
of the sensor grid, but is not assumed to be a launching platform for engagements.  The 

















Figure 79.   Overall physical layout of battlegroup.   
This layout is used to visualize scenarios for validating the proposed 
ASCMD functional architecture. 
 
body at 
the origin with ring.  All 
subsequent angles process in a counterclockwise fashion from that point as shown in 
Table 1
 
















The coordinate system used in the simulation is assumed to have the main 







Table 16.   Locations of the members of the battlegroup.   
from the main body and the angle from the main body. 
Figure 80 shows four sub-models from a top-level perspective labeled as the four 
basic elements of the OODA loop, plus a Re-observe sub-model.  The order of the top-
level simulation represents the sensor-to-shooter kill chain.  The simulation flows first 
from the first detection of the incoming threat to an Observe sub-model, then to the 
Orient,
e-time shot expecting 100% skin on skin 
elimination of an incoming ASCM.  This was not a realistic assumption because properly 
ship personnel will invariably contain some 
variant Shoot-Look-Shoot policy.  The structure of the following discussion will explore 
each of igure 80 moving from left to right through the 
kill chain.   
within Arena and is created in the process labeled “Detect.”  The concern here is the 
defense of the capital ship, not the neutralization or retaliation against the aggressor.  
Thus, we leave parts of the cruise missile’s flight before detection to other explorations.  
The Detect process allows the creation of the two major scenarios to be explored.  First, 
 to the Decide, next to the Act, and finally to the Re-observe sub-model.  The Re-
observe sub-model is the addition used to create the loop portion.  This loop behavior is 
critical to the success of the FORCEnet-enabled cruise missile defense schema and is one 
of the major changes to the overall architecture that was not within the PEO IWS model 
after the first salvo is fired.  The Re-observe sub-model in the architecture is a critical 
addition; the previous model provided a on
conducted threat doctrines created by own 
 the major sub-models shown in F
Figure 80.   The top-level view of the ASCMD simulation model.  
This reflects the OODA loop and Re-Observe sub-models. 
For the purposes of the simulation, the threat information is the tracked entity 
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the raid scenario was developed where ten missiles attack the main body, capital ship, in 
a coordinated fashion from ten bearings with only a maximum of ten seconds from the 
first mi ile to the last.  The second scenario is one where all ten missiles are inbound 
from a single shooter so that they are all from the same bearing, but are separated by 
some inter-arrival time.  In the second scenario, the time was a triangular distribution 
with a minimum of ten seconds between, a maximum of one, and a mean of thirty 
seconds.  A third and trivial scenario was where one missile was used for troubleshooting 
purposes, the results of which were not evaluated.  All threats are considered to be of the 
same m ssile type and moving at a rate of 0.6 km/s.  Arena would crash every time 
uncertainty was introduced with respect to the threat speed although no errors were ever 
detected.  Therefore, the authors used a constant value of 0.6 km/s.  Figure 81 below 
provides a visual representation legend of the main types of processes used in the 







Figure 81.   Arena icons.   
These icons represent the ma  processes used within the Arena software 









Several tasks occur in the Observe sub-model as the entities interact with the 
simulation as shown in Figure 82.  First, the attributes that characterize the threat and its 
responses are assigned to the “entities,” which are the threat missiles themselves, in the 
initialize blocks.  These assigned values are used throughout the simulation as inputs for 
various calculations.  Some values, such as the current location of the threat, are used in 
subsequent calculations; therefore, several initialize processes require Arena to perform 
the calculations in the prescribed order.  Later updates to these variables will likewise be 
broken into multiple blocks, which can be viewed as collectively updating Arena’s stored 
values at that instant.  When the detection takes place, one of the assigned properties is 
the distance at which the threat is located from the main body.  This property allowed the 
authors to account for a host of conditions including but not limited to weather, electronic 
attack, sensor locations, and abilities.  The probability that the threat will be able to 
penetrate further without being detected increases as these conditions worsen. 
Figure 82.   Layout of the Observe sub-model.   
The Initialize blocks contain threat missile data characterized by threat 
attributes and responses. 
 
All times in the simulation were measured in seconds, distance in kilometers, and 
angular measure in radians.  Table 17 lists the interceptors and their attributes.  Processes 












Table 17.   List of own ship missile interceptors and their assumed properties:  
Rolling Airframe (RAM), Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM), and 
Standard Miss
 
ile (SM) 3.   
nce the initial values have been established, the Arena-assigned properties such 
as entity creation time are recorded in the “Initial Values” block.  After the initial 
mechanics of setting up the mathematics have been satisfied, the system then moves into 
the process of tracking the entity.  First, the entity encounters a delay as a generic sensor 
has detected it but still must track, localize, and provide a preliminary assessment.  The 
next block in the Observe sub-model was where the sensor’s command and control 
function alerts the FORCEnet through an external communication link.  The 
communication and decision steps that are used throughout the simulation are not only 
used to imulate that function, but to also simulate allocation of network resources and 
account for network’s capacities and capabilities. 
s information leaves the bounded area local to the sensor and is sent to the larger 
a und network process takes place to ensure that the integrity 
of the data is
Assurance step has two major components and the sub-model associated with it is shown 
in Figure 83.  First, the network must resist attack by detecting and isolating information 
that is part of an attack or corrupted through the course of “normal” operations before it is 
inserted into the larger operating picture.  If no distortion of the data is detected, then the 





 maintained, thus concluding the Observe sub-model.  This Information 
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detecte
Figure 83.   Layout of the IA sub-model.   
This sub-model is run as a background process to ensure data integrity. 
 
Moving from the Observe sub-model to the Orient sub-model, as shown in Figure 
84, a block titled “Update Common Control Picture” simulates the tasking, network 
t picture is updated with the threat 
information.  T
then updated in the simulation.  Prior to introducing humans into the loop or making 
decisio
e “Threat Not Killed Block.”  The evaluation takes place in the 
decision process, “PROX.”  The times associated with the updating and decision-making 
d, then the system places the data in the “IA Penalty Box” where the data is 
reevaluated to determine if the threat data is legitimate or can be repaired.  This delay can 
involve everything from bit and frame synchronization to requests for re-transmission 
among other troubleshooting processes.  Based on the success of the repair function the 
threat is either passed on to the larger FORCEnet community or terminated as a false 
alarm in the “IA Threat Killed” disposal block in the main model.  This background 
network process allows the system to resist information attack and is robust enough to 
recover from attack. 
allocations, and delays as the overall FORCEne
he stored values for the variables that have a time-based component are 
ns based on the current threat information the simulation determines the threat 
missile location.  If at any point in the simulation the threat enters the keep out range of 2 
km, the threat is considered to have completely penetrated all defenses and is disposed of 
in the main model in th
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are part of updating the FORCEnet function and form a portion of the model mechanics 
that do not have a directly associated delay.  At various points in the remainder of the 
simulation, checks are made based on updated information; the process immediately 
preceding them accounts for their delay.   
block, the “IFC” portion.  Here the tactical action officer or other human in the loop is 
lock allowed the investigator to adjust 
for exp
are within the scope of the CWC’s responsibilities even though they are shown in the Act 
Figure 84.   Layout of the Orient sub-model.   
 
Moving out of the proximity check and concluding the Orient sub-model the 
threat is then processed in the Decide sub-model.  This sub-model contains only one 
designated as the decision authority.  This process is modeled as a queue and requires 
time to make a decision and order its execution.  Although this process was modeled as a 
single Arena selected random distribution, this b
erience, training, damage, rules of engagement, and overall level of data 
integration. 
 Next, the simulation moves into the most complex Act sub-model.  While 
some of this simulation would occur in concert with the CWC’s decision-making process, 
the order was chosen to allow Arena to represent the time delays and functional 
allocations.  Therefore, the authors acknowledge that the weapon and platform selection 
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sub-model.  Figure 85 shows the four sub-models that comprise the Act sub-model.  The 
IA6 sub-model provided defense of the FORCEnet information and is an exact 
replication of the previous Information Assurance sub-model in Figure 83.   
 
Figure 85.   The Act sub-model.   
ground process to ensure data integrity. 
The simulation next considers the battlegroup’s use of electronic countermeasures 
(ECM) that is assumed to be continuous throughout the engagement and occur in parallel 
to all of the other processes.  However, Arena is a discrete-event based simulation and to 
simulate the parallel process the authors simply reversed the sequence of events in the 
Electronic Combat sub-model shown in Figure 86.  The decision is first made to 
determine if the ECM will be successful.  If the ECM is not successful, electronic combat 
occurs for the remainder of the engagement but does not affect the outcome.  When ECM 
successfully defended the main body against attack, the simulation adds the appropriate 
delay and then disposes of the threat as a successful “EW Softkill.”   
This sub-model is run as a back
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Figure 86.   The layout of the electronic combat sub-model.   
 
Prior to engaging with missiles, the simulation updates the threat location and 
verifies that the threat is not within the keep out range.  The simulation segues into the 
Hardkill sub-model where the weapon-platform pair is selected and the missile engages 
Figure 87 and consists of the individual 
latforms and the platform selection process.   
the threat.  The Hardkill sub-model is shown in 
p
Figure 87.   The layout of the Hardkill sub-model. 
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The selection process used is a bubble sort comparison whereby the closest 
platform is chosen to attack the threat.  The process begins by updating the threat location 
and co pares the distances of the threat to each of the battlegroup platforms against the 
distance of the threat to the main body.  A comparison is made of each platform against 
the distance to the platform closest to the main body.  These comparisons continue in 
order until the frigate furthest from the main body is used as the basis for comparison.  
The simulation preserves the layered defense concept by selecting the platform closest to 
the threat to ensure that the engagement is kept as far from the main body as possible.  In 
addition to measuring the threat-to-platform range, the simulation predicts a 10-second 
future location to ensure that the target is not past the closest point of approach (CPA) 
and opening.  By verifying that the target is closing, the authors ensured that the 
interceptor missile would close and engage the threat.  Although some of the interceptors 
could close and engage the threat the time required would negate the tiered defense 
structure.  Figure 88 shows the platform comparison order, while Figure 89 shows the 
comparisons and decision logic for the main body.  Each additional platform has the 
same logic pattern but uses the threat distance to that platform as the basis for 
comparison. 
Figure 88.   The layout of the Decision Matrix sub-model. 
The order of platform basis used for comparison. 
m
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Figure 89.   The diagram shows the layout of the logic used when the main body is the 
basis for comparison in the CVN Shooter sub-model. 
 
he simulation selects the best weapon-platform pair, orders missile launch, and 
process in the Fox2 sub-models.  Figure 90 shows the receipt of the firing solution by the 
engaging platform through the pass to the Fox2 sub-model. 
Figure 90.   The layout of the DDG1 sub-model. 
 
Table 17 shows the interceptor properties assumed for each interceptor.  The three 
nce the engaging platform has been 
T
moves 
r (DDG) is “DDG1.”  Arena updates its 
location, verifies that the weapon is not within the keep out range, and begins the firing 
into the platform-specific engagement.  As the system moves from the CWC’s 
console to the platform an IA step was again performed as in Figure 83.  The platform’s 
combat information center (CIC) receives firing orders and passes the engagement 
information to the weapons system in the block labeled with the platform’s name, which 
in the case of the first guided missile destroye
interceptors used are the RAM, SM-3, and ESSM.  O
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chosen
Figure 91.   The layout of the DDG1 ESSM sub-model. 
 
At this point, the simulation began the interceptor launch sequence, recorded the 
number of missiles fired, and decremented inventory.  With the launch sequence started 
the inventories are adjusted to prevent the system requesting fire from more interceptors 
than are remaining in the launchers.  The time-based values are updated and part one of 
the fly-out is executed.  Positions are again updated and the second part of the fly-out is 
conducted.  Finally, a score is assigned to the fly-out in the block “DDG1 ESSM Pk.”  
This score is a random triangular distribution centered about the Pk values shown in 
 the interceptor must be selected.  The decision block chooses the weapon with the 
smallest range capable of engaging the threat.  Thus, long-range weapons are reserved for 
long-range engagements that extend the layered defense range.  Finally, having selected 
the appropriate weapon, the simulation begins the process of engaging the threat. 
 Figure 91 provides an example of the sub-model containing DDG1’s 
ESSM fly-out.  First, the simulation checks weapons availability, updates the time-based 
simulation parameters, verifies the threat is within interceptor’s engagement range, and 
holds fire until it is.  It then spins up the guidance and firing systems of the interceptor.   
Table 17. 
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The fly-out values were calculated as a two-part engagement.  First, the 
interceptor flies at a right angle to the threat missile’s line of bearing until it is on a line 
directly between the threat and the main body.  The interceptor then executes a maneuver 
to go into a head-to-head engagement with the threat.  This algebraically simulates a 
worst case of the proportional guidance solution.  This allowed the authors to obtain a 
discrete solution for the time to engage the threat from an arbitrary platform, with an 
arbitrary interceptor, against an arbitrary threat with arbitrary properties. 
Having assigned a random number based on the probability of kill associated with 
that weapon system in that firing doctrine, the simulation then undergoes a process 
final update a ber is greater than 
0.6, the
taken place.  Figure 92, the Re-Observe sub-model, shows these steps.  If successful, the 
Figure 92.   The layout of the Re-Observe sub-model.   
 
The simulation allowed the authors to begin to evaluate the FORCEnet-enabled 
concept of cruise missile defense from the sensor-to-shooter when applying either the 
PEO IWS architecture or the proposed architecture.  In the model we have implemented 
the following open architecture design principles: search and detect, data information 
services (IA), planning and assessment and decision, weapon / asset services, and mission 
xecution.  Furthermore, the integrated fire control scenarios described earlier are 
simulta
whereby a sensor is tasked to see if there is still an inbound threat.  All values are given a 
nd an evaluation takes place where if the random num
n the threat has been neutralized; if not, then the encounter is termed unsuccessful.  
The value of 0.6 was chosen to bias conservatively the simulation to ensure a kill had 
threat is disposed of in the “Threats Killed Hard” block.  If unsuccessful, the threat then 
is looped back to the Observe, the Orient, the Decide, or the Act sub-model, or if no loop 
is used it is disposed of as a “Threat Not Killed.” 
e
neously integrated into the simulation.  The precision cue scenario involves 
networking, tasking, and integrating multiple sensors, while the forward pass scenario 
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involves the communication of the threat data, and the launch on remote takes the first 
two scenarios and uses them to order the defense of the ship. 
 
2. Simulation Data and Results 
 
The authors originally looked at the mean time interval to accomplish several 
tasks.  However, the authors were also faced with the problem that the geometry of the 
threat and the battlegroup significantly confounded the time-based results.  To provide a 
high-fidelity simulation, the attackers’ detection range and direction were allowed to vary 
as they would during an actual attack.  Further, the times assumed for communication, 
network processes, and interceptor spin-up were arbitrary to preserve the unclassified 
nature of the simulation and the report.  Therefore, the authors recognized the value of 
using time as an MOP, but were forced to remove that MOP from consideration as it 
would not have the same fidelity and any conclusions based on time MOP’s would be 
suspect. 
The MOP’s used in the evaluation were the means of the following: the number of 
IA attacks; the number of threat missiles killed by electronic combat; the number of 
threat missiles killed by interceptor missiles; the number of reengagements; and the 
number of threat missiles that leaked, or were unsuccessfully addressed by defensive 
countermeasures.  The MOP’s used, came directly from the value system design.  The 
top-level function requires defending against a cruise missile attack; therefore, each 
m performs this function.  The 
key me
measure was chosen to measure directly how well the syste
asure that addresses this function is the number of leakers.  All other measures 
simply add clarity to this one measure of performance. 
All values are measured at the 95% confidence level.  The values in Table 18 
presents the raw data collected, and are shown as the mean and tolerance associated with 
a 95% confidence interval.  The PEO IWS architecture simulation results were held as 
the control group in both the raid and the stream case.  Throughout this discussion, 
comparisons limited to evaluations within the scenarios. 
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T   a c c  from the ASCMD simulation odel showing the m ces 5 d
 
able 18.  The r w data olle ted
Grou Scena
Cont ol Grou aid No Loo
Cont ol Grou S re  No Lo
Test Gr up Raid Ob rve
Test Gr up Ra d Or ent
Test Gr up Rai  De ide
Test Gr up R id Act
Test Gr up S rea  O ser
Test Gr up tre m Orien
Test Gr up tream D cid
Test Gr up Str am Act
 m ean with toleran
cc ss Kill T tal ills
0.080 6.2 0±0.090 8.259± .18 1. 68±
0.080 6.265±0.100 9.003± .19 1.535±
0.0 0 6.6 0±0.090 8.290± .19 1. 64±
0.080 6.7 4±0.090 8.969± .18 0. 38±
0.080 6.7 8±0.090 8.747± .18 0. 79±
0.080 6.8 9±0.090 9.116± .18 0. 99±
80 6.6 6±0.100 8.767± .19 1. 44±
80 6.7 9±0.100 9.195± .18 0. 06±
80 6.7 7±0.100 9.253± .19 0. 64±
90 6.7 5±0.100 9.134± .19 0. 54±
at 9 % confi ence. 
ers ee ga ement
0.0 0 0. 00 0.
0. 0. 00 0.
0.0 0 1. 10 0.
0.0 0 1. 37 0.
0.0 0 1. 93 0.
0.0 0 1. 75 0.
0.0 0 1. 71 0.
0.0 0 1. 69 0.
0.0 0 1. 11 0.
0.040 1. 40 0.
p rio IA Kills  EW Su e s o  K Leak R n g s
r p R   p 048±0.010 1.921± 9 0 0 5 7 0 ± 000
r p t am op 047±0.010 1.978± 0 0 070 0 ± 000
o  se 056±0.010 2.041± 8 5 0 0 0 6 7 ± 080
o i i 048±0.010 2.207± 1 0 0 8 5 9 ± 100
o d c 048±0.010 2.330± 3 0 0 6 5 9 ± 100
o a 048±0.010 2.308± 3 0 0 5 5 9 ± 100
o t m b ve 056±0.010 2.095±0.0 1 0 0 0 6 6 ± 080
o S a t 0.047±0.010 2.237±0.0 1 0 0 8 5 8 ± 090
o S e e 0.047±0.010 2.330±0.0 5 0 0 6 5 9 ± 100










3. Simulation Analysis 
 
First, the numbers of reengagements were plotted in Figure 93.  The plot shows 
that the loops in the architecture were allowing statistically significant opportunities at 
the p = 0.05 level for the system to subsequently engage the threat.  Further, the plot 
shows that entities are not looping indefinitely through the system.  Statistically, there is a 
difference in the means within the test groups based on loop location; however, this is 
due primarily to large sample size.  The overlapping confidence intervals create a conflict 
where the statistical significance is not enough for us to conclude that difference is 
substantial enough to assign a best location for the loop.  
Figure 93.   The mean number of reengagements plotted at the 95% confidence level. 
 
The Electronic Warfare (EW) success and the Information Assurance (IA) kills 
were plotted in Figure 94 and Figure 95 respectively.  In both cases, the test groups show 
an increase over the control group.  The increases were statistically significant at the p = 
0.05 levels, but the overlapping confidence intervals preclude the authors fro rawing 
any conclusions.  This was an expected result caused by an artifact in the design of the 
simulation.  The information assurance and electronic warfare portions have decision 
blocks that are “2-way by chance.”  Therefore, there is an additional opportunity for the 




Figure 96.   The mean number of kills by interceptors at the 95% confidence level. 
The test group shows an increase over the control group. 
 
Further, the confidence intervals do not overlap between the control group and the 
two test groups.  The improvement was measured by increased number of interceptor 
kills and there is a statically significant improvement as the Observe-Orient-Decision-Act 
(OODA) loop is truncated and the loop portion is moved closer to weapon release in the 
Act sub-model.  This is an expected result as the response time is improved by moving 
eliminating steps.  However, the overlapping confidence intervals within the test groups 
preclude drawing any conclusions with respect to the loop location.  In this case, the 
authors were able to state that there is a distinct and measurable difference between the 
two architectures when the stimuli are a raid or a stream.   
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The number threats that leaked through the defenses were plotted in Figure 97 
below. 
Figure 97.   The mean number of leakers at the 95% confidence interval.  
The plot shows that the test groups performed significantly better 
control groups by allowing fewer leakers to get through. 
than the 
 
For the leakers MOP, the better number was the lower number.  The number of 
leakers MOP confirmed the previous result that the revised architecture was an 
improvement.  Further, it allowed the authors to discriminate which architectures were 
better among the test groups.  By moving the loop back to the Decide sub-model, the 
architectures performed significantly and distinguishably better at the previously 
described levels.  This seems logical as many of the steps performed in the initial observe 
and orient steps would be redundant once initial decision-making and re-observation had 
taken place.  The addition of the integrated fire control scenarios would also tend to argue 
for the loop location at the Decide or Act sub-model.  The overlapping confidence 
intervals again e sub-models. 
 available from 
the simulation d architecture, and 
discusses outstanding issues for this project’s stakeholders and decision-makers. 
 
 prevented a distinction between the Act and the Decid
The Findings and Recommendations section draws the conclusions





























V. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The research and analysis efforts reflected on the previous sections of this report 
yielded a proposed ASCMD functional architecture that was compared to PEO IWS’s 
existing architecture.  The authors decomposed the proposed architecture from the 
highest level, the conceptual design, to the lowest level, the ASCMD simulation model.  
This section closes the report by discussing the comparison findings and conclusions, 
final overview of the proposed architecture, and outstanding issues to be reviewed by the 
project’s stakeholders and decision-makers. 
 
A. SIMULATION CONCLUSIONS 
 
Threat missiles were able to leak through in both attack scenarios.  The 
nses against 
cruise missile  in the revised 
architecture’s performance when compared to PEO IWS’s architecture in the simulation.  
Further
he focus of this paper is the development of a conceptual Anti-Ship Cruise 
Missile Defense (ASCMD) system that adheres to and integrates the FORCEnet 
architecture changes alone will not solve the Navy’s need to improve its defe
attack.  There is a statistically significant improvement
more, the models whose loops returned to the Decide or Act sub-model performed 
substantially better in both attack scenarios.  Although no conclusion could easily be 
drawn between the Decide and Act sub-models based on the measures of performance 
used in this simulation, some control aspects of the engagement are necessarily lost if the 
loop bypasses the Decide sub-model.  Since there is not a distinguishable difference 
between the two locations based on the measures of performance, the authors would not 
recommend the removal of the human in the loop at the Decide sub-model. 
The authors conclude that the revised architecture should formally include a loop 
and that the loop should bring the information back to the Composite Warfare 
Commander in the decide portion of the OODA loop.  
 




information architectural framework with the technical requirements of the PEO IWS OA 
nctional domain model.  Research and analysis efforts substantiated that Open 
rchitecture provides the right venue for the development and implementation of 
ORCEnet design concepts.  These design concepts make the implementation of a CMD 
tegrated Fire Control and advanced Command and Control command structure a near-
rm reality.  PEO IWS, chair of the open architecture enterprise team, continues to 
romulgate OA policies and standards, as well as planning and implementation of OA 
to the next generation of cruisers, destroyers, aircraft carriers, and submarines.  There 
re many challenges to overcome, many risks that need to be identified, managed, and 
itigated as early as possible during the system acquisition phase.  To realize the full 
otential of this new architecture, FORCEnet will need to be an operational construct 
pporting all U. S. Navy commands prior to implementation. 
The goal of the conceptual ASCMD architecture is to fuse time-dependent 
formation from different systems seamlessly, with minimal erroneous data, and be able 
 distribute the information in real-time to the decision makers and to the Strike Group 
articipating units formation will be 
istributed at the right time and to the right participating units.  Open architecture design 
verages ease of technology insertion and compatibility with other members of the same 
distributed network.   
There are areas that need further consideration in the application of OA, IFC and 
FORCEnet design concepts.  An effective CMD system design requires the achievement 
of the smallest possible reaction time from threat detection to weapons firing.  FORCEnet 
and OA will expedite data flow due to support common services and reduce human 
interaction in the kill chain.  The sensor-to-shooter kill chain can be hastened by 
introducing automated processes and computational intelligence, using fuzzy logic and 
neural networks, which in turn will curtail time lost due to organic intervention.  
Unfortunately, the neural network technology is not sufficiently mature, but recent 
research and development with neural networks show promise for the design as well as 



















The FO En links that are 
geographically distributed and fully interoperable across different platforms.  These data 
links su
 the implementation of all the Integrated Fire 
ontrol operational concepts previously addressed in this paper.  Creation of CONOPS 
 stakeholders, joint and coalition forces, 
and private industry partners.  Deployment of assets within the Strike Group along and 
near th
my and Navy 
units.  
 coordinate multiple operations 
simultaneously.  
f the latest technology with minimal impact or 
redesign of the system.  Provisions should be made for over-the-air computer program 
upgrad
RC et communications infrastructure requires sTable data 
pport the implementation of a CMD and IFC system that addresses the challenges 
associated with the various cruise missile threats.  Battlegroup network connectivity 
needs to be adapTable to the capability inherent within their participating units.  Levels 
of connectivity need to integrate current communications and data exchange networks. 
The PEO IWS 7 OA functional architecture model requires a level of integration 
that is not currently available in US Navy platforms.  A new level of networks and 
combat system interoperability is essential to
C
for this architecture will require inputs from DoD
e threat axis, command structure, and other battle considerations will need to be 
addressed to use the inherent capability of this new architecture.  The CONOPS that are 
currently in place for ASCMD can be modified to include the integrated fire control 
scenarios.  It is also recommended that an Integrated Product Team (IPT) be formed, 
consisting of naval combat system subject matter experts, who will integrate the PEO 
IWS 7 OA functional architecture EXCOMM and Command and Control functions. 
The combat system architecture addressed by this paper was scoped to USN 
assets alone.  There are numerous applications that can include joint forces, which will 
extend both the sensor net, best weapon, and shooter selection.  The Army has researched 
over the horizon cruise missile defense systems and conducted successful cruise missile 
defense experiments like Mountain Top (Zinger, Krill, 1997) with both Ar
Allied considerations must also take place, especially with countries that employ 
similar detection and weapons systems.  Integrating these global assets will be a force 
multiplier enabling the strike group commander to
OA allows for rapid insertion o
es to a deployed strike group, where all units will be upgradeable while still 
operating in the FORCEnet construct.  This will help avoid backwards compatibility 
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issues between units having received upgrades and those without them.  There needs to 
be a strategic deployment process where the installations and upgrades are minimal but 
sufficient for the unit and strike group to perform their mission and current operations. 
Risk is a component of any design implementation and the architecture’s main 
concern addresses the current lack of an operating FORCEnet.  Granted, the groundwork 
has been laid and processes and common services are being developed, but FORCEnet 
has not deployed and there is no firm operational start date.  Navy information and data 
flow superiority requires a proven and reliable network, which FORCEnet will achieve, 
once implemented.  When considering possible future technology and capabilities, risk is 
an inherent part of the design phase.  Assumptions have been made regarding bandwidth 
both overhead and off ship.  There is also risk in software development that integrates 
existing systems and the timely delivery, installation, and testing of this software to the 
strike g
t evolution of standards. 
Human system integration (HSI) certification done as early as possible. 
• Information assurance: user and information authentication. 
• Integration of systems that are not fully OA compliant. 
• Integration of EXCOMM and Command and Control systems. 
roup prior to deployment.  Additional risks remain in the following areas: 
• Ability to demonstrate joint interoperability. 
• Achievement of high track data rates via secure networks to address all the 
IFC scenarios. 
• Configuration control of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) equipment. 
• Constant evolution of computer programs programming languages. 
• Constan
• Establishment of an organic and strike group training capability to 
maintain a high- level of operational readiness.  Training capability needs 
to be part of the original design, not added as a separate system. 
• Evolution of the threat 
• Fusion of sensor data for air, surface, and undersea situational awareness 
• How to implement push-pull technology for sharing information within 
the strike group to alleviate network message traffic and improve delivery 
of critical information to the end user. 
• 
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• Introduction of disruptive technologies. 
• Method of delivering critical information: multicast, unicast, anycast, and 
broadcast.  
• Timely implementation of IPv-6 and associated capabilities. 
• Creation of a single integrated picture for air, surface, and undersea assets. 
• The FORCEnet vision is dependent on technology developing at least at 
ture, 
Continued investment in research and development programs to ensure the 
required technology advancements needed for FORCEnet development 
 
C. FINAL OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE 
quirements Overview Model 
 
its present rate. 
• GIG and FORCEnet architectures are somewhat contingent on what the 
other services and allied forces bring to the Table.  Their commitment in 
terms of present and future funding and political involvement as well as 
their rate of technology development will shape these architectures. 
 
Future research efforts to be considered include the following: 
• A CONOPS vision based on degraded network architecture from external 
intrusion. 
• Parallel research and development in the areas of neural network and 
fuzzy logic, as well as neural fuzzy networks. 
• A phased development program for FORCEnet, possibly spiral in na
which takes into consideration advanced technology with concrete 





The functional decomposition of the proposed ASCMD functional architecture is 
depicted in the Requirements Overview model in Figure 98.  The Requirements 
Overview model summarizes all of the proposed architecture’s capabilities and 
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performance (Hatley, Hruschka, Pirbhai, 2000).  The decomposition began with a high-
level conceptual framework, followed by a high-level Value System Design and 
Functional Flow Block Diagram of the architecture.  These high-level steps were 
followe
Figure 98.    model of proposed ASCMD functional 
 
 
d by a detailed breakdown of the architecture that included class diagrams, use 
cases, sequence diagrams, control flow and data flow diagrams, and finally a software 
simulation.  The creation of the class diagrams led into the use cases and sequence 
diagrams, which in turn led into the development of the control flow and data flow 
diagrams.  The process was not serialized; all diagrams were created iteratively and in 















architecture.   




2. Changes to Module Functionalities 
 
Figures 99 through 107 capture the changes made to each individual module’s 
functio ities. as reviewed 
and changes m
decomp ition





Additionally, the proposed architecture is tightly coupled to the simulation and the 
mo e simulation represent 
the pro ed a
of the simulati s to the proposed architecture functions.  The function Search 
and Detect is 
Information S of the simulation.  In the 
simulat  the
Decision.  Th
Asset Services each block in the 
simulation together are represented by the functions EXCOMM and Common services.  In 
this way, the proposed changes capture all of the aspects of the simulation and the 
modeling effor
This shows the correlation between the simulation and the architecture 
nal   Each module within the existing PEO IWS 7 architecture w
ade in accordance with the analysis of key capabilities and functional 
os  performed in the Design and Analysis section.  It is important to note that 
PEO IWS’s model, were not changed.  The authors agree with the way 
hanges are represented.  Changes to the Candidate OA Platform-Unique 
ication modules are in yellow font; changes to the Candidate OA Common 
ication modules are in blue font. 
deling efforts undertaken.  The OODA loop functions used in th
pos rchitecture functions depicted in Figure 10.  Table 19 shows the correlation 
on module
represented in the simulation by the Observe module.  The function Data 
ervices is represented by the Orient module 
ion  Decide module represents the function Planning, Assessment, and 
e Act part of the simulation is distributed among the functions Weapon 
 and Mission Execution.  Finally, the lines connecting 
ts. 
Table 19.   Mapping the simulation to the architecture function  
Connecting Lines EXCOMM
Connecting Lines Common Services
 Simulation 
Module name
Orient Data Information Services
sessment, and Decision



















Figure 99.   Function additions to Search/Detect module.   
Added functions are Sensor Coverage Monitoring, Sensor Management, 




Figure 100.   Function additions to Data/Inform tion Services module.   
Added functions are Sensor Track Fusion, Fire Control Quality Data, 

























Figure 101.   Function additions to Planning, Assessment & Decision module.   
Added functions are Scenarios; Identity Prioritization; Translate C2 Inputs 














Figure 102.   Additions to Weapon/Asset Services module.   
Added functions are combination of Assign/Schedule/Event for Weapons, 
Navigation, and Engineering; Prioritize and Monitor W/AS through 
Authorize Fire and Engagement Control Orders; and Recourse of 














Figure 103.   
and, Firing Reports, Fire 






Figure 104.   
nitoring and IA. 
 
Function additions to Mission Execution module.   

























Function additions to EXCOMM module.   












Figure 105.   Function additions to Common Services module.   
Added functions are Data Protection, Operator ID, Remote Monitoring 
Systems, Input/Output Control Console, Event Reconstruction, and 













Figure 106.   Function changes to Training module.   
Scenarios were modified to cover organic and non-organic events. 
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atus Assessment; and Integrated Fire Control. 
 
The m ulation, and analysis reflected in this study show that the 
revised open architecture model when implemented will provide the Navy with a 
capability that will reduce its vulnerability to cruise missile attacks.  Additional and 













Added functions are Mission Planning and Coo
Resource Management and Readiness Assessment; Health and Status 





 APPENDIX A  
 
STATEMENT OF WORK 
Open Architecture as an Enabler for FORCEnet 
Task 1: Cruise Missile Defense 
Scope: 
This task investigates the role of the Open Architecture (OA) Functional Domain 
Model in FORCEnet (Fn) and its application to cruise missile defense.  The specific 
focus will be on integrated fire control and the sh ponent. 
 
The following extract from Chapter 5 of FORCEnet Implementation Strategy 




If FORCEnet is to be the architectural framework for naval warfare in the 
information age, it must deliver performance, information assurance, and quality of-
service guarantees unprecedented in a system with the nodal diversity evidenced in the 
joint force.  This challenge is best met incrementally so that existing capability is not 
degraded nor information security ever compromised.  The design and implementation of 
complex systems for purposes of warfighting require a dedicated core of warfighters and 
system engineers trained in the art of operations analysis.  Together, warfighters and 
engineers make decisions about when and how to introduce new capabilities as 
technologies and operational concepts evolve in independent but integrated spirals. 
The FORCEnet information architecture should be thought of as a boundary 
between layers of functionality that is held invariant (over long periods), thus allowing 
developments to proceed independently on all sides of the boundary.  In the committee’s 
view, architecting FORCEnet is the process of defining thin waists, or boundaries, that 
are invariant and, when coupled with selected industrial standards and throttled with a 
network control system, would enable FORCEnet to evolve with advances in technology.  
The boundaries standardize the interfaces between the functions common to all warfare 
ipboard com
provides key insights into the issues of FORCEnet Ar
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Captain Richard T. Rushton, USN, et al. 
stains 
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Extracted from: Open Architecture, The Critical Network Centric Warfare Enabler 
First Edition, March 18, 2004 
 
FORCEnet and the fighting units and command-and-control structure that it 
supports are all subsystems of a joint battle force.  Systems engineering is a process for 
allocating functionality to subsystems that are bounded by system architecture so that the 
probability of mission success is increased within available resources.  A battle force 
performs three major functions: it manages battle, dominates battlespace, and su
 over the battlespace over time.  FORCEnet functionality is a subset of battle force 
functionality that can contribute to battle management, battlespace dominance, and 
sustainability.  FORCEnet cost and contribution to battle management, battlespace 
dominance, and sustainability should provide a basis for implementation decisions.  As a 
subsystem, FORCEnet must interface seamlessly with the remainder of the force while 
increasing the probability of mission success more than alternative investments.  
Understanding and defining the interfaces between what is in the FORCEnet subsystem 
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 and what is outside of it will be an ongoing process.  This top-down view of FORCEnet, 
together with the bottom-up work that is being done at the information architecture 
boundaries, is necessary to explain and quantify the warfighting value. 
 
Selected Issues: 
The following issues extracted from Chapter 5 capture some of the underlying 
research goals of this project:  
 
• The process and tools for translating FORCEnet operational concepts into 
products, services, and warfighting capabilities have yet to be fully 
developed.  Systems engineering is a process for allocating functionality 
to subsystems that are bounded by a system architecture. 
 
• The number of unique interfaces that must be maintained need to be 
carefully selected and kept to an absolute minimum, or evolution will be 
hindered by expensive and lengthy integration and testing.  One way to do 
this is to require that systems must partition common functions in a 
common way. 
 
• There has been little attempt to characterize how FORCEnet will function 
in terms of network management, data flow, traffic control, nodal 
performance, or data access.  This information is required to engineer the 
FORCEnet network management system. 
 
e MCP's that the Warfare Integration Unit under the 
DCNO for Warfare Requirements and Programs (N70) uses for program assessment).  
The focus of this engineering and analysis effort is on cruise missile defense with the 
goal to explore and develop a conceptual model that marries the operational and system 
Technical Requirements: 
The FORCEnet functional architecture is based on two operationally oriented 
scenarios selected to validate the FORCEnet architecture: (1) time-critical targeting 
employing persistent sensors and (2) cruise missile defense Mission Capability Packages 
(MCP's)(these are not the sam
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 Fn architecture requirements with the technical requirements of the OA Functional 
Domain Model as required to support the concept.  This work will be based upon the use 
of the Integrated Fire Control scenarios from references 7 and 8 to elaborate upon the 
basic mission capability requirements of cruise missile defense.   
 
STATEMENT OF WORK: 
 
Characterization of the Problem Space:  the identification of current system 
and legacy deficiencies as well as constraints inherent in the operational environment in 
order to characterize, understand and bound the problem space.  The project team will 
translate relevant operational imperatives into system engineering structures (concepts, 
functions, requirements, solutions) necessary to develop the concept.  A key step in this 
process is to evaluate the “correctness of the OA Warfare System Domain Model shown 
on page 2. 
Design Principles:  the formulation of principles for the design and architecting 
of OA and Fn (IFC) capabilities.  The project team will formulate design principles to 
serve a es will 
consider known limitations a ational environment such as 
communication challenges, ks, limited bandwidth, and 
operator interaction. 
Conceptual Design:  the development of a vision, architecture, and conceptual 
framework that addresses the problem space and is based on the design principles for a 
collaborative operations.  The project team will formulate a conceptual design of the 
required system within the boundaries of Fn and OA. 
concepts through functional description and decomposition as well as system architecting 
and simulation.  Develop representations, models, and methods to express automated 
of the proposed architecture.  
s guidelines for the development of system solutions.  Design principl
nd constraints of the oper
unreliability, ad hoc mobile networ
distributed system of automated decision aids for managing warfare resources for 
Functional Representation And Decomposition: the representation of system 
resource collaboration concepts and solutions in the context of the Fn/OA architecture 
and domains.  The project team will develop a system model to evaluate the performance 
 167 
 Analysis of Key Capabilities:  the identification and evaluation of technologies 
and research areas key to the Fn/OA concept.  Technology areas that will be researched 
and analyzed include: 
• Data fusion techniques and algorithms 
management scheduling and optimization methods 
ctionality, initialization, and control 
• Situation prediction and wargaming 




Documentation: The results of tasks 1-5 will be documented in accordance with 




• Weapon and sensor management 
• Engagement fun
Opportunities for application of fuzzy logic and neural networks 
Allocation of tasking to people and/or software 
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Cruiser1 ESSM Available 8 Variable
3 Cruiser1 ESSM Part A Flyout 25 *  ( TAN(ABS(Threat.Angle.-5.5)) ) /1.18 Variable
4 Cruiser1 ESSM Part B Flyout ( Current.Location - ( 25/COS(ABS(Threat.Angle.-5.5)) ) ) / ( Threat.Speed +1.18) Variable
5 Cruiser1 RAM Available 42 Variable
6 Cruiser1 RAM Part A Flyout 25 *  ( TAN(ABS(Threat.Angle.-5.50)) ) /.680 Variable
7 Cruiser1 RAM Part B Flyout ( Current.Location - ( 25/COS(ABS(Threat.Angle.-5.5)) ) ) / ( Threat.Speed +.680) Variable
8 Crui
Value Type
1 Cruiser 2 ESSM Part B Flyout ( Current.Location - ( 30/COS(ABS(Threat.Angle.-2.356)) ) ) / ( Threat.Speed +1.18) Variable
2
ser1 SM3 Available 8 Variable
9
Flyout 30 *  ( TAN(ABS(Threat.Angle.-2.356)) ) /.680 Variable
15
Threat.Speed +2.67)
 to prevent an undefinded number Variable
20
21
22 DDG1 ESSM Available 16 Variable
23 DDG1 ESSM Part B Flyout Variable
24 DDG1 RAM Available 42 Variable
25 DDG1 RAM Part A Flyout Time 10 *  ( TAN(ABS(Threat.Angle.-2.356)) ) /.680 Variable
Cruiser1 SM3 Part A Flyout 25 *  ( TAN(ABS(Threat.Angle.-5.5)) ) /2.67 Variable
10 Cruiser1 SM3 Part B  Flyout ( Current.Location - ( 25/COS(ABS(Threat.Angle.-5.5)) ) ) / ( Threat.Speed +2.67) Variable
11 Cruiser2 ESSM Available 8 Variable
12 Cruiser2 ESSM Part A Flyout 30 *  ( TAN(ABS(Threat.Angle.-2.356)) ) /1.18 Variable
13 Cruiser2 RAM Available 42 Variable
14 Cruiser2 RAM Part A 
Cruiser2 RAM Part B Flyout ( Current.Location - ( 30/COS(ABS(Threat.Angle.-2.356)) ) ) / ( Threat.Speed +.680) Variable
16 Cruiser2 SM3 Available 8 Variable
17 Cruiser2 SM3 Part  B Flyout ( Current.Location - ( 30/COS(ABS(Threat.Angle.-2.356)) ) ) / ( Variable
18 Cruiser2 SM3 Part A Flyout 30*  ( TAN(ABS(Threat.Angle.-2.356)) ) /2.67 Variable
19 Current.Location Set originally as 50
CVN Ram Available 42 Variable
DDG 1 ESSM Part A Flyout 10 *  ( TAN(ABS(Threat.Angle.-2.356)) ) /1.18 Variable
( Current.Location - ( 10/COS(ABS(Threat.Angle.-2.356)) ) ) / ( 
Threat.Speed +1.18)
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er NAME Value Type
26 DDG1 RAM Part B Flyout Time ( Current.Location - ( 10/COS(ABS(Threat.Angle.-2.356)) ) ) / ( Threat.Speed +.680) Variable
27 DDG1 SM3 Available
Numb
16 Variable
28 DDG1 S (Threat.Angle.-2.356)) ) /2.67 Variable
29 DDG1 S Variable
30 DDG2 E 16 Variable
31 DDG2 E Variable
32 DDG2 E ( Current.Location - ( 15/COS(ABS(Threat.Angle.)) ) ) / ( Threat.Speed +1.18) Variable
33 DDG2 R 42 Variable
34 DDG2 RAM Part A Flyout 15 *  ( TAN(ABS(Threat.Angle.)) ) /.680 Variable
35 DDG2 RAM Part B Flyout Variable
36 DDG2 S Variable
37 DDG2 SM3 Part A Flyout 15*  ( TAN(ABS(Threat.Angle.)) ) /2.67 Variable
38 DDG2 SM3 Part B Flyout Variable
39 ESSM Max Launch Range 56+(Threat.Speed * 40) Variable
40 M Available 8 Variable
41 Frigate ESSM Part A Flyout 200 *  ( TAN(ABS(Threat.Angle.)) ) /1.18 Variable
42 Frigate ESSM Part B Flyout ( Current.Location - ( 200/COS(ABS(Threat.Angle.)) ) ) / ( Threat.Speed +1.18) Variable
43 Frigate RAM Available 42 Variable
44 Frigate RAM Part A Flyout 200 *  ( TAN(ABS(Threat.Angle.)) ) /.680 Variable
45 Frigate RAM Part B Flyout ( Current.Location - ( 200/COS(ABS(Threat.Angle.)) ) ) / ( Threat.Speed +.680) Variable
46 Frigate SM3 Part A Flyout 200 *  ( TAN(ABS(Threat.Angle.)) ) /2.67 Variable
47 Frigate SM3 Part B Flyout ( Current.Location - ( 200/COS(ABS(Threat.Angle.)) ) ) / ( Threat.Speed +2.67) Variable
48 Frigatge SM3 Available 0 Variable
49 Future Threat To Cruiser 1 SQRT(((Future X Location-17)*(Future X Location-17))+((Future Y Location+17)*(Future Y Location+17))) Variable
50 Future Threat To Cruiser 2 SQRT(((Future X Location+21)*(Future X Location+21))+((Future Y Location-21)*(Future Y Location-21))) Variable
51 Future Threat to DDG1 SQRT(((Future X Location+7)*(Future X Location+7))+((Future Y Location-7)*(Future Y Location-7))) Variable
52 Future Threat to DDG2 SQRT(((Future X Location-0)*(Future X Location-0))+((Future Y Location-15)*(Future Y Location-15))) Variable
53 Future Threat to Frigate SQRT(((Future X Location-0)*(Future X Location-0))+((Future Y Location-200)*(Future Y Location-200))) Variable
54 Future X Location COS(Threat.Angle.) * Future.Location.Of.Threat Variable
55 Future Y Location SIN(Threat.Angle.) * Current.Location Variable
M3 Part A Flyout 10 *  ( TAN(ABS
M3 Part B Flyout ( Current.Location - ( 10/COS(ABS(Threat.Angle.-2.356)) ) ) / ( Threat.Speed +2.67)
SSM Avaiable
SSM Part A Flyout 15 *  ( TAN(ABS(Threat.Angle.)) ) /1.18
SSM Part B Fllyout
AM Available
( Current.Location - ( 15/COS(ABS(Threat.Angle.)) ) ) / ( Threat.Speed 
+.680)
M3 Available 16
( Current.Location - ( 15/COS(ABS(Threat.Angle.)) ) ) / ( Threat.Speed 
+2.67)
Frigate ESS







Number NAME Value Type
56 Future.Location.Of.Threat Initial.Range-(Threat.Speed * (TNOW-Entity.CreateTime+10)) Variable
Ram Max Launch Range 17+(Threat.Speed * 45) Variable
59 Threat.To.Cruiser1 SQRT(((X.Location-17)*(X.Location-17))+((Y.Location+17)*(Y.Location+17))) Variable
60 Threat.To.Cruiser2 SQRT(((X.Location+21)*(X.Location+21))+((Y.Location-21)*(Y.Location-21))) Variable
61 Threat.To.DDG1 SQRT(((X.Location+7)*(X.Location+7))+((Y.Location-7)*(Y.Location-7))) Variable
62 Threat.To.DDG2 SQRT(((X.Location-0)*(X.Location-0))+((Y.Location-15)*(Y.Location-15))) Variable
63 Threat.To.Frigate SQRT(((X.Location-0)*(X.Location-0))+((Y.Location-200)*(Y.Location-200))) Variable
64 X.Location COS(Threat.Angle.) * Current.Location Variable
65 Y.Location SIN(Threat.Angle.) * Current.Location Variable
66 Threat.Speed 0.6 Attribute
67 Initial.Range UNIF(250,1000,102) Attribute
68 Threat.Angle UNIF(0, 6.28,103) Attribute
69 Detect.Time Entity.CreateTime Attribute
70 Locally Locate and ID TRIA(1,5,60,100) Delay
71 Report to FORCENet TRIA( 15 , 20 , 200,101 ) Delay
72 IA5 TRIA( 1 , 3 , 30 ) Delay
73 IA Penalty Box5 TRIA( 10 , 15 , 30 ) Delay
74 Update Common Control Picture TRIA(3,5,15,104) Delay
75 IFC TRIA(2,6,30) Queue
Number NAME Value Type
76 IA TRIA( 1 , 3 , 30) Delay
77 IA Penalty Box TRIA( 10 , 15 , 30 ) Delay
78 Electronic Combat TRIA( 20 , 60 , 240) Delay
79 Decison To Shoot From The Each Platform TRIA( 0.5 , 1 , 2) Delay
80 Platform TRIA( 0.1 , .5 , 2) Delay
81 RAM Wait For In Range (Current.Location-Ram Max Launch Range )  / Threat.Speed Delay
82  RAM Spin Up TRIA( 1 , 3 , 10 ) Delay
83 ESSM  Wait For In Range (Threat.To.Cruiser1-ESSM Max Launch Range )  / Threat.Speed Delay
84 ESSM Spin Up TRIA( 3 , 4 , 10 ) Delay
85 SM3  Wait For In Range (Threat.To.Cruiser1-SM3 Max Launch Range )  / Threat.Speed Delay
86 SM3 Spin Up TRIA( 3 , 4 , 10 ) Delay
87 Evaluate Kill TRIA(2,5,10) Delay
88 IA.Good 99% True Decision
89 Real.Not.Real.Threat 50% True Decision
90 EWSuccess 80% True Decision
91 Prox Current.Location > 2 True Decision
57
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 APPENDIX C 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
 
BMA  Automated Battle Management Aids 
C    Air Conditioning 
CTD   Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrator 
ADC    Air Defense Commander 
AEW   Air Expeditionary Wing 
AFD    Architecture Flow Diagram 
AID   Architecture Interconnect Diagram 
ANSI   American National Standards Institute 
Ao   Operational Availability 
AOI    Area of Interest 
AOR    Area of Operation 
ASCM   Anti-Ship Cruise Missile 
ASCMD   Anti-Ship Cruise Missile Defense 
BDA    Battle Damage Assessment 
BG    Battlegroup 
C2    Command and Control 
C4I   Command, Control, Communications, Computers, & Intelligence 
C&C   Command and Control 
CAC   Common Access Card  
CAP   Combat Air Patrol 
CASREP   Casualty Report 
CAT   Category 
CAW   Carrier Air Wing 
CCD   Control Context Diagram 
CEC   Cooperative Engagement Capability 
CENTRIXS   Combined ENTerprise Regional Information eXchange System 





 CG   Guided Missile Cruiser 
I   Configuration Item 
IC    Combat Information Center 
ID   Combat Identification 
IWS   Close-In Weapon System 
M   Cruise Missile 
MD    Cruise Missile Defense 
OA    Course of Action 
ONOPS  Concept of Operations 
OP   Common/Composite Operating Picture 
ORBA  Common Object Request Broker Architecture 
OTS    Commercial off the Shelf 
PA   Closest Point of Approach 
RS   Congressional Research Service 
S   Common Services 
SG    Carrier Strike Group 
CVN   
WC   Composite Warfare Commander 
DCA   Defensive Counter-Air 
DCD   Data Context Diagram 
DDG   Guided Missile Destroyer 
DFD   Data Flow Diagram 
DIS   Data/Information Services 
DoD   Department of Defense 
DoDD    Department of Defense Directive 
ECM   Electronic Countermeasures 
EDM   Engineering Design Model 
EOR   Engage on Remote 
ESG   Expeditionary Strike Group 
ESSM    Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile 
















Carrier Vessel Nuclear 
C
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 EXCOMM   External Com
FCQ  Fire Control Quality 
FFBD   Functiona
FFG  Guided Missile Frigate 
m – Maritime 
ntegration 
c Engineers 
 or Foe 
L
of the Battlespace 
version 6 
eillance, and Reconnaissance 




l Flow Block Diagram 
 
FIFO   First-In, First-Out 
FP   Forward Pass 
FP/C   Force Planning/Coordination 
FTC   Force Track Coordinator 
GAO   General Accounting Office 
GCCS – M   Global Command and Control Syste
GIG    Global Information Grid 
HELO   Helicopter 
HIL   Human-in-the-Loop 
HSI   Human System I
IA   Information Assurance 
ID   Identification 
IEEE   Institute of Electrical and Electroni
IFC   Integrated Fire Control 
IFF   Identification Friend
INTE    Intelligence 
IOCC   Input and Output Control Consoles 
IP   Internet Protocol 
IPB    Intelligence Preparation 
IPT   Integrated Product Team 
IPv-6   Internet Protocol 
ISR   Intelligence, Surv
JLENS   Joint Land Attack Cruise
JEZ   Joint Engagement Zone 
JTAMDO   Joint Theater Air and Missile Defense Organ
JTRS   Joint Tactical Radio System 
JTT   Joint Tactical Terminal 
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 KA   Kill Assessment 









tegrated Warfare Systems 
KWEB   Knowledge Web 
LHA/LHD  Amphibious Assault Ship 
LP   Loop 
LOR   Launch on Remote 
LOS    Line of Sight 
MCP   Mission Capability Packages  
ME    Mission Execution 
MIO    Maritime Interdiction Operation 
MOE    Measures of Effectiveness 
MOP    Measures of Performance 
MOSA   Modular Open Systems App
NPS    Naval Postgraduate School 
NRT   Navy Review Team 
NSWC   Naval Surface Warfare Cente
OA    Open Architecture 
OACE   Open Architecture Computing Environm
OAET   Open Architecture Enterprise T
OMC   Operations Management Cente
OO   Object-Oriented 
OODA   Observe-Orient-Decide-Act
OOPDA   Observe-Orient-Predict-Decide-Ac
OSJTF   Open Systems Joint Task Force
OTH    Over-the-Horizon 
OV   Operational View 
PAD   Planning, Assessment &Decision 
PC   Precision Cue 
Pd   Probability of Detection 
PEO IWS  Program Executive Office of In
Pk   Probability of Kill 
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 POI   Point of Impact 






 Systems Center San Diego 
S  
 
POSIX   PorTable Operating System Interf
PROX   Proximity 
Ps   Probability of Survival 
PSD   Preferred Shooter Det
RAM   Rolling Airframe Missile 
RF   Remote Fire 
ROE   Rules of Engagement 
RV   Radar View 
SA   Situational Awareness 
S&D   Search and Detect 
SATCOM  Satellite Communications 
SCAN   Strategic Creative Analysis 
SEDP   System Engineering Design Pro
SIAP    Single Integrated Air 
S-L-S   Shoot-Look-Shoot  
SM    Standard Missile 
SoS   System of Systems 
SRA   Self Referencing Ac
S-S   Shoot-Shoot  
SSC San Diego Space and Naval Warfare
SS-L- S  Shoot-Shoot-Look-Shoot-Shoot  
SOW   Statement of Work 
SSDS   Ship Self Defense System 
SSN   Submersible Ship Nuclear 
SSPk    Single Shot Probability of Kill 
SWC   Surface Warfare Commander 
SWOT   Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats 
TADIL  Tactical Data Links 
TAMD   Theater Air Missile Defense 
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TOI    Time of Intercept 
TRO    Top Rank Objecti
UAV   Unmanned Air Vehicle 
US    United States
USAF    United States Air Force 
VSD    Value System Design
W/AS    Weapon/Asset Services 
WRT   With regard to 
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